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THE PSYCHIATRIST AND EXECUTION 
COMPETENCY: FORDING MURKY 
ETHICAL WATERS 
Douglas Mossman~ M.D." 
I. INTRODuCTIoN 
Frequently over the last two decades the U. S. Supreme Court 
has seemed troubled by inconsistent and unfair application of the 
death penalty. Reflecting this concern, the Court now requires that 
lower courts consider relevant mitigating evidence, including psy-
chiatric opinions and reports, when rendering capital punishment 
decisions.1 As a result, mental health professionals have a variety 
• Associate Professor of Clinical Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati College of 
Medicine, and Attending Physician, Psychiatry Service, Department of Veterans Affairs 
Medical Center, Cincinnati, Ohio. B.A. Oberlin College, 1976; M.D. University of 
Michigan, 1981. The author thanks Michael L. Perlin, Kathleen J. Hart, and Sidney Moss-
man for their advice, assistance, support, and encouragement. 
Portions of this article formed the bases for presentations at the Department of Psy-
chiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston, South 
Carolina, April, 1988; the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Psychiatry and 
the Law, San Francisco, Califomia, October, 1988; and the Department of Psychiatry, 
University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, Cincinruiti, Ohio, November, 1988. 
1. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 302, 320-30 (1989) (holding that unless the 
jury is instructed to consider mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood 
abuse, jurors are deprived of a way to express a reasoned moral choice not to impose the 
death penalty); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (holding that the sentenc-
ing authority must consider any relevant mitigating evidence), cerro denied, 470 U.S. 1051 
1 
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of awkward yet crucial roles in capital punishment decisions. 
Supreme Court rulings have firmly established the role of 
mental health testimony in the sentencing of capital defendants.2 In 
1972, disturbed by the "arbitrary and capricious" manner in which 
the death sentence was being imposed, the Court declared all exist-
ing death penalty statutes unconstitutional. 3 State legislatures re-
(1985); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (stating that the sentencer must not be 
prevented from considering, in mitigating a death sentence, Many aspect of a defendant's 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that defendant proffers"). 
See also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 3 MENTAL DISABILITY LAw: CIViL AND CRIMINAL § 17.08 
(1989) [hereinafter MENTAL DISABILITY LAw] (noting states' reactions to five Supreme 
Court decisions which held that the death penalty is constitutional only if the sentencer 
possesses individua1ized information and is directed by clear standards). See generally Paul 
S. Appelbaum, Psychiatrists' Role in the Death Penalty, 32 Hosp. COMMUNITY PSYCHIA-
TRY 761, 761 (1981) (stating that it is unclear whether psychiatric testimony makes the 
capital sentencing process fairer and more consistent); James S. Liebman & Michael J. 
Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate-: Mental Dis-
order as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 791-94 (1978) (summarizing the role of 
mental disability as a mitigating factor in AnglO-American law prior to the twentieth 
century). 
Professor Perlin believes that the Supreme Court's view of the role of the psychiatric 
opinion is confused and that its decisions reflect widely-shared, ambivalent, and ambiguous 
feelings about the mentally ill and the death penalty. See, Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme 
Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatric Testimony in Death Penalty 
Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot's Achilles Heel, 3 
N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 91 (1985) [hereinafter Barefoot's Ake]; Michael L. Perlin, 
The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: 
RJJndom Decisions, Hidden RJJtionales, or "Doctrinal Abyss?-, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987) 
[hereinafter Doctrinal Abyss]. The Mrelative paucity of executions and the elaborate proce-
dural requirements applicable in capital cases suggest a profound societal ambivalence on 
the subject That ambivalence affects both the judges who must enforce laws which pro-
duce intense moral dilemmas and a public which seems to want some executions, but not 
too many." Jonathan L. Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, and the Death Penalty: A Note on 
Implementing Supreme Court Decisions, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218, 238 (1988) 
(citation omitted). 
2. See infra notes 5-16. 
3. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). Furman represented three consol-
idated cases in which black defendants were sentenced to death. Id. at 252-53. While the 
short per curiam opinion in Furman gave no reasons for the Court's decision, fears of 
racial prejudice were present in the concurring opinions of several justices. Justice Doug-
las. for example, cited a study of U.S. capital cases which concluded that M'some suspi-
cion of racial discrimination can hardly be avoided.'" Id. at 250 n.15. Later, the Court 
rejected a similar study which purported to show a disparity in the imposition of the 
death penalty based on the race of both the murder victim and the defendant McClesky 
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987), cert. granted, 496 U.S. 904 (1990), aJl'd, 111 S. 
Ct. 1454 (1991) (denying second habeas corpus ~tition). Assuming the validity of the 
study, the court rejected it as evidence that the death penalty was capriciously or arbitrari-
ly applied because the study was insufficient to support the inference that the death penal-
ty was imposed with a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 292-97. 
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sponded by enacting mandatory death penalty statutes that allowed 
little or no discretion in applying the law, but the Supreme Court 
ultimately deemed this approach unacceptable as well.4 In Lockett 
v. Ohios the Court held that when imposing the death penalty, 
sentencers could not be prevented from considering mitigating 
factors such as information about personality and character supplied 
by mental health experts.6 Judges are now required to instruct 
jurors in death penalty cases about the nature and relevance of 
mitigating circumstances.' As a result, psychiatric opinion concern-
ing the impact of a defendant's background and the likelihood of 
future dangerousness8 may play an important part in jurors' deci-
sions about whether to impose the death penalty.9 That such opin-
4. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 600 (1978) (discussing state responses to Furman). 
The Ohio statutes overturned in Lockett were Omo REv. CODB ANN. §§ 2929.03 -
2929.04 (1975). See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589. For examples of other states with mandato-
ry death sentences which were subsequently overturned.. see, e.g., Woodson v. North Car0-
lina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (overturning N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Stat. 1975». In 
Woodson, the defendants were convicted of murder committed during the course of an 
armed robbery of a convenience store. Id. at 282-83. Under the North Carolina statute, in 
such circumstances the defendants were to Mbe punished with death." Id. at 286 (quoting 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975». The Supreme Court held that the imposi-
tion of capital punishment without allowing a level of discretion for the decisionmaker is 
unconstitutional because such laws Mdepart[] markedly from contemporary standards re-
specting the imposition of the penalty of death •••• " Id. at 301. See also Rockwell v. 
Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101 (Cal. 1976) (overturning Penal Code §§ 190 - 190.3, 
which allowed imposition of the death penalty when the defendant commited murder un-
der Mspecial circumstances." 556 Pold at 1104.) The Rockwell defendant, who was convict-
ed of murder in conjunction with attempted rape, qualified for the death penalty. Id. The 
California Supreme Court found the statues unconstitutional because they called for the 
mandatory imposition of the death penalty without providing for consideration of mitigat-
ing evidence or personal characteristics of the defendant. Id. at 1116. 
5. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
6. Id. at 604. 
7. See Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the judge 
must instruct the jury about mitigating circumstances or guide the jury toward considering 
such circumstances), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982). 
8. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of 
TEX. CRIM. FRoc. CODB ANN. § 37.071(2) (West Supp. 1976». The statute in Jurek re-
quired juries to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant would threaten s0-
ciety through future acts of criminal violence. MWhat is essential is that the jury have 
before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it 
must determine." Id. 
9. See Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in 
Virginia, 66 VA. L. REv. 167, 174 (1980) (by"requiring individualization of death penalty 
decisions, the Supreme Court Mhas virtually assured routine participation by mental health 
professionals, especially psychiatrists, in the sentencing phase of capital murder trials"); C. 
Robert Showalter & Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital Sentencing: Risks and 
Responsibilities in a Unique Legal Setting, 12 BUll.. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159, 
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ion has been roundly criticized in both medical and legal litera-
turelO has not dissuaded the Court from allowing its admission as 
evidence.ll The increasing importance of mental health testimony 
in capital trials was recognized in Ake v. Oklahoma,12 a decision 
in which the Supreme Court explicitly condoned an extensive role 
for mental health professionals in assisting counsel for capital de-
fendants. 13 In Ake, the defendant's attorney informed the court 
that he would raise an insanity defense and requested the state pay 
for a psychiatric evaluation, claiming such an evaluation was guar-
anteed by the U.S. Constitution.14 The request was denied even 
though the defendant's behavior immediately following arrest was 
so "bizarre" that the court sua sponte had him evaluated and sub-
sequently committed to a psychiatric hospita1.IS "The examining 
psychiatrist reported: 'At times [Ake] appear[ed] to be frankly 
delusional .... He claim[ed] to be the 'sword of vegence of the 
Lord and that he [would] sit at the left hand of God in 
heaven. ",16 Without the psychiatrist's diagnosis that Ake was a 
paranoid schizophrenic, he would have been executed. 
160 (1984) (language of recent death penalty statutes renders psychiatric testimony 
indispensible). 
10. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association, at 14, 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080) [hereinafter Barefoots Brief] 
(stating long-tenn predictions of dangeronsness should be based on Mpredil;tive statistical 
or actuarial infonnation that is fundamentally non-medical in nature"); Bruce J. Ennis & 
Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the 
Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693, 734-735 (1976) (MPsychiatrists have absolutely no ex-
pertise in predicting dangerous behavior - indeed, they !nay be less accurate predictors 
than laymen - and •.. they usually err in overpredicting violence."). See generally 
MENTAL DISABILITY LAw, supra note 1, §§ 2.14, 2.15, 17.13 (discussing empirical studies 
assessing the accuracy of psychiatric predictions of dangeronsness and the accuracy of 
psychiatric diagnoses, the debate over the role of mental health professionals, and the 
Supreme Court's response); George E. Dix, Clinical Evaluation of the -Dangerousness- of 
"Normal" Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REv. 523 (1980) (discussing problems posed 
by clinical prediction of dangeronsness of persons not afflicted with traditional mental 
illness). 
11. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898-903 (froding psychiatric testimony admissible to 
prove future dangeronsness, despite the argument, supported by the American Psychiatric 
Association [MAPA"], as amicus, that such predictions are unreliable). 
12. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
13. [d. at 83 (holding that when a defendant shows that his Msanity at the time of the 
offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the 
defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination 
~d assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense"). 
14. [d. at 72. 
15. [d. at 71. 
16. [d. 
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These rulings have both increased the importance of participa-
tion by mental health professionals in capital punishment cases and 
focused attention on the ethical problems17 they face. Two other 
recent Supreme Court cases have raised troublesome issues for 
psychiatrists who may be called upon to evaluate or treat inmates 
for whom execution is imminent In 1986, a sharply-splintered 
Court ruled that executing Alvin Ford, a Florida inmate who had 
become psychotic1s while awaiting execution, would violate the 
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment 19 The Court also ruled that Florida's procesg2o for deter-
17. For discussions on ethical problems raised by Ake for mental health professionals 
who provide forensic services, see Paul S. Appelbaum, In the Wake of Ake: The Ethics 
of Expert Testimony in an Advocate's World, IS Buu.. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. IS 
(1987) (discussing whether after Ake, psychiatrists must act as advocates for the defense 
and, if not, whether their impartiaIity is still affected); Stephen Rachlin, From Impartial 
Expert to Adversary in the Wake of Ake, 16 Buu.. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 2S 
(1988) (arguing that psychiatrists should not lose their objectivity and be influenced by 
the possible outcome of the case). But see Paul S. Appelbaum, The Parable of the Foren-
sic Psychiatrist: Ethics and the Problem of Doing Harm, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 
249 (1990) [hereinafter .Appelbaum's Parable] (stating that forensic psychiatrists are gov-
emed by different ethical principles than psychiatrists). 
18. MPsychotic" is defined as 
[g]ross impairment in reality testing and the creation of a new reality • • • • 
When a person is psychotic, he or she incorrectly evaluates the accuracy of his 
or her perceptions and thoughts and makes incorrect inferences about extemaI 
reality, even in the face of contrary evidence • • • • 
Direct evidence of psychotic behavior is the presence of either delusions 
or hallucinations (without insight into their pathological nature). The term psy-
chotic is sometimes appropriate when a person's behavior is so grossly disorga-
nized that a reasonable inference can be made that reality testing is markedly 
disturbed. Examples include markedly incoherent speech without apparent aware-
ness by the person that the speech is not understandable • • • • 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRlC AsSOCIATION, D~GNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MEN-
TAL DlSORDERS 404 (3d ed. rev. 1987). 
19. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405-410 (1986), reh'g denied, Ford v. State, 
522 So. 2d 34S (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction reliei), cert. denied sub nom, Ford v. 
Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). 
A subsequent decision, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320-30 (1989), touched on 
a related issue - the constitutionality of executing the mentally retarded. Despite stating 
that it may be cruel and unusual punishment to execute individuals who are severely 
retarded, a majority felt that the protection provided by the insanity defense made it un-
likely that such persons would be subject to punishment. Id. at 333. In her. concurring 
opinion, Justice O'Connor could not conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibits exe-
cuting all mentally retarded persons based solely on their mental retardation; instead, the 
court would need to make an individualized determination of personal responsibility in 
each case. Id. at 340. Penry holds that mental retardation does not automatica11y preclude 
execution, but Penry fails to distinguish between incompetence stemming from mental re-
tardation and incomp«?tence brought on by mental illness. The symptoms of mental illness 
are often ameliorated by psychotropic medication. Unlike mental illness, mental retardation 
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mining whether Ford was competent to be executed was inade-
quate.21 However, no majority could agree on what an adequate 
process might be.22 
In 1990, the Supreme Court was presented with an issue antic-
ipated23 but not addressed in Ford: whether a state can force an 
incompetent inmate to take medication that would render him com-
petent to be executed. After agreeing in March, 1990 to hear Perry 
v. Louisiana,24 the Court - using reasoning one commentator 
is not remediated by medication. See also MENTAL DISABILITY LAw, supra note 1, 
§17.06A (Supp. 1990) (discussing Penry); cf. AMERICAN BAR AsS'N, ABA CRIMlNAL Jus-
nCE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-5.6(b) at 290, 293 (1989) [hereinafter ABA 
STANDARDS] (rejecting the use of the tenn insanity and employing the tenn incompetent), 
discussed infra, note 28. 
20. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 & Supp. 1992); see infra text accompanying notes 
69-70 (summarizing the process). 
21. Ford, 477 U.S. at 413-16. The Court noted three defects in Florida's procedures: 
"1) failing to include the prisoner in the truth-seeking process, 2) denying the prisoner 
any opportunity to challenge or impeach the state-appointed psychiatrists' opinions, and 3) 
placing the final decision wholly within the Executive Branch." ld. 
22. For a summary and discussion of the Justices' differing opinions on appropriate 
procedures in Ford, see Mental Disability Law, supra note I, §§ 17.05-17.06. 
23. Numerous authors writing before and after the Ford decision analyzed both the 
legal and ethical problems connected with restoring the competence of inmates whose 
mental illness, if left untreated, rendered them safe from execution. See, e.g., Douglas 
Mossman, Assessing and Restoring Competency to be Executed: Should Psychiatrists Par-
ticipate?, 5 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 397 (1987) (raising objections to psychiatric participation 
but arguing that evaluation and treatment by psychiatrists of condemned inmates does not 
conflict with ethical standards); Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, Ethics and the 
Psychiatric Determination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 37, 49 (1986); Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law 
and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REv. 35, 76-100 (1986) (anticipating the issues of 
who should determine whether a condemnee is competent, and who should treat that 
condemnee, as problems associated with the decision to restore a prisoner to competence). 
24. 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating the judgment to execute and remanding "for further 
consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210 (1990)]"), reh'g denied, 
111 S.Ct. 804 (1991), affd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-KP-1324, 1992 WL 
296230 (La. Oct. 19, 1992) (holding that Perry could not be forcibly medicated to re-
stored competency for the purposes of execution). 
Perry was not the rust post-Ford case, or even the first Louisiana case, in which 
the Court was asked to deal with issues addressed in Ford. In April, 1988, Leslie 
LowenfIeld, a Louisiana condemnee, petitioned the Court for a stay of execution based on 
his incompetence; his application was denied. LowenfIeld v. Butler, 485 U.S. 995 (1988). 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan noted that LowenfIeld supported his appli-
cation with the sworn affidavit of a clinical psychologist who had examined him for five 
hours. The state trial and supreme courts denied LowenfIeld's application without offering 
any refuting evidence or reason. ld. at 995-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The district court 
subsequently denied LowenfIeld's application for habeas relief based on an "extended 
conversation" with the psychologist and ruled that LowenfIeld was competent to be exe-
cuted. ld. at 996 (citation omitted). The court of appeals affirmed the decision; its opinion 
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found "particularly puzzling"2S - ordered the 19th Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Louisiana to reconsider Perry's case in light of 
Washington v. Harper,26 a decision issued by the Supreme Court 
in February, 1990 which held that a prison inmate with a serious 
mental illness may be forcibly treated with antipsychotic drugs.27 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court -a mere ftfteen minutes before the scheduled execution." 
Id. On April 13, 1988, -[a]t 1:05 a.m., with petitioner already strapped in the electric 
chair, th[e] Court denied his application for a stay of execution •••• At 1:25 a.m. peti-
tioner was pronounced dead • • • before • • • [the Court] voted on the certiorari petition 
that accompanied petitioner's stay application." Id. at 999 (citation omitted). 
Commenting on these events, Iustice Brennan stated, -every court that has considered 
petitioner's insanity claim has made a mockery of this Court's precedent and of the most 
fundamental principles of ordered justice." Id. at 996. He added: 
The haste that attended disposition of this case is reprehensible. It is 
hardly surprising that a case scudding through the state courts in 24 hours 
should yield orders devoid of law or logic - !he ones in this case simply 
read, -DENIED" • • • And simple arithmetic suggests grave injustice when the 
Court of last resort takes 15 minutes to read and analyze 17 pages of opinions 
from the court below and cast a vote on life or death • • • • 
Regrettably, this case is not atypical. It is the natural product of a penal 
system conducive to inaccurate factfroding and shoddy analysis • • • • Even 
were I not convinced that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and 
unusual punishment • • • , I would have no part of a penal system that permits 
a State's interest in meting out death on schedule to convert our constitutional 
duty to dispense justice into a license to dispense with it. 
Id. at 999-1000 (citations omitted). 
25. Linda Greenhouse, New Hearing on Forced Medication of Inmate, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Nov. 14, 1990, at MO. 
26. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
27. Id. at 226-27. Although Harper was not a death penalty case, it did address the 
issue of whether prison offtcials can medicate prison inmates against their will for purpos-
es of prison administration and security. The majority in Harper found that the 14th 
Amendment's due process clause gives inmates a -signiftcant liberty interest" in avoiding 
tmwanted medication, but that, nevertheless, a state may -treat a prison inmate who has a 
serious mental illness with anti-psychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous 
to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." Id. 
Greenhouse frods the Court's reasoning in Perry puzzling in view of the fact that 
the Harper decision was issued before the Court agreed to hear Perry: -In fact, the Court 
had deferred acting on the Louisiana case for months last term, while the Washington 
case was under consideration." Greenhouse, supra note 25, at A30. She speculates that the 
Court was deadlocked 4 to 4 in the case, because Iustice David H. Souter, who joined 
the Court after Perry was argued, could not participate. "A tie would have automatically 
upheld the state court permitting the inmate • • . to be medicated and executed. By con-
trast. [the Court's] action vacates the lower court's decision and bars the execution tmtil 
constitutional question is resolved in a new round of appeals." Id. 
Dr. Paul Appelbaum speculates that the Supreme Court might be asking the lower 
court to expand the factual elements in Perry that are relevant in light of Harper: -[t]he 
record is devoid of information about Perry's dangerousness, whether he meets Louisiana's 
commitment criteria, or whether it would be in his best medical interest to be treated, .. 
which are the Harper criteria for a the involuntary treatment of an inmate. Rojean Wag-
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Ford and Perry raise a host of practical and procedural prob-
lems for mental health professionals who may be called upon to 
evaluate or treat potentially incompetent prisoners. These problems, 
which the Court has left unaddressed so far, include the legal 
standard for execution incompetence/8 the method for selecting 
competency evaluators, the method and detail with which evalua-
tors should examine prisoners, the nature of adequate representation 
for prisoners undergoing competency evaluations, the proper forum 
for hearing evaluators' findings, the proper scope of mental health 
expert testimony, and the procedure for initiating treatment of pris-
oners found incompetent.29 Although these problems are important 
and nettlesome, they are logically secondary to an ethical question 
ner, Supreme Court Sends Involuntary Medication Case Back to Louisiana. 8 PSYCHIATRIC 
TiMEs, January, 1991, at 55 (quoting Dr. Appelbaum). 
28. The American Bar Association [M ABA"] recommends that a convict be deemed 
Mincompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the 
convict cannot understand the nature of the pending proceedings, what he or she was 
tried for, the reason for the punishment, or the the nature of the punishment[,]" or cannot 
Mrecognize or understand any fact • • . which would make the punishment unjust or un-
lawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counselor to the court." ABA 
STANDARDS, supra note 19, Standard 7-5.6. TIlls language was adapted from Justice 
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20 n.3 (1950) (hold-
ing that it is not a denial of due process to leave the question of a convicted individual's 
sanity to the governor, who has the aid of experts). The ABA also suggests standards for 
selecting evaluators and procedures for hearing their testimony. See ABA STANDARDS, 
supra note 19, Standard 7-5.7. 
29. For discussion of the special problems raised by Ford regarding informed consent 
for evaluations, conflicts of interest and the proper scope of psychiatric testimony, see 
Ward, supra note 23, at 76-81. For discussion on current Florida procedures for evaluat-
ing and treating an incompetent condemned prisoner, see Michael L. Radelet & George 
W. Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent for Execution: Ethical Chaos with Only 
One Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 297, 298, 301-03 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Ethical Chaos]. For guidelines concerning clinicians' decisionmaking about whether to 
participate in the assessment of incompetence and methods for undertaking evaluations and 
providing testimony, see Kirk S. Heilbrun & Harry A. McCIaren, Assessment of Compe-
tency for Execution? A Guide for Mental Health Professionals, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 205 (1988). For some provisional guidelines that clinicians might use 
when gathering information about execution incompetence, see William D. Kenner, Compe-
tency on Death Row, 8 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 253, 254 (1986). For discussions of 
issues related to appropriate legal procedures, see Paul F. Enzinna & Jana L. Gill, Capital 
Punishment and the Incompetent: Procedures for Determining Competency to Be Executed 
After Ford v. Wainwright, 41 FLA. L. REV. llS (1989); Rachelle Deckert Dick, Note, 
Ford v. Wainwright: Warning - Sanity on Death Row May Be Hamrdous to Your 
Health, 47 LA. L. REV. 1351 (1987); Stephen L. Ihm, Note, Ford v. Wainwright: The 
Eighth Amendment, Due Process and Insanity on Death Row, 7 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 
103-ll2 (1987) [hereinafter Due Process and Insanity]; Gordon L. Moore III. Comment, 
Ford v. Wainwright: A Coda in the Executioner's Song, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1461, 1470-82 
(1987) [hereinafter Iowa Comment]. 
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which psychiatrists must answe~ before practical and procedural 
issues become relevant: may psychiatrists "ethically . . . participate 
at all"31 in the evaluation or treatment of the condemned? 
A substantial number of professionals believe that "this arena 
is no place for a psychiatrist to function, that it downgrades the 
profession, and that all psychiatrists should refuse to participate" in 
such proceedings.32 Overall, the profession is divided as to wheth-
er participation in the evaluation and treatment of condemnees is 
ethical. During a debate conducted at the American Psychiatric 
Association's 1987 Annual Meeting, an audience poll showed lis-
teners to be evenly split on the matter.33 A subsequent survey of 
psychiatrists found that a slight majority felt that participation was 
30. For much of the rest of this discussion, this article refers to ethical problems faced 
by psychiatrists, even though they comprise only a sub-group of the mental health pro-
fessionals who might be involved in the evaluation and treatment of condemned prisoners. 
As physicians, psychiatrists are the sole mental health professionals who could order med-
ication for an incompetent condemnee against his will (nurses might share respoDSlDility 
for administering such medication); medication is likely to be the core of treatment for 
prisoners whose mental disorders are severe enough to make them incompetent for execu-
tion. See, e.g., infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text (discussing the role of medication 
in maintaining a prisoner's competency). Psychiatrists must also recognize moral obliga-
tions they share with other physicians and hold themselves bound by ethical codes 
uniquely applicable to physicians. See infra text at notes 129, 151, and 180-188 (discuss-
ing the Hippocratic Oath and the American Psychiatric Association Code of Ethics). De-
spite some inter-professional pOints of difference, however, the ethical issues confronted by 
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals overlap extensively. This article's focus 
on ethical problems for psychiatrists is intended primarily to simplify exposition. Many of 
the ethical difficulties faced by psychiatrists who deal with the condemned are very simi-
lar to those faced by other mental health professionals. See infra text accompanying notes 
334-43. 
Indeed, attorneys representing the condemned face problems similar to those con-
fronted by psychiatrists treating the condemned, particularly where the issues of inferring 
prisoners' desires or best interests are concemed. For a discussion of these issues, see 
Richard 1. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscientious Absten-
. tion, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 
67, 68-75 (1990). 
31. Ward, supra note 23, at 76 (emphasis added). 
32. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 45 (citation omitted). See also Louis 10110 
West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, 45 AM. 1. ORlHOPSYCHlATRY 689 
(1975) (arguing that capital punishment is outdated, immoral, and unjust and that medical 
professionals should declare participation unethical); Questioning Psychiatry's Role in 
Death Penalty Cases (mterview with Doudlas A. Sargeant), PSYCHIATRY '86 at 3 (Decem-
ber, 1986) [hereinafter Questioning Psychiatry's Role] (asserting that Ma fair reading of the 
ethics of our profession should ban participation in executions"). 
33. K. Hansman, Forensic Expens Debate Ethics of Restoring Prisoners' Competency 
to Allow Their Execution, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (lune 5, 1987) 15, 21 (discussing the de-
bate between four leading forensic psychiatrists over the ethics of treating incompetent, 
condemned inmates). 
HeinOnline -- 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 10 1992-1993
10 CASE WESTERN RESERVE L.4W REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
ethically permissible.34 The American Psychiatric Association's 
Council on Law and Psychiatry reacted ambivalently to Ford. 
"After much discussion, the council was unable to agree, on the 
basis of principle, whether psychiatric participation in the evalua-
tion and treatment of persons sentenced to execution is consistent 
with ethical standards.,,35 The changing views of the Council's 
chainnan, Dr. Paul Appelbaum, further demonstrate just how per-
plexing psychiatrists have found this problem. Initially, he believed 
that both evaluation and treatment were unethical;36 now he views 
evaluation, but not treatment, of the condemned to be consistent 
with physicians' moral and social obligations.37 This latter posi-
tion is consistent with that taken by the American Psychiatric As-
sociation [" AP A"] and the American Medical Association [" AMA"] 
in an amicus curiae brief filed in Perry.38 
The focus of this article is whether it is ethical for physicians 
to participate in the evaluation or treatment of condemned prisoners 
who are incompetent. According to Ward, this may be the "ulti-
mate question,,39 faced by psychiatrists who are asked to deal 
with execution competency. This article is not intended to offer an 
answer to this question.40 Rather, it seeks to (1) elucidate issues 
34. A clear majority of the psychiatrists polled saw no ethical problem in evaluating 
competency to be executed, and a slight majority felt that treatment to restore competency 
posed no problem. A substantial minority, however, thought that treatment was ethically 
problematic or contrary to personal moral standards. Robert Weinstock, Controversial 
Ethical Issues in Forensic Psychiatry: A Survey, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 176 (1988). 
35. Loren H. Roth. 17ze Council on Psychiatry and lAw, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 411, 
412 (1987). 
36. Dr. Appelbaum previously believed that a psychiatrist who participated in evalua-
tion or treatment of the incompetent condemned M'abandon[ed] his role as healer' and 
acted as the 'final certifying stamp' for the prisoner's execution." Hansman, supra note 
33, at 15 (quoting Paul S. Appelbaum, Remarks at the Debate at the APA Annual Meet-
ing (1987». See also Panel Discussion, 17ze Death Penalty: Dilemmas for Physicians and 
Society - a Panel Discussion, 50 nm PHARos OF ALPHA OMEGA ALPHA HONOR MEI>I-
CAL SOCIElY, Summer 1987, at 23-27. 
37. Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 256-57. 
38. Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and the American Medical Ass0-
ciation as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at 25, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 
(1990) (No. 89-5120) [hereinafter APA/AMA Brief] (stating that the state cannot medicate 
a condemned inmate only for the purposes of capital punishment). 
39. Ward, supra note 23, at 76. 
40. In an earlier article I argued that if one Mpresume[s] that capital punishment can 
be, under some conditions, justified," both evaluation and participation are ethical. Moss-
man, supra note 23, at 407. I suggested Mthat those who decry such proceedings are also 
voicing an aversion to executions." lti. However, I wish I had made clearer that I oppose 
capital punishment on moral grounds and, therefore, oppose psychiatrists· participation in 
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connected to the "ultimate question's" resolution. (2) articulate a . 
set of premises within which psychiatrists should evaluate their 
relationship to institutions whose purposes include punishing crimi-
nals, and (3) suggest that, if the death penalty itself is just, then 
there are no coherent ethical objections to psychiatric 
participation. 41 Part II of this article offers a brief review of the 
sociopolitical issues that provide the context for Ford and Perry, as 
well as brief summaries of those cases. Part ill summarizes four 
types of arguments that advance the view that psychiatric participa-
tion is unethical and shows how these arguments are internally 
execution competency proceedings. Professor Richard Bonnie believes that opposition 10 
psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings, along with opposition 10 
other aspects of capital punishment (e.g., opposition 10 executing those who commit capi-
tal crimes as minors or who are retarded but legally sane), is really opposition 10 the 
death penalty. Conversation with Professor Richard Bonnie (May 14, 1990.) Although I 
suspect many would endorse this view, most mental health professionals who have argued 
against participation by psychiatrists have not explicitly opposed capital punishment. In-
stead, their arguments are silent on the morality of the death penalty itself. See, e.g., Kirk 
Heilbnm et a!., The Debate on Treating Individuals Incompetent for Execution, 149 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 596, 597 (1992) (voicing opposition 10 the manner in which the death 
penalty "is currently practiced," but avoiding taking an explicit, principled opinion on the 
morality of capital punishment). See infra text accompanying notes 107-135. 
, Psychiatrists, I believe, have a special obligation 10 be honest with others and them-
selves. Many psychiatrists are ambivalent about implicitly endorsing punishment as an 
institution, insofar as punishment involves inflicting an evil or harm on others. See, e.g., 
Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 250 (asking "if psychiatrists are committed to 
doing good and avoiding harm, how can they participate in legal proceedings from which 
harm may result?"). As this article explains, by viewing punishment as 'doing harm,' we 
misconstrue the decision 10 hold someone accountable. See infra notes 120, 293-294 and 
accompanying text. 
Confusion about the justification of punishment and the ethics of holding patients 
accountable for their actions may create some of the ambivalence psychiatrists have about 
viewing their patients as responsible for assaults. For discussions of this problem, see 
John O. Beahrs, Legal Duties of Psychiatric Patients, 18 BUll.. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY 
& L. 189, 198-99 (1990) (stating that patients should retain their duties created by an im-
plied contract between the patient and the psychiatrist but that, in practice, involuntary 
patients are likely 10 be held 10 a lower standard of responsibility); Seymore L. Halleck, 
The Concept of Responsibility in Psychotherapy, 36 AM. J. PSYCHOTIfERAPY 292 (1982) 
(arguing that the issue of responsibility is dealt with inconsistently and suggesting a mod-
el 10 think about free will in a practical, rather than an absolute, way); Seymour L. 
Halleck, Responsibility and Excuse in Medicine and lAw: A Utilitarian Perspective, 49 
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 127 (challenging determinate sentencing and 
proposing the use of a medical model of criminal justice that stresses utilitarian princi-
ples). 
41. This is not 10 suggest that psychiatrists, therefore, would be morally obligated 10 
participate. They might refuse 10 do so for a variety of reasons, such as finding partic-
ipation repugnant or emotionally intolerable. See, e.g., Ethical Choos, supra note 29, at 
303-04 (discussing how mental health professionals treating Gary Alvord, a condemned, 
incompetent inmate, were emotionally lorn). 
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inconsistent and are contradicted by our intuitions about the "right" 
course of action in other situations. Part IV discusses the ethical 
justification of retributive punishment in a reasonably fair42 crimi-
nal justice system. Particular attention is given to those issues that 
might trouble psychiatrists contemplating evaluation or treatment of 
the potentially incompetent condemned. Part V suggests in a rea-
sonably fair criminal justice system, psychiatrists can assume that a 
condemned criminal has given his hypothetical rational consent to 
evaluation and treatment, and that this consent provides a moral 
authorization for psychiatric participation in execution competency 
proceedings. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Sociology and Statistics 
Opinion polls consistently show that at the most general level, 
the American public overwhelmingly supports the use of the death 
penalty.43 When pollsters probe more specific issues, however, 
this picture changes somewhat A majority of the public supports 
mandatory execution for partiCUlar crimes; however, only a fraction 
of this group is willing to specify the crimes to which the penalty 
should be mandatorily applied.44 In addition, even fewer persons, 
42. For a discussion of what is implied by a -reasonably fair" system, see infra note 
230. 
43. Laura A. Kiernan, After Decades Without It, Is Death Penalty Necessary?, BoSTON 
GLOBE, April 26, 1992, New Hampshire Weekly, at 2 (stating that in a 1991 Gallup poll, 
"76% of adult Americans said they favored the death penalty for murder, ••• [a] number 
[that] has remained constant for eight years."); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Death Penalty Laws 
Retum Amid Rising Debate in U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, June 14, 1981, at 1 (offering Gallup 
poll evidence that 66% of Americans favor the death penalty); FRANK G. CARRINGTON, 
NEl1HER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 58-60 (1979) (citing Gallup and Harris polls for the years 
1976 and 1977, which found that at least 65% of Americans supported capital punish-
ment); Recent Survey Research Data on the Death Penalty, in THE DEAnI PENALTY IN 
AMERICA 85, 85-88 (Hugo A. Bedau ed, 3d ed 1982) [hereinafter Recent Survey] (atti-
tudes toward capital punishment for persons convicted of murder were examined by vari-
ous demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, race, religion, education and income; 
in all categories except race, support for the death penalty was greater than 2:1, while for 
race, opposition was either greater or equal to support). But see Anthony N. Doob & 
Julian V. Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes, and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 
16 CAN. J. BEHAv. SCI. 269, 277 (1984) (The public's concerns about leniency in sen-
tencing reflect impressions left by the mass media, not courts' actual behavior; thus, poli-
cy makers should not accept these attitudes at face value, but should recognize that con-
cerns about judicial leniency are -founded upon incomplete and frequently inaccurate news 
accounts."). 
44. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Capital Punishment: A 
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as jurors, would sentence convicts to death.4s The public also is 
quite ignorant about, and has little interest in, many of the details 
of capital punishment 46 These findings suggest to Entin that "the 
death penalty remains in force mostly as a symbol of opposition to 
crime and disorder.H47 He believes that public acceptance of the 
ancient prohibition against executing the incompetent shows that 
"the rule . . . serves an important social function . . . . [It] oper-
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists, 29 CRIME & DELINQ: 
116, 126-137 (1983) (64% percent of the respondents indicated that they would definitely 
or probably vote for the death penalty; however, support for mandatory execution for a 
specific crime ranged from a high of 57.4% in the case of a mass murder, to a low of 
32.0% for murder committed during a robbety); Neil Vidmar & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, 
Research on Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, in THE DEATII PENALTY IN AMERICA 
68 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (mdicating that higher support for capital punish-
ment on a general level relative to lower support for capital punishment on a more spe-
cific level may reflect the hypothesis that people favor the idea of capital punishment but 
not the implications). 
45. Vidmar & Ellsworth, supra note 44, at 83-84 (45% of subjects questioned gener-
ally about capital punishment indicated their support for the death penalty; when asked to 
assume the position of a juror in a trial where the defendant had been found guilty of a 
vety serious crime, only eight percent indicated that they would vote for the death penal-
ty); Recent Survey, supra note 43, at 85, 90 (39% of individuals questioned reported that, 
as jurors, they would vote guilty Meven though the defendant would automatically receive 
the death penalty; nationally, general support for the death penalty was 60%). 
46. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 362 (1972) (Marshall, 1., concurring) (Americans 
"know almost nothing about capital punishment.); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
232 (1976) (Marshall, 1., dissenting) (If the public "were better informed they would 
consider [the death penalty] shocking, unjust, and unacceptable.); Neil Vidmar & Tony 
Dittenhoffer, lnfonned Public Opinion & Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CAN. 1. CiuMINoLO-
GY 43, 52 (1981) ("[O]n the whole[,] if the public were informed, opinion polls would 
show more people opposrmg1 • • • capital punishment than favorrmg1 it.). See also Rob-
ert M. Bohm et aI., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall Hy-
potheses, 28 1. REs. CRIME & DELINQ. 360, 369-370 (1991) (finding that during the 
pretest phase of experimentation, the 272 subjects were able to answer only 52% of 
knowledge questions correctly; no knowledge question was answered correctly by more 
than 67.3% of the subjects and only half of the 14 questions were answered correctly by 
more than 50% of the subjects); Ellsworth & Ross. supra note 38, at 139-145, 161 (con-
cluding that Mrespondents [to the survey] had little knowledge of the factual issues [sur-
rounding the death penalty,] • • • and their willingness to admit this ignorance may indi-
cate that they did not feel that factual knowledge is vel)' important); Austin Sarat & Neil 
Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Mar-
shall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171, 184-187 (72% of experimental subjects knew 
that there were people awaiting execution. However, knowledge of the application and 
deterrent value of capital punishment and its effects on those sentenced to die, issues 
which Marshall deemed relevant to the formation of an informed opinion, was consider-
ably lower. Only 36% of subjects were familiar with deterrence arguments. Such findings 
indicate that people are moderately well-informed about -how capital punishment is ap-
plied, but are less well-informed about its effects.). 
47. Entin, supra note 1, at 239. 
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ates to reduce the class of persons subject to execution," and thus 
"diminishes our larger ambivalence" about the use of the death 
penalty.48 
The Supreme Court appears to share this ambivalence. Al-
though, since Furman, no majority of justices has been willing to 
declare capital punishment unconstitutional,49 the Court generally 
has affirmed elaborate post-conviction procedural requirements that 
have slowed the pace of executions. Several justices who object to 
abolishing capital punishment judicially appear to support eliminat-
ing it legislatively.50 The Court's recent frustration with the task 
of reviewing death sentencesS1 should not be construed as support 
for more executions. S2 
In the late 1980s, the United States' "death row" population 
surpassed 2000.53 The combination of undiminishing legislative 
48. ld. at 238-39. 
49. But see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (Execution for the rape of an 
adult woman is grossly disproportionate and excessive as compared to the crime, and 
therefore violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and \Dlusual punish-
ment.). 
SO. See Funnan v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 375 (stating that M[i]f • • • [this Court] were 
possessed of legislative power, I would either join with Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall [to eliminate capital punishment] or, at the very least, restrict the use of 
capital plDlishment to a very small category of the most heinous crimesj (Burger, CJ., 
joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at 405-06 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (·Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty.,. 
51. This impatience is reflected in the Court's recent decision to allow states to limit 
habeas corpus petitions. See Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553-55 (1991) 
(holding that a federal court may not review a state court's decision to deny a prisoner's 
federal constitutional claim if the decision of the state court is based upon a procedural 
default established by the state court which is independent of the prisoner's federal ques-
tion). 
52. See FRANKLIN E. ZlMRING & GoRDON HAWKlNS, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT AND TIlE 
AMERICAN AGENDA 46 (1986) (noting that in the early 1980s there was a Mwave of deci-
sions voiding death sentences and sections of state death penalty laws" after which wide 
latitude was given to states in a series of cases); cf. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating 
Death, 1983 SUP. cr. REv. 305, 387-388 (asserting that the federal courts have struck a 
balance between the competing demands of the death penalty debate by handing down a 
very large number of death sentences relative to the small number of actual executions). 
53. See David Bruck, On Death Row in Pretoria Central, THE NEW REPUBUC, July 13 
& 20, 1987, at 18-19 (number of death row inmates nearing 2000). Articles published 
after 1988 consistently state that Mover 2,000" convicts are residing on death row. See, 
e.g., Bonnie, supra note 30, at 67 (stating that there were over 2000 condemned prisoners 
awaiting execution); Radelet & BIIllllU'd, supra note 23, at 297 (stating that in early 1988, 
America's death row population exceeded 2000 inmates). 
According to a Justice Department study, there were, as of December 31, 1990, 
"2,356, prisoners awaiting death penalties ••. , up 5% from the previous year." Associat-
ed Press, 40% on Death Row are Black, Report Says, CiNClNNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 30, 
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and public support for the rendering of death sentences coupled 
with a comparatively slow rate of executions suggests that the 
numbers of persons awaiting execution will continue to rise. Both 
courts and commentators have noted repeatedly that confinement on 
death row entails extreme emotional distress.54 Many condemned 
inmates arrive on death row with significant histories of neurologi-
cal and psychiatric problems.55 The inmate who awaits execution 
faces a unique and terrible fonn of emotional stress: "the anticipa-
tion of death at a specific moment in time and in a known man-
ner.,,56 The available evidence suggests that a substantial fraction 
of death row inmates - who, by virtue of their psychological and 
medical histories, are especially vulnerable to stress-induced decom-
pensation - display significant levels of severe psychiatric 
symptoms, including psychosis.57 As the nation's death row popu-
lation increases, psychiatrists who work within or provide consulta-
tion to state prison systems can expect to perfonn a proportionately 
greater number of services for those who appear incompetent to be 
executed. 58 
1991, at AS. 
54. See, e.g., Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
C'[T]he onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare phe-
nomenon. j; Rector v. Bryant, 111 S. Ct. 2872, 2875 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
C'The stark realities are that many death row inmates were afflicted with serious mental 
impairments before they committed their crimes and that many more develop such impair-
ments during the excruciating interv!l1 between sentencing and execution. j; see also infra 
notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
55. See, e.g., Dorothy O. Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and PsychoeducationaZ 
Characteristics of 15 Death RDw Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 
838, 840, 844 (1986) [hereinafter Characteristics] (Lewis detailed the psychiatric and 
neurological evaluations of 15 condemnees which revealed serious psychiatric impairment. 
Six were determined to be chronically psychotic, suffering from delusions, hallucinations 
and bizarre and sadistic behavior; nine suffered from psychiatric symptoms during child-
hood; three attempted suicide during childhood and one attempted it during adolescence; 
all had histories of head injuries.). 
56. Johnnie L. Gallemore Jr. & James H. Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death 
RDw Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (1972); see also Harvey Bluestone & 
Carl L. McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962) C'Presumably, the greatest of stresses would be imposed on the 
man who knows he is going to be put to death - and knows just when that will be.j. 
57. See Gallemore & Patton, supra note 56, at 168, 169; Bluestone & McGahee, supra 
note 56, at 393. At the time that Ford's case was advancing through the appellate courts, 
it was estimated informally that half of Florida's condemnees become psychotic at some 
point during their commement. Robert Sherill, Electrocution Binge: In Florida, Insanity is 
No Defense, 239 nm NATION 537, 555-556 (1984) (quoting the director of Florida Clear-
ing House for Justice). 
58. "The pace and complexity of the present death penalty process guarantees a long 
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B. FfJrd v. Wainwrighf9 
Before the Supreme Court heard Ford v. Wainwright, the legal 
and ethical issues involved in executing an incompetent person had 
received a modicum of scholarly consideration.60 The Court's de-
cision to hear Ford greatly increased both academic and practical 
interest in the potential problems raised for mental health profes-
sionals who might become involved in execution competency pro-
ceedings. 
Neither Alvin Ford's mental competence nor his legal sanity 
were ever at issue at the time that he was tried and convicted of 
murder in 1974.61 Ford began to evince significant mental deterio-
ration after spending eight years on Florida's death row.62 His 
psychosis was initially manifested in a pervasive delusion that he 
wait between sentence and execution. Clearly, post-sentencing incompetence will become 
more common. Therefore, doctors can anticipate that the state will require their services 
more frequently to provide evaluations and treatment pursuant to competency to be exe-
cuted statutes." Rochelle G. Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to be Execut-
ed, 96 YALE L. J. 167, 172-73 (1986). See also Heiltnm et a!., supra note 40, at 996 
("increasing numbers of mental health professionals will be asked to become involved"). 
During an October, 1988 presentation of an earlier version of this paper to a national 
audience of forensic psychiatrists, approximately one-fifth of about 60 listeners indicated 
they had been involved in some way in execution competency proceedings. 
59. 477 U.S. 399 (1986), reh'g denied, Ford v. State, 522 So. 2d 345 (PIa. 1988) (de-
nying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub nom. Ford v. Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 
(1989). 
60. A sample of frequently-cited pre-Ford writings on execution competency includes 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of 
Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 401 (1962) (reviewing the procedure for determining 
whether a prisoner is indeed insane, and recommending procedural protections Mboth com-
mensurate with • • • society·s aversion to execution of the insane and consistent with the 
need to avoid interminable delay"); Paul J. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the 
Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765, 804 (1980) (arguing that 
the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the presently incompetent, thus providing an 
alternative basis for resolving problems raised by the Mcondemned prisoner who refuses to 
pursue legal claims that might prevent his execution"); Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 
88 YALE L. J. 533, 533 (1979) (arguing that court-sanctioned state procedures to assess 
the sanity of condemnees are inadequate when analyzed under Msubsequently prescribed, 
more stringent constitutional guidelines" and proposing Ma framework of procedural safe-
guards designed to protect the rights of condemned prisoners to raise the issue of insanity 
and to have that claim properly evaluated"). 
Prior to Ford, the incompetency issue seems to have been raised infrequently by 
condemned prisoners. For example, only four of 180 condemned California prisoners 
raised the issue of incompetency between 1942 and 1956. Note, Post-Conviction'Remedies 
in California Death Penalty Cases, 11 STAN. L. REV. 94, 131 (1958). 
61. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401-402. 
62. Id. at 402. 
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was the target of a conspiracy in which the Ku Klux Klan and 
others plotted to induce him to suicide. He believed that prison 
guards were a part of this conspiracy, and that they were killing 
people and putting bodies in prison beds. Later, Ford began to be-
lieve that his female relatives were being tortured in the prison, 
and that members of his family had been taken hostage. The hos-
tage delusion then expanded: Ford began to speak of a "hostage 
crisis" by "day 287" in which Senator Kennedy and others were 
among the hostages. By 1983, Ford appeared to have assumed 
authority for the "crisis." He also began referring to himself as 
"Pope John Paul III," claimed to have fired several prison officaIs, 
and claimed to have appointed nine new Florida Supreme Court 
justices.63 
Over the course of his illness, Ford's counsel arranged for two 
psychiatrists to examine him.64 Amidst "long streams of seemingly 
unrelated thoughts,"6s Ford told the second psychiatrist, in No-
vember, 1983: "'1 can't be executed because of the landmark case. 
1 won. Ford v. State will prevent executions all over. ,"66 The psy-
chiatrist was convinced Ford was not malingering and concluded 
that Ford neither understood why he was condemned to death, nor 
that he would be executed.67 One mopth later, Ford regressed to 
almost complete incomprehensibility. He spoke in a sort of code 
that involved the "intermittent use of the word 'one,' making state-
ments such as 'Hands one, face one. Mafia one. God one, father 
one, Pope one. Pope one. Leader one. ,"68 
Ford's attorney then invoked Florida's procedures for deter-
mining a condemned prisoner's competency to be executed.69 In. 
63. ld. 
64. ld. at 402-03. 
65. ld. at 403. 
66. ld. 
67. ld. See also infra note 115 (discussing psychiatric detection of malingering). 
68. Ford. 477 U.S. at 403. 
69. ld. at 403-04. FLA. STAT. ch. 922.07 (198S) details procedures to be followed 
when a person sentenced to death appears to be insane. Under the statute, the governor 
must stay the execution and appoint three psychiatrists to jointly examine the prisoner to 
detennine whether the prisoner "understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and 
why it is to be imposed upon him." ld. at § 922.07(1}~ After the psychiatrists make a 
detennination, they submit a report to the governor. If, based on the report, the governor 
decides the prisoner is competent to understand the situation, the governor will order the 
warden to proceed with the execution. However, if the governor believes that the prisoner 
is incompetent, the prisoner must be committed to a Department of Corrections mental 
health facility until he is restored to sanity. At that time, the governor must again appoint 
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accordance with the statute, the Governor stayed the execution and 
appointed three psychiatrists to evaluate whether Ford had "the 
mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and 
the reasons why it was imposed upon him. ,,70 The psychiatrists 
jointly interviewed Ford for 30 minutes and submitted separate 
written reports to the Governor. Each psychiatrist offered a differ-
ent diagnosis, but all thought Ford was competent to be executed. 
Pursuant to the statute, after receiving the psychiatrists' reports, the 
Governor signed Ford's death warrant on April 30, 1984, without 
explanation or comment.71 After a series of appeals, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to consider both the constitutionality of 
executing the insane and the adequacy of Florida's procedures for 
hearing Ford's c1aim.72 
Even before Ford's appeal, all states with death penalty stat-
utes prohibited execution of the incompetent.73 Indeed, for centu-
ries, Anglo-American law has protected a person from being exe-
cuted if he has "lost his sanity.,,74 The Ford Court noted that his-
torians and jurists have offered several rationales for this prohibi-
tion but "the reasons for the rule are less sure and less uniform 
than the rule itself. ,,75 Justice Marshall agreed with Sir Edward 
Coke's view that the execution of a "mad man" serves as no ex-
ample to others, has no deterrent value, and is extremely cruel. 76 
Marshall also noted that Sir John Hawles found execution offensive 
to religion because it dispatches someone into the next "world, 
a panel of three psychiatrists to ascertain the prisoner's competency to be executed. 
70. 477 U.S. at 412 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 522.07(2». ""The Governor's order specifi-
cally directed that the attorneys [who were present at the examination] should not partic-
ipate in the examination in any adversarial manner. This order was consistent with the 
present Governor's 'publicly announced policy of excluding all advocacy on the part of 
the condemned from the process of determining whether a person under a sentence of 
death is insane.'" 477 u.s. at 412-13 (quoting Goode v. Wainwright. 448 So. 2d 999, 
1001 (FIa. 1984), ajJ'd, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that FLA. STAT. ch. 
522.07 met minimum standards required by procedural due process), cert. denied and stay 
denied, 466 U.S. 932 (1984». 
71. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404. 
72. 474 U.S. 1019 (1985), ajJ'd, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), reh'g denied, Ford v. State, 522 
So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub nom. Ford v. 
Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). , 
73. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 n.2 (noting that 41 states had a death penalty or statutes 
regulating execution procedures and 26 had statutes requiring that incompetent prisoners' 
executions be suspended). 
74. Id. at 400. 
75. Id. at 407. 
76. Id. (citing 3 EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTl1'UTE OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND *6). 
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when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it."77 Blackstone 
explained that the insane should be spared execution lest they die 
before having the chance to "[allege] something in stay of judg-
ment or execution.'t78 Justice Powell agreed with Justice Marshall 
that executing the incompetent is crue1.79 Both justices also con-
curred that the retributive purpose of punishment is ill-served by 
"executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has 
been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life ... 80 
C. Perry v. Louisiana81 
Although Ford holds that the execution of the incompetent is 
constitutionally forbidden, the decision is silent as to how a con-
demned. prisoner, once ruled incompetent to be executed, should be 
treated. In February, 1990, in Washington v. Harper,82 the Su-
preme Court recognized that prisoners had a limited right to refuse 
psychiatric medications, and described minimal procedural safe-
guards for instituting involuntary treatment of prisoners.83 Harper, 
a ward of the Washington State Penal System since his 1976 rob-
bery conviction, was treated against his will for a manic-depressive 
disorder. His treatment included forced administration of antipsy-
77. ld. (quoting Sir John Hawles, Solicitor General in the Reign of King William the 
Third, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Ba1eman (1685), in 11 How. ST. TRIAL 474, 
477 (1816». 
78. ld. (citing 4 Wn.LIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *24-*25). 
79. ld. at 421 (powell, J., concurring). 
80. ld. at 409. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between the cri1erion for 
execution incompe1ence and the rationale for the ancient prohibition against executing the 
Minsane," see Ward, supra no1e 23, at 59-68. Ford died of natural causes on Feb. 28, 
1991; at the time of his death he was still under a death sen1ence and had never been 
judged incompe1ent. Heilbrum et al., supra no1e 40, at 598. 
81. 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating the judgment to execu1e and remanding Mfor further 
consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210 (1990), reh'g denied, III 
S.o. 804 (1991), affd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-KP-1324, 1992 WL 296230 
(La. Oct. 19,. 1992) (holding that Peny could not be forcibly medicated to restored com-
pe1ency for the purposes of execution)]"). 
82. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
83. ld. at 219-27. The Court found that the due process clause permits involuntary 
treatment of a prisoner with antipsychotic medication Mif the inma1e is dangerous to him-
self or othelS and the treatment is in the inma1e's medical in1erest." ld. at 227. Procedural 
requirements for instituting involuntary treatment are met as long as the prisoner is given 
a full and fair hearing and the decisionmaker is independent of those who would treat the 
inma1e. ld. at 231. The Court determined that due process does not require a judicial 
decisionmaker, stating that Man inma1e's in1erests are adequa1ely protected, and pemaps 
better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical professionals 
rather than a judge." ld. 
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chotic drugs.84 However, Harper was not a prisoner whose invol-
untary treatment might restore his competence and thereby make 
him fit for execution. This was precisely the situation that the 
Court appeared ready to address when it granted certiorari in Perry 
v. Louisiana.8s 
Unlike Alvin Ford, Michael Perry's mental state figured prom-
inently in the trial proceedings leading to his conviction in 1985. 
He was arrested in the summer of 1983 and charged with murder-
ing his parents and three other relatives. At the time of his arrest, 
he told police that his family had harrassed him and had stolen his 
property and that was why he had murdered them.86 
Perry was sent to a state psychiatric facility for evaluation and 
treatment upon the recommendation of two psychiatrists who exam-
ined Perry several months after his arrest.87 On admission, he stat-
ed that he did not have enough blood; that he was hearing voices; 
that robots, the President, and the CIA were telling him what to 
do; that robots had told him to kill his family; that he was being 
fed body parts; and that if shot, he would not be killed.88 
Perry was found competent to stand trial in 1985 after he had 
been hospitalized for six months and subsequently imprisoned for 
one year.89 Over the objections of counsel, he withdrew his insan-
ity plea and entered only a plea of "not guilty.,,90 He was con-
victed and sentenced to death.91 During the two years following 
84. Id. at 214. 
85. 494 U.S. 1015 (1990). 
86. Perry explained his murderous actions by stating -I just couldn't take it anymore." 
State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 547, 549 (La. 1986) (afftnning Perry's conviction and 
sentencing and holding that the defendant had the burden of establishing incapacity to 
stand trial), cert. denied, Perry v. Louisiana, 484 U.S. 872 (1987), judgment vacated and 
remanded, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (vacating the judgment·to execute and remanding -for 
further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210 (199O)]), reh'g 
denied, 111 S.Ct. 804 (1991), affd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-KP-1324, 1992 
WL 296230 (La. Oct. 19, 1992) (holding that Perry could not be forcibly medicated to 
restored competency for the purposes of execution). When asked why he killed his two-
year-old nephew, Perry replied, -[t]he kid was evil, some sort of devil, witch of some 
sort • . . . He was a very smart kid . • • too smart for his age. I had to make sure he 
was dead." Id. 
87. Id. at 547-48. 
88. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 3-4, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) 
(No. 89-5120) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. 
89. Perry, 502 So. 2d at 547-48. A competency hearing in September, 1983 resulted 
in hospitalization. Perry was then returned to prison in March, 1984. A second compe-
tency hearing in March, 1985 resulted in a froding of competence to stand trial. 
90. Id. at 547, 550. 
91. Id. at 545. A twelve member jury unanimously found the defendant guilty as 
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his conviction, he was treated almost continuously with haloperi-
dol,92 but continued to have periods of psychosis.93 
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Perry's conviction but 
recommended that an assessment of his competency to be executed 
"might be in order prior to execution."94 Over the next nine 
months, the trial court held four hearings at which medical records 
and both oral and videotaped testimony were reviewed.9s In Octo-
ber, 1988, the court concluded that Perry was competent to be 
executed.96 The court then ordered that his competency was to be 
maintained97 with medication prescribed by the penitentiary's med-
charged. During the sentencing phase, the jury recommended the death penalty, fmding the 
existence of aggravating circumstances. The jury found that the defendant knowingly creat-
ed the risk of death and that the crime was committed in a particularly heinous manner. 
ld. 
92. MHaIoperidol is the fll'St of the butyrophenone series of major tranquilizers • • . 
[and] is indicated for use in the management of manifestations of psychotic disorders." 
PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1236 (1989). 
The prevailing theory regarding the mechanism of action of antipsychotic drugs 
is based on the observation that all of the currently available antipsychotic 
drugs have a similar action on the dopamine system: the blocking of the bind-
ing of dopamine to the postsynaptic dopamine receptor in the brain • • • • The 
theory that psychosis is a result of an excess of dopamine or the result of 
abnormal activity of certain dopamine receptors has been confinned by the 
observation of increased dopamine concentrations and an increased number of 
dopamine-2 receptors in the brains of some patients with schizophrenia •••• 
lonathan M. Silver et aI., Biological Therapies for Mental Disorders, in CLINICAL PSYCHI-
ATRY FOR MEDICAL SltJDENTS 459, 462 (Alan Stoudemire ed., 1990). The effectiveness 
of antipsychotic medication in preventing schizophrenic relapse has been amply document-
ed. If treatment is not continued after initial remission of acute psychotic symptoms, 
schizophrenic patients have a relapse rate of 8-15% per month; with continued medication, 
patients have a relapse rate of 1.5-3% per month. ld. 
93. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 88, at 6-13. On December 20, 1985, after being sen-
tenced to death, Perry arrived at the penitentiary. From the time of his arrival, his docu-
mented behavior included confused thinking, acting out, disorientation as to person and 
place, wild, uncontrolIable rages, yelling, screaming, delusions, hallucinations, a belief that 
he could not be killed by electrocution, memory impairment and paranoia. ld. For a dis-
cussion of the psychiatric disorders that might engender execution incompetence, see 
Heilbrum et aI., supra note 40, at 598. 
94. Perry, 502 So. 2d at 564. 
95. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 88, at 16-23. 
96. ld. at 23. The triaI court adopted the defInition of execution incompetency offered 
by lustice Powell in his concurring opinion in Ford, who held that the Eighth Amend-
ment precludes the execution of inmates who are M'unaware of the punishment they are 
about to suffer and why they are to suffer it. '" APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 4 
(quoting Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (powell, 1. concurring in part and con-
curring in the result». 
97. 10hn M. Davis & Suzanne Andrinkaitis, The Natural Course of Schizophrenia and 
Effective Maintenance Drug Treatment, 6 1. CLIN. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 25, 68-88 
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ical staff, even if the medication had to be forcibly administered 
over defendant's objection,98 After being ordered by the United 
States Supreme Court to review its decision, the district court af-
firmed its ruling to forcibly treat Perry to restored competence so 
that he could be executed; however, the Louisiana Supreme Court, 
while affirming the lower court's holding that Perry was insane, 
held that Perry could not be treated with psychotropic medication 
without his consent.99 
D. The Medical Profession's Response 
Perry's disposition emphasizes for psychiatrists - especially 
those "who are in state employment and often under pressure to 
conform their treatment to the needs of the state"l00 - the ambi-
guity and discomfort they face in confronting the prospect of eval-
uating and treating incompetent death row inmates. 101 This ambi-
guity and discomfort has both legal and ethical dimensions, In an 
effort to bring about a legal resolution of Perry that might also 
relieve physicians of their moral dilemmas in treating death row 
(1986) (concerning the role of maintenance medication and the treatment of schizophrenia). 
98. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 88, at 23. 
99. See Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (199O) (vacating the judgment to execute and 
remanding Mfor further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, [494 U.S. 210 
(1990)]"), reh'g denied, III S.Ct. 804 (1991), affd in part and vacated in part, No. 91-
. KP-1324, 1992 WL 296230 (La. Oct. 19, 1992) (holding that Perry could not be forcibly 
medicated to restored competency for the pmposes of execution). See also supra notes 23-
24. 
100. Howard Zonana, Keeping Death-Row Inmates Sane: Perry v. Louisiana, AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. NEWSL. (Am. Acad. Psychiatry & Law, Baltimore, Md.), April 1991, at 
5,6. 
101. See Heilbrun et aI., supra note 40, at 599 (discussing the risk that disclosures 
made by patients in treatment might be used to assess competency for execution). See 
also Jerome J. Shestack, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Dual Loyalties, 60 ABA J. 1521 
(1974) (recognizing the potential conflict of interest inherent in situations in which a 
psychiatrist must serve not only a patient, but also a family, an institution, a state, or 
self, and urging Psychiatrists and lawyers to cooperate both in carefully identifying situa-
tions presenting a conflict of interest and in fashioning appropriate procedural safeguards); 
Richard J. Bonnie, Introduction to PSYCHIATRiSTS AND TIm LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSES 
AND DEBATE xiii, xv (1977) (noting that clinicians are increasingly placed in a Mdouble 
agent" role where they are called upon to serve interests beyond the patient's hea1th.); cf. 
Seymore L. Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas of Forensic Psychiatry: A Utilitarian Ap-
proach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 279, 279 (1984) (concentrating on psy-
chiatrists involved in the civil commitment process as opposed to condemnee incompeten-
cy process, Halleck notes that psychiatrists employed by the government relate to the 
patient for the government's pmposes; consequently, the psychiatrists' allegiances are un-
clear, leading to possible harm to the patient as a result of the interaction during the 
evaluation process). 
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inmates,I02 the American Psychiatric Association and American 
Medical Association joined in filing an amicus curiae brief in 
Perry. 103 
The APA/AMA Brief noted that in Harper, the Supreme 
Court had determined that a prisoner retains a liberty interest in re-
fusing unwanted medication under the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause.104 However, involuntary treatment of serious 
mental illness is permissible "if the inmate is dangerous to himself 
or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest "lOS 
The APA/AMA Brief argued that the Louisiana trial court autho-
rized involuntary medication for Perry solely to preserve his com-
petence to be executed; Perry had not been shown to be dangerous 
or gravely disabled.106 The brief argued further that treatment of 
Perry was not in his medical interest,I07 so that neither the "dan-
102. The APA proposed commuting to life imprisorunent the death sentences of prison-
ers who are found incompetent to be executed. See infra text at notes 110-15. 
103. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38. -
104. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-27 (1990) (guaranteeing a right to refuse 
medication under the Fourteenth Amendment and holding that this right can be sufficiently 
protected by a hearing before prison officials if the state feels it has an interest in ensur-
ing prison safety). 
105. AMA/APA Brief, supra note 38, at 12 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 227). 
106. Id. at 10-12. 
107. The APA/AMA Brief does not specify what a "medical interest" is. "Medical" is 
defmed as "of, relating to, or concemed with physicians or with the practice of medi-
cine . • • [;] requiring or devoted to medical treatment •••• " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DlcnONARY 1402 (3d ed. 1971). By this definition, the only strictly 
medical issue under consideration in Perry was the nature of his symptoms and their 
proper treatment; Perry's only strictly "medical interest" ought to have been the alleViation 
of his symptoms. This view of Perry's medical interest seems consonant with Justice 
Scalia's questioning, during oral argument, how one could justify withholding from Perry 
treatment that would have been prescribed for him under any other circumstances. Zenana, 
supra note 100, at 6. Zenana suggests that 
Id. 
[a] broader definition of medical interests requires looking at the overall goals 
of management. For example, the use of antibiotics to treat an infection is not 
always warranted if the patient is in a terminal condition from another disease. 
The question here is whether to liken the death penalty to another disease (e.g. 
cancer), or to decide that medical interests are not involved since the death 
penalty represents a legally authorized judicial decision. 
The question of whether part of a physician's overall goals of management should 
include withholding medication so as to influence the course of justice is discussed infra 
at text accompanying note 141. Leaving that issue aside, the physician who withholds 
antibiotics for the pneumonia-stricken cancer patient is best thought of as managing' two 
medical conditions at once, whereas Perry's physician would know that Perry had other 
pressing but non-medical interests. The death penalty is not a disease. 
Medical treatment is undertaken not as an end in itself, but with a view to the non-
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gerousness" nor the "medical interest" requirements for involuntary 
psychiatric treatment of prisoners (as set forth in Harper) had been 
met. lOS 
The brief recognized that, left untreated, Perry might remain 
psychotic for an interminable period, and recommended that states 
commute incompetent condemnees' sentences to life imprisonment 
and allow them to receive treatment.109 The APNAMA Brief 
viewed commutation as a solution to both the constitutional issues 
raised by Perry, and the ethical problems faced by physicians who 
might be asked to evaluate or treat an incompetent condemned in-
mate.110 The brief argued that "to allow a prisoner to languish 
with a treatable psychosis would violate the Eighth Amendment 
principle established in Estelle v. Gamble,',lll which recognizes a 
prisoner's right to treatment for known medical problems. llz 
Commutation would insure that antipsychotic medication would be 
medical interests, such as happiness or well-being, that it promotes. MWe feel, usually, that 
we can cope with almost all • . . states of vulnerability if we have our health. After all, 
we perceive health as a means toward freedom and other primary values." EDMUND D. 
PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, A PHILoSOPHICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRAcnCE 
209 (1981). An important task for physicians is to help patients facing difficult decisions 
to perceive and weigh their interests, interests which are affected by medical decisions but 
which, physicians must humbly recognize, are not all medical. The recognition that justly 
convicted individuals have a strong interest in receiving just punishment should greatly 
assist psychiatrists to examine the issues raised in Peny's case. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 256-60. 
108. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 10-12. 
109. Id. at 20-25. See MD. ANN. CODE § 75A(d)(3) (1992 Repl. Vol.) (When an inmate 
is adjudicated incompetent to be executed, his case is remanded to the sentencing court, 
which automatically strikes the death sentence and enters a sentence of life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole.). See also 1 NIGEL W ~ CRiME AND INSANITY IN ENG-
LAND: THE HiSTORICAL PERsPECTIVE, 205, 216 (1967) (Before England abolished the 
death penalty in 1965, death sentences were commuted for life when prisoners were deter-
mined to be insane.); J.D. Feltham, 71te Common Law and the Execution of Insane Crimi-
nals, 4 MELB. U. L. REV. 434, 475 (1964) (proposing a mandatory duty to commute the 
death sentences of insane prisoners as Mhas been the invariable practice in England since 
1840 . • • "). In Montana a court is allowed to suspend a death sentence of an incompe-
tent condemnee when MSO much time has elapsed since the commitment of the defendant 
that it would be unjust to proceed •••. " MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-202 (1991). 
110. I argue below that, under the premises usually assumed by those who oppose 
treatment of the incompetent condemned. the possibility of commutation (which, the 
APA/AMA brief asserts, allows for ethical treatment) substitutes one set of ethical dilem-
mas for another. See infra notes 136 and 183. 
111. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 20 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 
(1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 97.4 (1977». 
112. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104 (concluding that Mdeliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the [gratuitous cruelty] proscribed by the 
Eighth Amendment"). 
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administered involuntarily only if an- underlying parens patriae 
justification for medical treatment were established, and would not 
be used solely for the purpose of making an inmate fit for punish-
ment. 113 The brief. argued that governments have "a deep-seated 
social interest in preserving medical care, in actuality and in public 
perception, as an unambiguously beneficent healing art . . ... [T]he 
use of medical treatment. .. in order to facilitate a patient's 
death. .. would threaten States' vital interests in the ethical 
standards and the treatment function of the medical profes-
sion."u4 This combination of constitutional obligations and State 
interests favoring commutation and treatment outweigh any "interest 
in allowing an incompetent inmate like Perry to suffer for lack of 
needed medication."us 
113. The constitutionality of this practice has been questioned. See Washington v. Harp-
er, 494 U.S. 210, 241 (1989) (Stevens, I., with Brennan and Marshall, II., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("Forced administration of antipsychotic medication may not 
be used as a fonn of punishment.); lones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 385 (1983) 
(Brennan, I., dissenting) (The Supreme Court has never approved of either using psycho-
tropic medication to control behavior or using it Mfor reasons that have more to do with 
the needs of the institution than with individualized therapy.); Pena v. New York State 
Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Neither behavior control nor 
punishment may be the objective of involuntary medication; rather, such medication should 
be used only Mas part of an ongoing treatment program authorized and supervised by a 
physician."); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F: Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Inel. 1972) (behavior control 
is an improper goal of involuntary medication), affd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See also, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th 
Cir. 1973) (Involuntary administration of apomorphine, a drug that induces vomiting, is 
cruel and unusual punishment); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(administration of succinylcholine, a drug that induces paralysis, might trigger Mserious 
constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment.). 
In addition, Louisiana has explicitly forbidden this practice for civilly committed 
mental patients. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:171 (West 1989) ("Medication shall not 
be used for nonmedical reasons such as punishment or convenience of the staff.). 
114. APNAMA Brief, supra note 38, at 15-16. 
115. Id. at 25. The APNAMA Brief recognized only two state interests that might pre-
clude commutation: the possibility of spontaneous recovery and the possibility that a pris-
oner might feign psychosis (or another condition constituting execution incompetence) to 
avoid execution. The Brief argued that a state might wait years for a spontaneous recov-
ery to occur, during which time an inmate would suffer substantial, but possibly treatable, 
symptoms of psychosis. For many inmates, recovery might not ever occur without treat-
ment. 
As for the possibility of feigning, the Brief argued that Mpsychiatrists now have at 
their disposal a range of methods shown by empirical studies to be effective in the detec-
tion of malingering." Id. at 22. The studies cited in the Brief, see id., at 22-23 nn.24-27, 
include reports evaluating prisoners, although none of these reports deals with prisoners in 
Michael Perry's situation. See, e.g., David Schretlen & ltal Arkowitz, A Psychological Test 
Battery to Detect Prison I1I11Ulles who Fake Insanity or Mental Retardation, 8 BEHAv. 
SCI. & L 75 (1990); Richard Rogers et al., The SIRS as a Measure of Malingering: A 
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Psychiatrists asked to administer treatment to the condemned 
are faced with "an excruciating ethical dilemma "116 wrought by 
the knowledge that the very symptoms that medication might di-
minish, symptoms that cause suffering which psychiatrists ordinari-
ly feel duty-bound to alleviate, are what stand between an inmate 
and execution. To further bolster its case for commutation of death 
sentences following determination of execution incompetence, the 
Brief cited several Ford-inspired articles from the mental health 
and legal literature offering a variety of ethical arguments against 
physician participation in the execution competency process. The 
following section critiques arguments that challenge the morality of 
psychiatric assessment and treatment of incompetent condemned 
inmates. 
m. THE PROFESSION'S ETlllCAL REsPONSE: AN lNrrIAL CRITIQUE 
A. Arguments in Opposition to Assessment or Treatment 
Although psychiatrists, on the whole, are divided about the 
appropriateness of assessing and treating incompetent condemned 
prisoners,l17 the professional literature is generally critical of psy-
chiatric involvement in execution competency proceedings.llS The 
criticism is directed both toward assessing inmates' competence 
and, even more strongly, toward treating inmates judged incompe-
tent.119 A variety of arguments have been offered in support of 
Validation Study with a Correctional Sample, 8 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 8S (1990). The Brief 
does not mention that there is substantial professional disagreement about the ability of 
psychologists and psychiatrists to detect malingering, and does not cite studies demonstrat-
ing professionals· failure to do so. For a review, see David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The 
Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCIENCE 31, 3S (1988) (reviewing 
studies of accuracy of mental health professionals· evaluations). 
116. APAJAMA Brief, supra note 38, at 16. 
117. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
118. See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text 
119. The National Medical Association·s ('"NMA j position represents a striking excep-
tion to this criticism. The NMA advises psychiatrists to evaluate and treat incompetent 
condemnees. It considers inmates who are facing execution deserving of the same kinds 
of psychotherapy that would be rendered to terminally ill patients. -rhe NMA views the 
death penalty as a jurisprudential issue and not a medical one.M Ward, supra note 23, at 
86 (arguing on behalf of the NMA, that a psychiatrist·s duty to treat includes a duty to 
treat incompetent inmates whether or not they are condemned). Dr. Robert T. M. Phillips, 
chainnan of the NMA·s psychiatry section, believes that justice will not be served if 
psychiatrists withdraw from such work (particularly evaluating the inmates who are fight-
ing death sentences). ~ work is going to be done. It must be done. And if it·s not us 
doing this work, rm concerned about who it will be • • • . You cannot assume that 
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the thesis that participation is unethical. In some cases, these argu-
ments are concerned with the anticipated psychological or practical 
consequences of participation,120 but not with moral issues. 
For example, in one of their amicus briefs, the AP A and the 
AMA argue that treating the condemned incompetent would have 
the practical consequence of undennining the already-precarious 
status of the doctor-patient relationship in prison settings. 121 
Physicians, and especially psychiatrists, require the 
trust of their patients . . . . 
. . . Prisoners already have reasons to be suspicious 
of psychiatrists, because psychiatrists in an evaluative role 
often testify against prisoners in competency, insanity, and 
death penalty proceedings. If psychiatrists are now required 
to do harm to prisoners in their treatment role, the ability 
of all physicians to maintain an effective patient-physician 
relationship with prisoners will be significantly im-
paired .... 
. '.. [p]sychiatric care in the Nation's prisons and 
jails leaves much to be desired . . . . Allowing involuntary 
medication to be employed for the purposes of facilitating 
capital punishment would exacerbate those problems.l22 
Other authorities argue that assessing or treating the condemned 
incompetent exposes mental health professionals to a high degree 
of psychological distress. l23 Heilbrun and McClaren caution those 
who are considering whether to participate in assessing potentially 
incompetent condemnees to beware of the emotional cost of know-
[psychologists and social workers] can read the prison record, see an abnormal BEG, and 
recognize there's something there that may need to be pursued." Bru~ Jancin, Mitigating 
Psychiatric Disorders 'Common' in Death Row Inmates, 18 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY NEWS, 
October 1990, 1 at 24 (quoting Dr. Robert T. M. Phillips). MPsychiatry did not write the 
laws, but it has an important role in the treatment and care [of capital defendants], even 
if it leads to execution." K. Hansman, Psychiatry's Role in Capital Cases Important to 
Ensuring Justice, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 13 (August 7, 1992) (quoting Dr. Robert T.M. Phil-
lips). 
120. Though these arguments are important, they are not the focus of this essay. I draw 
attention to them here to distinguish them from those that are related strictly to ethical is-
sues. 
121. See APNAMA Brief, supra note 38. 
122. Id. at 18-19 (citations omitted). "The spectre of the physician donning the 
executioner's hood inspires little confidence among people who receive medical treatment 
from the same physician." Salguero, supra note 58, at 96. 
123. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
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ing that their opinions could have life-or-death consequences for 
the evaluee.124 Radelet and Barnard illustrate this concern by ex-
amining the case of Gary Alvord,l25 a Florida convict who was 
found incompetent for execution by a state-approved panel of psy-
chiatrists.126 Alvord was convicted of murdering three women in 
spite of evidence presented that a Michigan court had found him 
not guilty by reason of insanity for a previous rape of a ten year 
old gir1.127 The mental health staff who worked with Mr. Alvord 
found the ethical conflicts they faced to be so upsetting that they 
resolved never to participate again in the restoration of a 
condemnee's competency. 128 
The ethical objections voiced by critics of psychiatric involve-
ment in either the assessment of condemnees or their treatment to 
a state of restored competency can be categorized as four different 
arguments. The first type of argument equates psychiatric involve-
ment with participation in an execution. The second variety catego-
rizes involvement as a violation of normative principles of medical 
ethics. The third set of arguments treats involvement as a violation 
of informed consent standards. The final category criticizes psychi-
atric participation in a condemnee's competency proceedings as a 
perversion of medical practice. Each of these arguments is de-
scribed below. 
1. Psychiatric Involvement Constitutes Participation in an 
Execution 
If psychiatric involvement in execution competency proceedings 
124. For example, Heilbrun and McLaren write: 
"'The idea that one consequence of a professional activity might be the 
death of another human being can evoke confusion, guilt, [and] frustra-
tion • . • • A strong stomach, a thick skin, and a f1I1ll commibnent to doing a 
thorough job will prove useful, even necessary, for participating clinicians. 
• • • A review of the arguments on participation, careful personal reflec-
tion, and consultation with colleagues who have done these assessments are 
recommended • • • • Having carefully considered the arguments and his or her 
own feelings at the outset, the clinician can more easily monitor ongoing feel-
ings and reactions and keep them from overly influencing the assessment." 
Heilbrun & McClaren, supra note 29, at 207-08. 
125. See Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1984) (denying the district 
court·s grant of habeas corpus), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 956 (1984). 
126. See Radelet & ijamard, supra note 30, at 303-04. 
127. Alvord v. Florida, 322 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 
(1976). 
128. Radelet & Barnard, supra note 30, at 303-04 (reviewing responses of psychiatrists 
and mental health staff at the institution where Alvord was being treated). 
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is tantamount to assisting in an execution, then such involvement 
clearly violates the ethical codes of the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation.129 Several writers interpret psychiatric assessment of exe-
cution incompetence in just this manner.l30 Wallace, for example, 
objects to psychiatrists making competency assessments because 
such evaluations involve "the application of medical expertise to 
induce death.,,131 Participation in competency hearings, he be-
lieves, constitutes membership in a "tribunal" that makes "the legal 
decision of readiness of the individual for death.,,132 Such mem-
bership, Wallace argues, is "the ultimate form of participation" in 
carrying out the prisoner's sentence to be executed. 133 Ewing 
notes that the opinions of psychiatrists often carry significant 
weight in judicial hearings. l34 He argues that, for practical pur-
poses, psychologists and psychiatrists decide "whether a condemned 
inmate is to live or die."13S Sargent concurs: psychiatric evalua-
129. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsSOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL Ennes 
wrm ANNOTATIONS EsPECrAILY APPUCABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 1, , 4, (1989) [hereinafter 
APA PRINCIPLES] (A psychiatrist may not be Ma participant in a legally authorized execu-
tion. j. 
130. See infra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. 
131. Donald H. Wallace, Incompetency for Execution: The Supreme Court Challenges 
the Ethical StaruUJrds of the Mental Health Professions, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 272 
(1987) (arguing that the decision of Ford v. Wainwright offends the healing ethic of the 
mental health professional and proposing that psychiatrists assigned by the court to partici-
pate in the assessment of a condemnee ethically oUght to demand a second psychiatrist's 
opinion). " 
132. Id. at 280. Wallace explicitly notes that he bases his choice of the word Mtribunal" 
generally on the plurality opinion of the Court in Ford v. Wainwright, and specifically on 
Justice Powell's concurrence. Id. at 266-67, 280. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 
423 n.4 (1986) (powell, J., concurring) (M[A]lthough we need not decide the issue in this 
case, the term. 'State court' may well encompass an independent panel of psychiatric 
experts who might both examine the defendant and determine his legal sanity.j, reh'g de-
nied. Ford v. State, 522 So. 2d 345 (PIa. 1988) (denying post-conviction relie!), cert. 
denied sub nom. Ford v. Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). . 
133. Wallace, supra note 131, at 280. 
134. See Charles P. Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating "Insanity- on Death Row: Legal 
and Ethical Perspectives, 5 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 175, 177 n.14 (1987) (noting 'that most 
state statutes require that physicians, psychiatrists and/or psychologists examine inmates 
and pointing out that although sanity is a legal rather than an ethical issue, the required 
presence of mental health professionals indicates that their opinions are essential to judi-
cial determinations). 
135. Id. at 181 (1987). Entin points out that there may be a moral difference between 
declaring, 011 one hand, that a death row inmate who initially claims to be insane is ac-
tually not, and, on the other hand, Mcertifying that a previously insane death row inmate 
has regained sanity." Entin, supra note 1, at 224. In the latter situation, the prisoner has 
been legally determined to be insane, has gone through psychiatric treatment, and now 
awaits a reevaluation of his competence to be executed. Entin suggests that a reevaluation 
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tioo, in this context, asks the doctor to pronounce a prisoner "fit 
for execution ... 136 Although the state of New York does not allow 
capital punishment,137 its medical society recently took the step 
of defining the ethical rules incumbent on physicians should capital 
punishment ever be reinstated. 138 The society reiterated the cus-
tomary prohibition against physician participation in executions. 
The society understood participation to include among other things 
"[t]he determination of mental and physical fitness for execu-
tion.,,139 
If assessment seems problematic, the treatment of the incompe-
tent condemned is, to most commentators, even more trouble-
some.14O Barbara Ward argues that a psychiatrist who treats in-
resulting in a finding of insanity by the participating psychiatrist -could be 'tantamount to 
imposing a new death sentence,'" Id. at 225 (quoting Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, 
at 49). 
136. Questioning Psychiatry's Role, supra note 32, at 3. Elsewhere, Sargent likens the 
psychiatrist's role in competency evaluations to the acts of Nazi physician Josef Mengele 
("The Angel of Death"). Working in the Nazi concentration camp at Auschwitz. Mengele 
decided which prisoners were healthy enough to work and would therefore be spared 
death. See Douglas A. Sargent, Treating the Condemned to Death, HAsTINGS CENTER 
REPoRT, Dec. 1986, at 5, 6. Sargent addresses the AMA's proscription against physician 
participation in execution by asking, -[b]ut what about making a diagnosis of competency 
to be executed? If such a determination results in an execution that would not have taken 
place otherwise, is diagnosis not also a proscribed medical act?" Id. Note that Ewing's, 
Wallace's, and Sargent's argument, if correct, would apply with even more force were the 
commutation-if-incompetent position of the APA/AMA Brief universally adopted. See supra 
notes 131-136. Psychiatrists who found condemnees competent would not simply be losing 
chances to delay executions; through giving testimony that supported a finding of compe-
tence, they would help prevent prisoners' lives from being spared. 
137. See State v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879 (1984) (holding unconstitutional N.Y. PENAL 
LAw § 60.06 because it failed to allow the sentencer to consider relevant individual cir-
cumstances, including the defendant's record and character and the circumstances sur-
rounding the offense). 
138. Fred Rosner et aI., Physician Involvement in Capital Punishment, 91 N.Y. STATE J. 
MEn. IS, 18 (1991). 
139. Physicians Participation in Capital Punishment in New York, 15 NswsL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., Dec. 1990, at 102. 
140. The position of the Medical Society of the State of New York constitutes an ex-
ception. While its policy statement dermes assessment of mental fitness as a form of 
participation in executions, providing treatment to -[r]elieve acute suffering of a convicted 
prisoner while he is awaiting execution" is expressly permitted by the statement. Id. 
Note that physicians often use the word -acute" to refer to a relatively sudden 
change of condition or a condition requiring immediate intervention, in contrast to prob-
lems which may cause recurrent, intermittent, or -chronic" suffering which require 
treatment over time. It is thus not clear whether this statement would permit only relative-
ly brief medical interventions or more extended courses of treatment as well. Recall that 
psychiatrists felt that Michael Perry required continuous treatment with antipsychotic medi-
cation to maintain mental stability. See supra text accompanying notes 87-93. 
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competent comdemnees helps "bring about an execution which 
would not have occurred but for the treatment "141 The AP A and 
the AMA distinguish psychiatric assessment from treatment of the 
death row inmate who is already insane. 142 They argue that, 
when testifying for the state in a criminal proceeding, the assess-
ment findings of a forensic psychiatrist are subject to adversarial 
cross-examination and evidentiary refutation. Treatment of the 
already insane condemnees, on the other hand, demands that psy-
chiatrists use their therapeutic skills "to maintain [their patient's] 
competence so that [the] patient may be executed."143 Treatment 
of the incompetent condemned, the AMA and the AP A conclude, 
is "only a small step away from participating in the execution 
itself."I44 Some commentators suggest that the physician could be 
considered directly responsible for the inmate's death. After all, 
there is but a negligible chance that the inmate, once sane, will 
"articulate a heretofore unknown reason for a stay of execu-
tion .... " thus, "[n]o intervening acts ... will prevent the execu-
tion that the physician ... made possible.,,14s Because the psy-
chiatrist knows that execution is made possible by treatment, the 
distinction between treatment and execution would be "meaning-
less." 146 
141. ward, supra note 23, at 85 (emphasis added). See also id. at 99 ("Modem medical 
technology may now enable us to cure someone with medication and thereby send him to 
the electric chair when a century ago he would have been incurable and would have 
spent the remainder of his life in prisons or hospitals.,. 
142. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 17 n.19. 
143. It!. 
144. It!. at 17. 
145. Salguero, supra note 58, at 178 (citations omitted). 
146. Id. at 178 n.64. In fact, Salguero argues that treatment is tantamount to murder: 
An analogy can be made to the doctrine of causality in the criminal law with 
regard to homicide. This doctrine is expressed in the MODEL PENAL CoDE § 
2.03 (1985), which states: "Conduct is the cause of a result when: (a) it is an 
antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred •••• " 
Murder is defined as "purposely or knowingly" causing the death of another 
human being, according to the MODEL PENAL CoDE §§ 210.1, 210.2 (1985). In 
tum, this intent requirement is satisfied ·when death was within the purPose or 
the contemplation of the actor. 
Salguero, supra note 58, at 177 (citations omitted). Cf. Phillipa Foot, Ethics and the 
Death Penalty: Participation by Forensic Psychiatrists in Capital Trials, in EnnCAL 
PRAcrrCE IN PSYCHIA1RY AND THE LAw (Richard Rosner & Robert Weinstock 005., 1990) 
207, at 209 ("The psychiatrist knows that if he gives an honest opinion ••• he may, in 
effect, be bringing about the death of a person whom he has examined and perhaps even 
treated. " [emphasis added]). 
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2. Participation Violates Nonnative Principles of Medical Ethics 
Critics' second major argument is that psychiatric participation 
in execution competency proceedings violates nonnativ~ principles 
of medical practice. 
For example, the principles of beneficence, autonomy, and 
avoiding killing are among the nonnative principles involved in 
psychiatric association with execution proceedings. The principle of 
beneficence, that a physician should relieve suffering, would be 
violated if the psychiatrist facilitates the state's execution process. 
The principle of autonomy, that a physician's choices cannot over-
ride the patient's choices, would be violated if the psychiatrist 
treated the inmate to retore competency against the inmate's will. 
Finally, the principle of avoiding killing would be violated because 
the psychiatrist's role in execution proceedings may cause the 
offender's death.147 
Historically, competency was required at the time of execution 
so that, among other things, the prisoner would suffer in anticipa-
tion of his death. 148 This goal seems antithetical to medicine's 
traditional objective of relieving suffering. Sargent argues that 
restoring the condemned to competency violates the physician'S 
obligation to assist "the patient to do what the patient wants to do 
within the constraints of the law." 149 He joins Radelet and 
Barnard in believing that competency-restoring treatment would be 
non-beneficial, harmful, and cruel. ISO 
Some critics of psychiatric participation feel that, "fundamental 
ethical principles of theD healing professions"lsl . prohibit assess-
ment and treatment, even if these principles do not explicitly pro-
hibit participation. Traditional norms also suggest that physicians 
are duty-bound to act beneficently and nonmaleficently, to do no 
hann, to preserve life, to promote health, and to alleviate suffer-
ing.1S2 A state-employed psychiatrist, in particular, may be caught 
147. See Salguero, supra note 58 at 168; see generally ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEoRY 
OF MEDICAL Ennes 141-290 (1981). 
'148. See, e.g., Radelet & BarIlIU'd. supra note 23, at 39-40; Henry Weihofen, A Ques-
tion of Justice: Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.A. J. 651, 652 (1951). 
149. Questioning Psychiatry's Role, supra note 32, at 3. 
ISO. Compare id. ("That isn't the proper business of physicians - to go around killing 
people or assisting people to kill people.") with Radelet & BarIlIU'd. supra. note 23, at 49 
("[S]uccessful treatment means the patient will die. This is a use of the state's limited 
treatment resources that some [people] will fmd especially outrageous.,,). 
151. Ewing, supra note 134, at 183. 
152. See, e.g., id.; Salguero, supra note 58, at 168 ("The physician is bound by a fun-
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both ethically and legally between a rock and a hard place: where 
refusing to treat incompetent condemnees could increase their suf-
fering, treating them could lead to their death.lS3 Ewing believes 
that psychiatrists faced with these alternatives should withhold 
treatment from an incompetent condemned inmate because the 
ultimate purpose of such treatment "is not to heal or relieve suffer-
ing of that inmate, but to enable the state to take the inmate's 
life ... 154 Salguero takes the argument one step further: physicians 
best serve society bX placing the welfare of individuals ahead of 
the state's interest in punishment.1ss 
damental ethical principle to do no hann and preserve life.,,}. See also VEATCH, supra 
note 147 at 22 (1981) ("Those who have stood in • • • [the Hippocratic] tradition are 
committed to producing good for their patient and to protecting that patient from hann."). 
153. For a discussion of the ethical position a psychiatrist faces when administering 
antipsychotic drugs for nonmedical purposes, see Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 
222-23 n.8 (1990) ("[W]e will not assume that physicians will prescribe these drugs for 
reasons unrelated to the medical needs of the patients; indeed, the ethics of the medical 
profession are to the conlraIy • • • • This consideration supports our interpretation of the 
state's policy as ensuring that antipsychotic medication will be administered only in those 
cases where appropriate by medical standards."); APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 16 
("[W]hen the State's purpose in medicating someone involuntarily has no connection to 
either a parens patriae or dangerous principle, the directive to medicate creates an excru-
ciating ethical dilemma for treating physicians.,,). See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 107 (1976) ("[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners con-
stitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amend-
ment. ") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974 (1977). 
154. Ewing, supra note 134, at 183. 
ISS. Salguero, supra note 58, at 182. 
Along similar lines, the American Psychiatric Association previously endorsed the 
view that Ma psychiatrist's primary obligation is to look out for the examinee's best inter-
ests even when they conflict with those of society." Ward, supra note 23, at 94 (citing 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsSOCIATION, PSYClUATRY IN nm SENTENCING PROCESS 7 
(1984». However, the APA's position may have changed given its amicus brief for the 
Perry .case. There, the APA stated that a competency evaluation would not violate the 
duty to do no hann because there is Mno treatment relationship. Instead, the psychiatrist is 
acting as a consultant in the adversary process, providing a professional evaluation that is 
frequently subject to cross-examination or to refutation by conlraIy evidence." APA/AMA 
Brief, supra note 38, at 17 n.19. 
Appelbaum offers an eloquent elaboration of this position. He asks, Mif psychiatrists 
are committed to doing good and avoiding harm, how can they participate in legal pro-
ceedings from which hann may ~lt?" Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 250. He 
argues that Mthe evaluative function that forensic psychiatrists perform" is such that the 
forensic psychiatrist in truth Mdoes not act as a physician," but as someone who applies 
Mpsychiatric expertise in legal contexts." [d. at 252 (emphasis added). Thus, Mthe argu-
ment that the principle of nonmaleficence will be violated if [psychiatric testimony yields] 
hann[ful] results to the evaluee is inelevant." [d. at 257. In treating an incompetent 
condemnee, however, a psychiatrist would be acting as a physician, and thus should give 
primacy to ethical principles of beneficience and non-maleficence. Appelbaum leaves open 
the question of whether these principles would prohibit treatment, but emphasizes that Mthe 
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3, Participation Violates the Right to Informed Consent 
A third criticism of psychiatric participation is that it might 
require psychiatrists to violate traditional standards of informed 
consent The AP A instructs psychiatrists to begin competency eval-
uations with a full description of "the nature and purpose and lack 
of confidentiality of the examination,,,lS6 Moreover, it is arguable 
that evaluations of execution competency require the same level of 
voluntariness of consent as evaluations of competency to stand 
trial.1S7 But as Ward points out, "a true incompetent will not un-
basis on which the question of treatment must be decided is clear: does treatment satisfy 
the demands of beneficence and nonmaleficence?" Id. Salguero concurs: M[I]n performing 
an evaluation, the role of the physician as a healer is not necessarily implicated , , • • 
Further, • • • a diagnosis of incompetency presents the life-affmning possibility of a stay 
of execution." Salguero, supra note 58, at 177. 
There are several problems with this position, three of which deserve mention here. 
First, Mcompetency" is not a diagnosis, but a legal conclusion that courts, not physicians, 
reach. The diagnoses that psychiatrists properly render, and about which they inform 
courts, refer to medical conditions (such as schizophrenia). See infra notes 180-83 and 
accompanying texL 
A second problem derives from the contention that a psychiatrist who conducts a 
forensic psychiatric evaluation is not acting as a physician. It simply strains credulity to 
assert that a physician who interviews someone concerning symptoms, who assesses, and 
who makes a diagnosis is acting as anything other than a physician. Indeed, Salguero's 
argument itself actually invokes physicianly obligation - Mpreserving an inmate's life," by 
justifying certain competency evaluations if there is hope of finding evidence of incompe-
tence, on the grounds that the eValuation would preserve the inmate's life. Id. Salguero 
might respond that there is an important distinction between physicians' acting as evalua-
tors and physicians' acting as healers. Foot's response is instructive: We should Mbe wary 
of arguments of those who seem to believe that a new role can be created by a differ-
ence of pmpose, as if the legitimacy of setting aside the principle of nonmalificence were 
not exactly what is in question. • • . In spite of the other things that they are called on 
to do, psychiatrists and other doctors must surely be seen primarily as healers, with 
primum non nocere as their guiding lighL" Foot, supra note 146, at 210. 
The third problem results from a failure to examine the notion of Mharm" in context. 
The maxim primum non nocere (Mrust, do no harm") is usually invoked in customary 
medical contexts, where the harms to be avoided are side effects or other adverse medical 
events. Punishment is not a medical outcome and thus its implications for treatment deci-
sionmaking may require a different analysis. 
156. APA PRINCIPLES, supra note 129, § 4 'I 5. See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 
19, at § 7-3.6 (recommending that both defense counsel and the evaluating mental health 
professional advise defendant of the purposes of the examination); DECLARATION OF HA-
WAIJjll (approved by the General Assembly of the World Psychiatric Association July 10, 
1983), 1 WPA Buu.. 23 (1989) (MIf and when a relationship is established for purposes 
other than therapeutic, such as in forensic psychialIy, its nature must be thoroughly ex-
plained to the person concerned. "). 
157. Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 466-69 (1981) (holding that, under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a prisoner must consent to a psychiatric evaluation before 
the information can be used against him or her in court). 
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derstand the process, nature, purpose, or consequences of an insani-
ty evaluation. "ISS 
Treatment of the incompetent condemned appears even more 
problematic. Restoring a defendant's competency to stand trial -
even over his objection - helps him pursue legal remedies such as 
assisting in his defense.1s9 In this manner the government exercis-
es its parens patriae power through the psychiatrist to assist the 
defendant-patient 160 However, arguably the condemned 'incompe-
tent has no interest in having his competency restored. According 
to this argument, the principle of parens patriae should not ap-
ply.llil In Salguero's words, "[t]he state is asking the physician to 
treat an unwilling individual in order to change him to meet the 
will of society , [sic] which is especially repugnant to medical 
ethics."lli2 Bonnie imaginesthea situation of an incompetent pris-
oner, who, while competent, stated had that he would prefer to 
stay insane rather than provide his consent to be treated. Bonnie 
concludes: 
In light of the prisoner's unequivocal preference for life, I 
158. ward. supra note 23, at 77. 
159. Wallace, supra note 131, at 273-74 ("The treating mental health professional may 
fmd some consolation that the use of professional skills at trial • • • allows the defendant 
to pursue avialable legal remedies." (citations omitted); see APA/AMA Brief, supra note 
38, at 10-11 n.12 ("[T]he benefits of medication ••• may be vital to the defendant's 
ability to assist in his defense • • • .j. Cj. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19,' § 7-4.10 
cmt. at 223 (,,[T]reatment is for the benefit of the criminal justice system • • • • j. 
160. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Perry v. Loui-
siana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No. 89-5120) (arguing that the sovereign has historically had 
general custody and care for the insane (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*247». 
161. See Wallace, supra note 131, at 276 ("This situation is quite unlike the use of 
medical skills to prolong the life of the tenninally ill.j. See also APA/AMA Brief, supra 
note 38, at 9-10 ("It strains credulity to invoke the parens patriae power in this case. 
Louisiana's efforts are aimed not at benefiting Perry as a ward of·the the State, but mth-
er at facilitating his death to serve sepamte state interests. j. But see Heilbrun et al., 
supra note 40, at 597 (between 1972 and 1990, 1078 prisoners were removed from death 
row; M[t]he capacity to work with counsel on collateral appeals is thus more important 
than it might seemj citing data from Death Row, USA (NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, Jan, 21, 1991). 
162. Salguero, supra note 58, at 181. Note that psychiatrists are by no means invariably 
opposed to treating patients involuntarily "to meet the will of society," id., so long as 
they agree with society's will. See, e.g., H. Richard Lamb, Will We Save the Homeless 
Mentallj Ill?, 147 AM. J. PSYClUATRY 649, 650 (1990) ("If homeless persons with major 
mental illness are incompetent to make a decision with regard to accepting treatment • • • 
then I believe that outreach teams including psychiatrists should bring all of these patients 
to hospitals, involuntarily if need be. j. 
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see no way to justify treating the patient on the ground 
that it is beneficial to him. If the prisoner is to be treated, 
it will be for the sole purpose of serving the state's interest 
in carrying out the execution . . . . 
. . . Because the clinician's actions no longer have any 
link to the prisoner's own interests ... the clinician would 
be, serving a role that is ethically indistinguishable from the 
physician who administers the lethal injection of barbitu-
rates. 163 
4. Participation is a Perversion of Psychiatric Practice 
A fourth objection to psychiatric participation in execution 
competency proceedings is that such participation constitutes an 
immoral or perversion of psychiatric practice. Although this argu-
ment is often not regarded as distinct from the previous three argu-
ments, it nonetheless deserves individual consideration. 
The Ford decision necessarily entangles psychiatrists in a high-
ly visible, symbolically-charged facet of the American criminal 
justice system. l64 Dr. Appelbaum suggests that the judiciary has 
evinced "the universal desire for someone else to make the hard 
decisions,,16s by increasing the use of psychiatric testimony in the 
capital sentencing process. The psychiatrist's traditional therapeutic 
role is to help others gain insight and make hard decisions. How-
ever, Appelbaum concludes, the demand for psychiatrists to play a 
key role in sentencing decisions "may be serving as a substitute for 
some hard thinking about the purpose of punishment, and particu-
163. Bonnie, supra note 30, at 85. 
164. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986) (requiring neutral profession-
als to provide testimony as evidence of competency for execution), reh'g denied. Ford v. 
State, 522 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub nom. 
Ford v. Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). '"There can be little doubt that there will be 
widespread dissemination of information about the actions of psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists in cases of incompetency for execution. The avid public interest in death penalty 
cases, fueled by intense media scrutiny, is a potentially volatile situation." Heilbrun, et al., 
supra note 40, at 600. 
For extensive reviews of the symbolic aspect of death penalty litigation. see 
Barefoot's Alee, supra note I, at 91 nn.I-3, passim ('"There can be no question as to the 
symbolic significance of capital punishment as a political, sociological or penological 
issue, either historically or contemporaneously." Id. at n.2); Doctrinal Abyss, supra note I, 
at 88-97 (arguing that the ambiguity of the Court's treatment of insane criminal defen-
dants reflects the public's ambivalence toward the psychological and social symbols in-
voked by mental incompetence and crime generally). 
165. Appelbaum, supra note I, at 762. 
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lady about the role of th~ death sentence in the modem 
world."I66 Nonnal psychiatric practice is perverted when it allows 
courts and society-at-Iarge to avoid their responsibilities. 
Several commentators urge psychiatrists not to participate in 
execution competency' proceedings because in doing so a psychia-
trist is taking on the criminal justice system's burden and thus 
reinforcing society's ambivalence toward the death penalty. At the 
American Psychiatric Association's 1987 Annual Meeting, Dr. 
Appelbaum told listeners that psychiatric participation in execution 
competency proceedings would give capital punishment an unde-
served "scientific veneer," and would teU society, "we'U do your 
dirty work ... and this will make you aU feel better."I67 Others 
criticize participation because they fear that a psychiatric presence 
legitimizes the death penalty,t68 or may aid society's "attempt to 
improve the image of execution by cloaking it in the aura of medi-
cine."I69 Arguably, psychiatric input is not required to determine 
execution competency. Consequently. for retribution to be mean-
ingful, society. in the fonn of a jury, 170 should evaluate the pris-
oner and make the ultimate detennination of execution competen-
cy.l7l 
B. Critique of Arguments Against Participation 
In sum, critics of psychiatric involvement in execution compe-
166. ld. See also Judge David L. Bazelon, Veils, Values. and Social Responsibility, Ad-
dress before the American Psychological Association, (August 24, 1981), in 37 AM. PSy-
CHOLOGIST 115, 118 (1982) (Stating "Public decisions are often so close to impossible 
that those who are charged with making them are more than anxious to pass their burden 
to lUlwitting experts" and arguing that the social expectations placed on mental health pro-
fessionals by the judiciary may lead the testifying professionals to make tmfounded 
conclusory statements). 
167. Hansman, supra note 33, at 15, 21. 
168. See Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 46-47 (arguing that the official creation 
of professional standards for execution competency will legitimize "the whole process as 
well as the death penalty itseItj. 
169. Barbara Boisen, Strange Bedfellows: Death Penalty and Medicine, 248 JAMA 518, 
519 (1982) (restating the opinion of Dr. Armand Stuart, medical director of the Oldahoma 
Department of Corrections). 
170. See Ewing, supra note 134, at 184 & n.57 ("Although the law has given mental 
experts considerable responsibility for helping decide legal questions raised by crazy be-
havior, experts have less competence to assist in these decisions than is commonly be-
lieved. Moreover, much of the factual knowledge necessmy for legal decisionmaking is 
accessible to lay observers as well as experts.") (quoting Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behav-
ior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL L. REv. 527, 
602 (1978»; Questioning Psychiatry's Role, supra note 32, at 3. 
171. Ward, supra note 23, at 89. 
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tency assessment and psychiatric treatment restoring competency 
assert arguments equating involvment with participation in the 
execution, categorizing participation as contrary to principles of 
medical ethics, treating participation as a violation of informed 
consent standards, and criticizing participation as tainting the public 
perception of the practice of medicine.172 Although these argu-
ments are plentiful, they are internally inconsistent and they contra-
dict our intuitions about proper conduct in other scenarios. 
1. Psychiatric Involvement Does Not Constitute Participation in 
Executions 
By equating assessment or treatment of a condemned inmate 
with participation in an execution, those opposed to these activities 
over-state their case. Unlike administering a lethal injection, assess-
ing or treating psychosis does not directly cause death. The direct 
causes of death in executions are those actions that physically 
cause death, such as injecting the barbiturate or throwing the 
switch on the electric chair. To argue that assessment or treatment 
is an indirect cause of a convict's death - the "but for" argu-
ment173 - would impugn a host of other commonly accepted fo-
rensic activities. These activities include testifying for the prosecu-
tion in a capital case174 and giving competency-restoring treat-
172. See supra notes 129-71 and accompanying text. 
173. Cj. supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also Ward. supra note 23, at 8S 
(arguing that the psychiatrist has assisted in an execution which would not have occurred 
but for the treatment); Salguero, supra note S8, at 177 (suggesting that the but-for test is 
an appropriate measure of causation). It seems odd to label customary medical treatment 
for psychosis as the 'proximate cause' of a condemned prisoner's execution when it takes 
a subsequent series of well-planned preparations and acts to effect a death penalty. By 
contrast, to say that Mbut for his having committed a crime, psychiatric treatment would 
have enabled the prisoner to resume a normal life" correctly focuses on the criminal"s 
responsibility for what are, in his case, the implications of treatment. 
174. Bonnie makes this very point: 
[P]articipation in capital sentencing evaluations does not, in itself, offend any 
ethical injunction, and the pertinent question • • • is whether there is a princi-
pled basis for declining to perform execution competency evaluations while 
participating in the capital sentencing process. 
Both types of evaluation provide information and opinion • • . that could 
condemn or spare the prisoner. What seems to differentiate the two contexts is 
the immediacy of the link between the evaluator's opinion and the decision 
whether the person being evaluated will live or die • . • . 
The emotional impact of this contextual difference cannot be doubted, 
but I do not see its ethical significance. Indeed, • • • the case against participa-
tion in a capital sentencing evaluation actually would seem to be stronger than 
the case against participation in a routine execution competency evaluation. 
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ment to a patient accused of a capital crime.175 Many psychia-
trists regard these actions as ethical, even though death, although 
not the purpose of the activity, certainly is "within . . . the con-
templation of the actor.,,176 The indirect-execution argument might 
also preclude ever treating a condemned inmate, even though his 
execution is years away, since that treatment could prevent the 
development of incompetence that would preclude execution.177 
In • • • a sentencing proceeding, • • • the expert's opinion may very well in-
crease the 1iIcelihood that the defendant will be sentenced to death. In . . . a 
competency evaluation • • • the expert can alter the prisoner's situation only by 
extending his life. 
Bonnie, supra note 30, at 80-81. Appelbaum agrees: M[T]he immediacy and degree of 
harm to which the prisoner is subject heighten ethical concerns. But this may simply be a 
case of being closer to the consequences of one's actions." Appelbaum's Parable, supra 
note 17, at 257. 
175. The parens patriae justification for giving an incompetent defendant treatment is 
that the potential risk of recovering and being convicted is balanced by the potential 
benefit of medication (e.g., being able to assist in one's defense and perhaps gain acquit-
tal). See APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 10-11 n.12 (discussing the balance of risks 
and benefits associated with treatment of defendants). MWhether a particular treatment is in 
a particular patient's medical interests, however, is always a question involving consider-
ation of risks and benefits. There may well be room for debate about that balance •••• " 
It!. at 10. Few physicians, however, would think it proper to refrain from treating a pa-
tient with the intent of helping him avoid being tried, particularly if the patient desired 
treatment. 
The Mimmediacy" argument raised by Bonnie in connection with competency assess-
ments would seem to apply here as well: the psychological meaning of treating someone 
who might be punished in the next few weeks seems greater than in the case where pun-
ishment may be years away, but ethically, the problem is identical. 
176. Salguero, supra note 58, at 177; cf. supra note 124. 
177. Appelbaum comments: 
Does not any effort at treatment remove a potential obstacle to execution? I 
think this argument fails since the evidence suggests that only a tiny percentage 
of prisoners will become severely ill enough to meet the generally strict stan-
dards for incompetence. Thus, the balance of risks and benefits is very different 
for a prisoner for whom the question of incompetence has not been raised, but 
who may be in need of psychiatric care. 
Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 257 (emphasis added). 
There are three problems with Appelbaum's counter-argument. r1l'St, many, though 
not all, efforts at treatment will remove potential obstacles to execution. Although psychia-
trists who treat condemned inmates may not know in advance which of their patients will 
become incompetent, they do know that for some inmates their treatment will prevent 
deterioration and thus be MrespoDSlole" for their execution. There seems to be no less 
reason for criticizing psychiatrists who work under these circumstances, and who know 
that they are making sure inmates do not get crazy enough to avoid execution, than there 
is for terming psychiatrists who treat those judged incompetent for execution Mthe agents 
of that punishment." It!. at 258. 
Second, Appelbaum does not cite any evidence. While it is true that the question of 
execution competency has been raised for relatively few convicts, this may reflect the 
inadequacy of defense counsel usually afforded the mentally ill, rather than the true inci-
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Assessment and treatment should be further distinguished from 
participation because they are neither performed for the purpose of 
executing the prisoner, nor are they the reason for his death. If a 
prisoner has been justly tried, and if capital punishment itself is 
justified, then the reason for execution is that the prisoner was 
found guilty of a crime and must be punished.178 Assessment and 
treatment of the condemned serve the same purposes and offer the 
same potential benefits as they do for other patients: restoring 
sanity, relieving the torment of mental illness, and helping patients 
cope rationally with their situation. These medical benefits to the 
condemned inmate are not negated by one of the non-medical con-
sequences of sanity - eligibility for execution - though they may 
be less welcome than they are for more typical patients. Moreover, 
dence of serious mental disorders among death row inmates. See Michael L. Perlin, Are 
Courts Competent to Decide Competency: Stripping the Facade from United States v. 
Charters, 38 KAN. L. REv. 957, 996 (1990) (noting the generally Mscandalous" quality of 
legal assistance provided to the mentally ill), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); cf. 
Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionaiiwtion, and Homelessness: A Story of 
Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 126 (1991) ("Traditionally, lawyers assigned to 
represent state hospital patients have failed miserably in their mission,. See also supra 
notes 54-56 (discussing rates of severe mental illness among condemned prisoners). 
Third, even if the majority of death row inmates are not likely to develop mental 
disorders severe enough to render them incompetent for execution, psychiatrists may be 
able to recognize a sub-group of inmates whose medical histories or presenting symptoms 
make the possibility of execution incompetence quite high. Michael Perry would appear to 
be a case in point: even the trial court recognized his competency was Machieved through 
the use of ..• antipsychotic drugs." APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 4 (quoting Pet. 
App. 62). For prisoners like Perry, the Mrisk" of being treated and remaining sane are 
clear long before the scheduled execution date. As Professor Bonnie explains: 
As legal challenges for death row prisoners proceed through the courts, 
those who are mentally ill become well known to the mental health profession-
als responsible for providing services. As a prisoner's likely execution draws 
near, the potential legal significance of his questionable competency - and the 
enabling effect of continued treatment - will be apparent, even in the absence 
of any formal adjudication. Thus, ethical objections to treatment can arise in 
many cases other than those in which the condemned prisoners have been ad-
judicated incompetent for execution - indeed, the problem is discernible when-
ever a death row prisoner becomes psychotic. The slope of the Mno treatment" 
argument is very slippery indeed. 
Bonnie, supra note 30, at 84-85. 
178. Cf, Salguero, supra note 58, at 178, n.64: MOn its face, the purpose of treatment is 
to cure the patient, and the consequence of the care is to enable to state to execute. 
However, .•• the distinction [between purpose and consequence] is meaningless." Even if 
. the iust sentence were correct, it is not clear why the distinction is meaningless. The law 
does not authorize the state to execute someone because he is competent, but because he 
has been convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death. Execution is a consequence 
of criminal conviction and of nothing else. 
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these benefits are not necessarily outweighed by the prospect of 
execution. 179 
2. Normative Principles of Medical Ethics Do Not Prohibit 
Psychiatric Participation 
Ethical codes often provid~ physicians with general behavioral 
directives (e.g., "preserve life," "alleviate suffering," "do no harm") 
which are useful in the typical medical contexts in which they 
were developed, but which may fail physicians who attempt to 
apply them in novel circumstances. ISO To use a well-worn exam-
ple, the exhortation to "preserve life," which has guided and in-
spired modem physicians for two centuries,181 is no longer an 
adequate guide to late twentieth-century decisionmaking, when 
medical technology enables physicians to indefinitely prolong the 
agony-filled lives of terminally-ill patients. 182 
179. See infra text accompanying notes 305-26. 
180. Veatch argues that, in general, physicians will go astray if they simplistically Map-
peal to some parochial set of ethical rules or code of ethics to decide what is morally 
right in any medical ethical dilemma." VEATCH, supra note 147, at 74 (emphasis added). 
What Veatch terms Mthe dangerous ffippocratic principle," id. at 147, which simply pre-
scribes benefiting patients, is consequentialistic, paternalistic, and individualistic. Id. More-
over this principle lacks validity because it Mhas never involved pledges or promises made 
with or accepted by those outside the professional group." Id. at 90. Veatch utilizes con-
tract theory to establish a sounder foundation for medical ethics. Id. at 108-38. Veatch's 
theory recognizes that physicians and patients Mare members of a common moral commu-
nity of responsible people endowed with reason, dignity, and equality of moral worth. " Id. 
at 327. In thus placing respect for individuals' humanity and autonomy at the center of 
his conceptualization of ethical issues, Veatch's arguments correspond closely to those of 
this paper, infra, Part lV, concerning the justification of punishment 
181. "The ffippocratic Oath does not require a physician to use his skill to preserve 
life. It does require the ffippocratic physician to avoid giving 'a deadly drug to anybody 
if asked for it,' but that is certainly quite different" VEATCH, supra note 147, at 166. 
The notion that physicians have a duty to preserve life seems connected with ideas of 
progress that gained prominence by the seventeenth century. See Amundsen, The 
Physician's Obligation to Prolong Life: A Medical Duty without Classical Roots, 8 
HAsTINGS em. REP. 23, 28 (August, 1978) (noting that the duty to preserve life was not 
developed until the seventeenth century); GERALD J. GRUMAN, A HISTORY OF IDEAS 
ABOUT nIB PROLONGATION OF LtFE 83·90 (1966) (discussing the contemporaneous devel-
opment of the duty to preserve life and the progress of the eighteenth century). 
182. See PREsIDENT'S CoMMISSION FOR nIB STuDy OF EnnCAL PROBLEMS IN MEDI-
CINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, DECIDING TO FoREGO LtFE-SUSTAlN-
ING TREAThfENT (1983) (suggesting that the changing context of death and dying in the 
modem age requires a different moral framework). Many commentators would suggest that 
holding the preservation of life to be an absolute duty was never a satisfactory guide to 
decisionmaking. See, e.g., Talcott Parsons et al., The -Gift of Life» and Its Reciprocation, 
39 Soc. REs. 367, 395 (1972) (arguing that traditional medical ethics has tended toward 
Mabsolutizing • • • the value of preserving life" which has Mstrongly insulated medical 
ethics from any ethical system or complex that did not place a commensurate emphasis 
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In the context of capital punishment generally, the directive to 
"preserve life" could be read as asking physicians to interfere with 
the detennination or imposition of death sentences whenever they 
have an opportunity to do so. In the particular context of execution 
competency, such interference could take the form of testifying 
falsely that a convict is incompetent, or of manipulating medical 
treatment so as to delay recovery from psychosis. The lmowledge 
that physicians would behave in these ways would undoubtedly 
give prosecutors and prison officials ample incentive to limit 
doctors' activities in legal arenas. But leaving this consequence 
aside, for physicians to feel that their professional ethics afford a 
special justification for interfering with the execution of the law in 
ways that other citizens may not would be arrogant. 183 
upon the value of preserving life"); VEATCH, supra note 147, at 169 (The putative duty 
always to preserve life lacks a broad moral consensus, and "either reduces to a more 
general Hippocratic principle of benefiting the patient" or is "a careless expression of a 
more narrow and sophisticated role-specific duty . . • to avoid knowingly and actively 
killing human beings."). For example, In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985) involved 
the decision to remove a naspgastric (feeding) tube from an eighty-four year old terminal-
ly ill woman who suffered from severe organic brain SYndrome, urinary tract infection, 
gangrene, and arteriosclerotic heart disease. Id. at 1217. It was only through technology 
that the woman's life was extended at all. However, the physician still faced ethical con-
cerns; obviously the goals of alleviating suffering and preserving life clashed mightily. 
183. One might raise the point that the duty to preserve life - like other physicianly 
duties - is activated only by the establishment of a doctor-patient relationship, which 
does not obtain in forensic contexts: "psychiatrisls operate oulside the medical framework 
when they enter the forensic realm." Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 258. "When 
professiona1s function as either evaluators or consultants, they establish no therapeutic or 
habilitative relationship with defendants and thus owe them no loyalty." ABA STANDARDS, 
supra note 19, at Standard 7-7.1 cmt Even if psychiatrists are in fact oulside the medical 
framework and do not establish therapeutic relationships with evaluees, psychiatrists are 
not precluded from seeking out relationships with defendants and prisoners with the intent 
of saving lives, even if they interfere with legal outcomes by doing so. Thus some clini-
cians, for example, will conduct capital sentencing evaluations only for the defense, with 
the intent of rmding mitigating evidence. Cf. Foot, supra note 146, at 216 (suggesting 
that psychiatrists might ·work against capital punishment from the inside"). My purpose is 
not to criticize these clinicians, but to point out that the urge to use one's clinical prow-
ess to preserve life frequently enters the minds of clinicians who engage in forensic activ-
ities. 
Were the APNAMA Brief'S commutation-if-incompetent position adopted, see supra 
text at notes 110-15, psychiatrisls who wished to work in opposition to the death penalty 
would have an enormous temptation to seek opportunities to testify that condemnees are 
incompetent; the duty to "preserve life" - if accepted at face value - would appear to 
place all psychiatrists under enormous pressure to find reasons to suggest that prisoners 
are incompetent The potential conflict between the duty to preserve life and the duty to 
tell the truth in court would be at least as troublesome as the ethical conflicts faced by 
psychiatrists whose treatment might restore execution competency. Even if one felt that 
psychiatrists were not obligated to individual prisoners with whom they have evaluative, 
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Ewing and Wallace conclude from their, reading of the codes of 
conduct that professional organizations should officially declare 
most involvement in execution competency proceedings to be un-
ethica1.184 But if the psychiatrist refuses to evaluate a prisoner, he 
forfeits a chance to preserve life. 
The ethical codes' outcome-oriented prescriptions appear to 
conflict with one another. ISS Codes of ethics direct physicians to 
preserve life, avoid harm, heal the sick, and prevent suffenng. 
They do not answer the question of which is more harmful, treat-
ing psychotic condemned inmates with the knowledge that they 
could then be executed, or leaving them psychotic for months or 
years. The codes give no guidance as to how they apply when 
healing the sick and preventing suffering may not preserve life. 
Psychiatrists who use only the codes' directives to choose a course 
of action "cannot make an ethical choice. ,,186 
Assessment and treatment of incompetent condemned prisoners 
are not clear violations of professional codes of ethics. Codified 
directives often may produce laudable results in "typical" circum-
stances in which physicians find themselves. These directives are 
ill-suited to prescribe psychiatrists' behavior in atypical doctor-
patient relationships, as when the patient is an incompetent 
condemnee. In the novel or atypical context, the psychiatrist must 
but not treatment, relationships, the APA/AMA Brief's argument about the desirability of 
regarding psychiatrists as practitioners of a beneficent healing art would provide the basis 
for psychiatrists· having a moral obligation to prisoners in generaL APA/AMA Brief, 
supra note 38, at 13. This general moral obligation would only be satisfied by fmding 
condemnees incompetent. The Brief's position thus seems to entail physicians' working to 
subvert the capital punishment process. 
Clinicians unambiguously have advocated subverting strict civil commitment laws 
when these would prevent involuntary hospitalization of someone who very much needs 
this type of care. See, e.g., Louis McGarry &. Paul Chodoff, The Ethics of Involuntary 
Hospitalization, in SIDNEY BLOCH &. PAUL CHODOFF, PSYCHIATRIC Ennes 203, 211-212 
(1981) (suggesting that psychiatrists not "acced[e] too readily to current trends" nor "suc-
cumb to prevailing fashion when they are convinced that it is not always in the best 
interests of those patients"); see also R. Michael Bagby &. E. Leslie Atkinson, The Effects 
of Legislative Refonn on Civil Commitment Admission Rates: A Critical Analysis, 6 
BEHA V. SCI. &. L. 45, 58 (noting that there is little evidence to suggest that psychiatrists 
adhere to tightened commitment requirements; some psychiatrists ignore restrictive laws 
and commit those "whom they believe should be committed"). 
184. See Ewing, supra note 134, at 185 (recommending that the American Psychiatric 
Association prohibit members from treating or assessing condemned prisoners); Wallace, 
supra note 131 at 278 (arguing that professional organizations should explicitly deem un-
ethical any member's treatment or asessment of persons sentenced to capital punishment). 
185. Salguero, supra note 58, at 168. 
186. Id. 
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make an effort to abstract general principlesl87 of conduct to 
guide decisionmaking and to explain, for example, why physicians 
are often obligated to alleviate suffering and preserve life, yet 
sometimes obligated not to do so. For example, a cancer patient 
may 'prefer to endure pain rather than be unconscious from pain 
medication so that he may put his affairs in order during the last 
weeks of his life. An AIDS patient may wish to forego life-pro-
longing respirations and drugs in order to die a peaceful death. In 
these situations it is clear that the physician's primary obligation is 
to do other than relieve suffering or save lives. 
Physicians are dedicated to, and have special skills to under-
take, healing and life-saving activities. But ethical directives to 
alleviate pain or save lives are always limited by the prior context 
of a doctor-patient relationship. Without the relationship, in this 
and all other medical contexts, individuals have a fundamental right 
to be left alone. 188 
3. Participation Does Not Violate Informed Consent 
The physician'S contractual duty to the patient is normally 
created when the patient gives informed consent Usually these 
contractual agreements between doctor and patient create a duty on 
the part of the doctor to perform activities for the patient who 
seeks their benefit. 189 When dealing with an incompetent con-
demned prisoner, however, the psychiatrist must infer what the 
reasonable prisoner would want in order to determine what duties 
accompany the relationship.l90 
187. The process is analogous 10 Dworkin's description of how an ideal judge would 
decide hard cases. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 81, 105-130 
(1977) (suggesting that an ideal judge would decide difficult cases by initially constructing 
broad legal theories). For a neurologically-based account of how general theories, explana-
tions, and moral principles are developed from a series of particular experiences, see PAUL 
S. CHuRCHLAND, A NEUROCOMPIJrATlONAL PERsPECTIVE: nm NATURE OF MIND AND TIlE 
SlRUCTURE OF SCIENCE, 153-230, 297-303 (1989). 
188. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.B. 92, 94 (N.Y. 1914) 
(holding that the doctor's duty 10 the patient supersedes the duty 10 uphold the Hippocrat-
ic Oath); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding the 
patient's right to accept or refuse treatment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). 
189. See Robert M. Veatch, Models for Ethical Medicine in a Revolutionary Age, 2 
HAsTINGS CENTER REPoRT 5, 7 (June 1972) (discussing the contract model of doctor-
patient relationships). See also VEATCH, supra note 147, at 108-30, 327-30 (proposing a 
draft for a nested Mtriple contract" to guide the creation and boundaries of physician-pa-
tient relationship). 
190. Cj. Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (describing the Mreasonable patient" standard of 
informed consent). 
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Professor Bonnie emphasizes the importance of sensitivity to 
the patient's wishes in a scenario exploring the ethics of treating 
the incompetent condemned.191 This scenario suggests that psychi-
atric practice might be perverted most by a position that absolutely 
forbids treatment. Bonnie asks us to "consider the possibility of a 
'living will' in which the condemned prisoner - contemporaneous-
ly determined to be competent - states that if he becomes incom-
petent while awaiting execution, he wishes to be treated."I92 To 
categorically reject a competent prisoner's requests for treatment 
would deprive him of his autonomy "and thereby eraseO [his] 
human dignity. "193 Bonnie offers as plausible motivations for a 
prisoner's request for treatment the prisoner's preference for death 
over the ravages of psychosis. Some prisoners prefer execution to 
life-long imprisonment following commutation. l94 In addition, it 
is not difficult to imagine a treatment request being made by a 
prisoner who accepts his guilt and deems execution his just desert. 195 
191. Bonnie, supra note 30, at 83. 
192. ld. 
193. ld. at 84. 
194. ld. at 83. Bonnie's discussion here assumes the existence of a clause such as that 
existing in Maryland, which calls for commutation of death sentences when condemnees 
are found incompetent to be executed. See supra note 109. Ga!y Gilmore was one person 
who preferred execution to imprisonment. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). 
Convicted and sen1enced to death for the murder of a hotel clerk, w., he found execution 
preferable to imprisonment..See NORMAN MAILER, THE ExEcunONER'S SONG 484 (1979). 
He told a Monnon chaplain of his preference for execution, stating MI'Il be honest with 
you. I've been in for eighteen years and I'm not about to do another twenty. Rather than 
live in this hole, I'd choose to be dead." ld. But see infra note 195 (quoting Gilmore's 
statement that his punishment was proper and was the result of a fair trial). 
Gilmore instructed his attorneys, who believed they had strong grounds upon which 
to mount an appeal, to forego any appeal of his death sentence. MAILER, infra at 489. 
He explained, MI've been here for three weeks and I don't know that I want to live here 
for the rest of my life •••• " ld. Gilmore fired his counsel and withdrew his motion for 
a new trial. ld. He continued to resist efforts to postpone or vacate his death sentence, 
and was ultimately executed by a fuing squad on January 17, 1977. ld. 
195. Socrates provides an important historical example; see infra note 247 and accom-
panying text. Ga!y Gilmore may represent another such case. In speaking to the Justices 
of the Utah Supreme Court in November, 1976, he stated: 
Your Honor, I don't want to take up a lot of your time with my words. 
I believe I was given a fair trial and I think the sentence is proper and I am 
willing to accept it like a man. I don't wish to appeal • • • • I desire to be 
executed on schedule, and I just wish to accept that with the grace and dignity 
of a man .... 
MAILER, supra note 194, at 534. See also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) 
llTlhe Court is convinced that Gary Mark Gilmore made a knowing and intelligent waiv-
er of any and all federal rights he might have asserted after the Utah trial court's sen- . 
tence was imposed ••• • j. Of course, only a minority of convicts view their punishment 
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One possible counterargument is that problems in obtaining 
proper consent arise in many other forensic situations without re-
sulting in prohibitions against psychiatric participation. It seems 
appropriate for psychiatrists to respond to calls for execution com-
petency evaluations in the same way they do in these other cir-
cumstances. For example, Halleck and colleagues offer sentencing 
evaluation guidelines that should also provide ample safeguards 
against a psychiatrist's improper evaluation of a prisoner's execu-
tion competency when the prisoner is unable to give consent 196 
They recommend that "the psychiatrist should stop the examination, 
inform the party who requested the evaluation [of the prisoner's in-
competence] ... , and allow the legal system to arrive at a solu-
tion to the problem. ,,197 Following this suggestion could produce 
at least two possible outcomes. First, a court may rule that the 
state's interest in carrying out sentences, or the loss of liberty en-
tailed by conviction, render unnecessary the usual requirements for 
prisoner consent Second, a court might rule that it is reasonable to 
assume that if the prisoner is incompetent to consent to be inter-
viewed he is incompetent to be executed. 198 
4. Participation is Not a Perversion of Psychiatric Practice 
While treating an incompetent prisoner might carry with it all 
the emotional burdenl99 of treating a condemnee who had ex-
pressed no preferences about competency restoration, it is hard to 
see how such treatment could be criticized as doing "society's dirty 
work" or as a perversion of medical practice. Nor can a competen-
cy evaluation of a consenting prisoner, under these circumstances, 
be dismissed as an unwise appropriation of the duty of society to 
this way. "According to the NAACP Legal Defense fund, of the first 100 executions in 
the United States after 1976, 11 were consensual." Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 
307 n.20. These examples are intended primarily to expose certain features of our ethical 
predilections, rather than prepare us for a particular (and unlikely) exigency. 
196. Seymour L. Halleck et aI., Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, in AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC AsSOCIATION, ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 181, 201 (1984). 
197. [d. 
198. "While competency for execution and competency to give informed consent are not 
the same, under many execution competency standards they are similar." Ward, supra note 
23, at 78. 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28. See also Radelet & Barnard, supra 
note 23, at 303-04 (discussing emotional impact on Chattahoochee Florida State Hospital 
staff involved in caring for Gary Alvord, who was adjudicated incompetent for execution 
in 1984). 
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judge an inmate's fitness for execution.2OO One purpose of the 
evaluation would be to detennine whether the inmate needs a type 
of treatment that he has requested - an eminently medical under-
taking. Even where the condemnee consents, many psychiatrists 
might wish, for emotional reasons, to shun the evaluation and 
treatment of condemned prisoners. But psychiatrists have little basis 
to absolutely condemn their colleagues who choose to evaluate and 
treat condemned prisoners201 unless these psychiatrists adopt the 
position that there is never any justification for the death penalty, 
so that all psychiatrists must be absolutely enjoined from treating 
the condemned.202 
This article characterizes the "participation as perversion" ob-
jection203 as having three' components: (a) psychiatrists have no 
special expertise in assessing execution competency; (b) society, 
represented by a judge or jury, not a psychiatrist, has the responsi-
bility for determining execution competency; and, (c) psychiatrists 
should not abet society's refusal to accept its responsibility for 
addressing problems associated with capital punishment or its un-
willingness to confront matters about which it is profoundly ambiv-
alent. "Participation as perve~ion" is an important objection be-
cause it deals with psychiatrists' roles in a highly visible and sym-
bolically important arena. The role psychiatrists play in forensic 
matters, and how they think about that role, says a great deal 
about how they perceive themselves and their patients general-
ly.2M Psychiatrists can respond to this objection, however, in 
ways that fall short of complete abstention from involvement with 
incompetent condemnees. 
200. But see text accompanying note 145; Ward. supra note 23, at 89. 
201. Note that I leave open the possibility that psychiatrists who felt the death penalty 
was always immoral might logically object to fellow physicians' acting in ways that allow 
the machinety of capital punishment to work. However, none of the published objections 
that I discuss in this article explicitly call upon psychiatrists to refuse to participate be-
cause capital punishment is wrong or unjust. 
202. Limited condemnations, e.g., that the evaluating or treating psychiatrists were not 
impartial, were misdiagnosing, or were using poor therapeutic technique, would, of course, 
still be reasonable. 
203. See Mossman, supra note 23, at 4OQ.()1, 403..()4 (discussing ·psychiatry·s 'social 
function' in the capital punishment process~ and ·role conflictsj. 
204. See Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, offering an elegant, succinct discussion of 
this issue. One of the most frequently-cited defenses of psychiatric participation in forensic 
matters is Richard J. Bonnie & Christopher Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Profes-
sionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427 
(1980) (justifying participation and offering guidelines for psychiatrists). See infra text 
accompanying notes 293-302. 
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Attorneys, philosophy professors, and other well-educated per-
sons could probably assess the ethicality of competency evaluations 
as well as psychiatrists. In fact, only a minority of psychiatrists can 
be expected to have enough understanding of the complex legal 
and philosophical issues at stake to perfonn an adequate evaluation 
of execution competency. However, psychiatrists do have unique 
expertise concerning the disorders that cause incompetence. With 
special training, psychiatrists can explain to fact-finders how those 
disorders impair thought processes, understanding, and judg-
ment,20S There is, therefore, reason to presume that the lack of 
psychiatric input in execution competency judgments might entail 
"a serious loss to the pursuit of justice ... 206 
No matter how valuable their expertise may be, when psychia-
trists participate in execution competency proceedings they must 
avoid usurping or being thrust into the roles of the other "players." 
It is properly only the judge's or jury's task to decide whether a 
convict is competent to be executed. Wallace's concern about 
psychiatrists' participation in a competency tribunal207 seems jus-
tified in view of the actions of psychiatrists evaluating Alvin Ford. 
Those psychiatrists submitted unchallenged written conclusions that 
Ford was competent to be executed.208 Psychiatrists need proce-
205. GutheU and Bursztajn describe methods for assessing uncooperative patients and for 
showing courts how subtle fonus of psychosis and mood disturbance affect competency to 
refuse treatment. Thomas G. Gotheil & Harold Bursztajn, Clinician's Guidelines for As-
sessing and Presenting Subtle Forms of Patient Incompetence in Legal Settings, 143 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 1020 (1986). Psychiatrists with proper training might offer analogous kinds 
of services to courts charged with adjudicating execution competency. 
206. Compare Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 2S5 with Ewing, supra note 134, 
at 184 (psychiatric input, though desired by courts and legislators, is not necessary; com-
petency decisions Mcould be made just as well - if not better - on the basis of lay 
evidence provided by those who know the inmate best and have had the greatest opportu-
nity to observe him.,,). Professor Stephen Morse feels that mental health testimony in 
general has little courtroom value: 
Although the law has given mental experts considerable responsibility for help-
ing decide legal questions raised by crazy behavior, experts have less compe-
tence to assist in these decisions than is commonly believed. Moreover, much 
of the factual knowledge necessary for legal decisionmaking is accessible to lay 
observers as well as experts. 
Stephen Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals. and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 
51 S. CAL L. REv. 527, 602 (1978). 
207. See supra text accompanying note 132; see also Wallace, supra note 131, at 280. 
208. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 403-04 (1986), reh'g denied. Ford v. State, 522 
So. 2d 345 (FIa. 1988) (denying post-conviction relief), cert. denied sub nam. Ford v. 
Dugger, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). This circumstance was not unique: 
[A] team of three psychiatrists was appointed by the Govemor [of Florida] to 
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dural regulations that clarify the psychiatrist's role and the proper 
scope of expert testimony. Professional guidelines for conducting 
evaluations and providing testimony209 might reduce the likeli-
hood that a psychiatrist would decide the ultimate legal conclusions 
about execution competency.210 
Society may be trying to ignore the problems associated with 
capital punishment, but that fact, by itself, does not argue against 
psychiatrists' participation in the process. Execution competency is 
only one problem area in which the legal system uses psychiatry in 
an attempt to resolve awkward situations or avoid "hard thinking." 
Psychiatrists should remain aware that society often asks them to 
make uncomfortable decisions in a variety of forensic situations, 
including the determination of competence for decisionmaking, 
child custody determinations, the need for involuntary commitment, 
and the prediction of long-term future dangerousness for sentencing 
purposes. Psychiatrists therefore must guard against assuming re-
sponsibilities that properly belong to judges or juries. 
While psychiatrists are not responsible for making decisions 
about legal status, they do routinely make decisions about whether 
to provide treatment The psychiatrist must answer the difficult 
question of whether providing treatment for an incompetent, psy-
chotic condemnee-treatment that, were he not condemned, he 
might receive as a, matter of course-is necessarily a perversion of 
assess [Gary] Alvord's competency, and [on November 26, 1984,] three days 
before the scheduled execution, the prisoner was evaluated. After the psychia-
trists dictated a five-sentence report in the prison parking lol slating their belief 
that Alvord was indeed incompetent to be executed, the governor slayed the 
execution •••• We note in passing that the psychiatrists' report simply offered 
the conclusion that Alvord was incompetent for execution; no details were 
given as to how the examination was conducted or what medical impairments 
were found. In short, it was really the psychiatrists, not the governor, who 
made the decision that Alvord was incompetent. As in every olher case in 
which the issue of competency has been raised in Florida death penalty cases, 
the physicians in the Alvord case acted as both experts and judges. 
Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 301. 
209. See supra note 29 (citing guideline sources). 
210. The APA offers similar guidelines for psychiatrists involved in trials where legal 
sanity is at issue, and recommends that psychiatrists nol testify as to the ultimate legal 
conclusion. See Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement 
on the Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681 (1983). In practice, it is often diffi-
cult for courtroom experts to make a clear statement about the results of their evaluations 
without at least coming very close to commenting on the ultimate legal issue. Cj. 
Heilbrun & McClaren, supra note 29, at 212-13 (discussing strategies for commenting on 
a patient's mental state without reaching a conclusion as to the ultimate legal issue -
competency). 
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medical practice. This article suggests that if such treatment had 
been competently and explicitly requested by the inmate prior to 
his becoming psychotic, withholding it might seem more offen-
sive.211 If such explicitly-requested treatment seems justifiable, it 
must serve some interest of the inmate. Is it possible that another 
condemnee who became psychotic without having made an explicit 
prior request for competency-restoring treatment would have the 
same interest in being treated? I believe he would, and that this 
interest derives from a paramount interest in receiving punishment. 
Section IV explains this position, which has substantial implications 
for physicians who work with patients who have committed crimes. 
C. Dlustrations of Psychiatrists' Dilemmas 
To appreciate physicians' need for an approach to treating 
prisoners that acknowledges the justification of punishment, consid-
er the following three scenarios in which the ethical issues facing 
physicians seem analogous to those raised by execution competency 
proceedings. But in these scenarios the typical or expected actions 
of physicians do not generate immediate or vigorous denunciation. 
(1) Inmates convicted of non-capital crimes can be transf€?rred 
to mental hospitals if they develop psychiatric disorders,212 and 
returned to prison once they have recovered. Suppose a psychiatrist 
is asked to evaluate or treat a convict who has been serving a life 
sentence in a particularly nasty prison prior to being transferred to 
a hospital for psychiatric care. The psychiatrist knows that the 
convict understandably prefers living in the mental institution 
(which in this case is a relatively pleasant place) to being returned 
to the prison. All of the arguments cited above against evaluating 
or treating the incompetent condemned apply to the psychiatrist 
involved with a convict who faces non-capital punishment. A psy-
chiatric evaluation would determine whether the prisoner is "fit" to 
211. See supra note 202 and accompanying text 
212. Such inmates are entitled to a number of due process protections before they may 
be subjected to involuntary treatment Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-95 (1980). In 
Vitek, the Supreme Court distinguished criminal confmement from involuntary psychiatric 
hospitalization on grounds that the latter can result in a distinct social stigma and 
"[c]ompeIled treatme.nt," which are not associated with mere imprisonment Id. at 492. A 
prisoner retains a liberty interest in not being committed to a psychiatric hospital without 
appropriate due process safeguards because of "the stigmatizing consequences of a transfer 
to a mental hospital . • • , coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatoIy be-
havior modification as a treatment •. ' .• " Id. at 494. See MENTAL DISABlLlTY LAw, 
supra note I, § 3.66, at 394403 (discussing transfer rights and procedures). 
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resume punishment.213 The treatment can be expected to allow 
punishment, which would otherwise not continue, to proceed. Eval-
uation and treatment might violate infonned consent requirements 
and the psychiatrist might be viewed as an ally or agent of the 
state, "an instrument of punishment,.,214 rather than as an advo-
213. Note that transferring a prisoner to a hospital is not equivalent to punishment. 
Even though time spent in-hospital prior to or following sentencing may be counted as 
part of a prisoner's total sentence, persons who are not convicted also spend time in 
hospitals, so hospitalization cannot be equated with punishment. See, e.g., Franklin v. 
Berger, 544 A.2d 650, 653 (Conn. App. 1988) (denial of credit for pretrial confmement 
denied defendant equal protection), cenijication granted in part, 546 A.2d 282 (Conn. 
1988), rev'd, 560 A.2d 444 (Conn. 1989); State v. Tal-Mason, 515 So. 2d 738, 740 (FIa. 
1987) (prisoner entitled to credit for Mprecommitment coercive detentionj, appeal granted, 
596 So. 2d 796 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (second habeas co'rpus appeal); Matter of 
Knapp, 687 P.2d 1145, 1152 (Wash. 1984) (equal protection violation to deny defendants 
credit for time spent in hospital as part of probationary term and for presentence evalua-
tion); and ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at Standard 7-10.10(a) (prisoner hospitalized 
in psychiatric facility Mis entitled to earn good time credits on same terms as prisoners in 
adult correctional facilitiesj. 
Suppose a prison has an inrmnary which, arguendo, is relatively pleasant when com-
pared with the rest of the institution and the prisoner has requested treatment and is re-
Ceiving it voluntarily. Because the inrmnary is part of the penal institution. the convict 
would still be Min prison" while treated in the inrmnary. In this situation. a return to a 
regular cell technically would not entail a resumption of punishment. Yet, the ethical 
issues faced by a physician who must decide whether the convict is ready to leave the 
inrmnary are similar to those faced by a physician who must decide whether a hospital-
ized convict is ready to return to prison. Although these morally awkward positions are 
faced regularly by prison psychiatrists - albeit in less dramatic contexts than when the 
death penalty is involved - psychiatrists have not been exhorted to abjure treating con-
victs. See American Psychiatric Association. TASK FORCE REPoRT 29: PSYCHIATRIC SER-
VICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS (1989) (discussing the issues facing psychiatrists who treat 
convicts). For a discussion of the procedural rights available to prisoners who might be 
compelled in treatment, see MENTAL DISABIUTY LAW, supra note I, § 3.66 (discussing 
Baugh v. Woodward, 604 F. Supp. 1529, 1535 (B.D.N.C. 1985) (Prisoners have Ma pro-
tected constitutional liberty interest in not being transferred to an inpatient prison mental 
health facility.j, affd in part, vacated in part, 808 F.2d 333 (4th Cit. 1987) (vacating 
the judgment that a hearing must be provided before a prisoner is physically transferred 
to a mental health facility and holding that a hearing promptly after physical transfer does 
not raise constitutional concerns». 
214. APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 18. The Brief continues, "lhis concern is at its 
greatest with respect to patients in prison. Prisoners already have reasons to be suspicious 
of psychiatrists, because psychiatrists in an evaluative role often testify against prisoners in 
competency, insanity, and death penalty proceedings." Id. The Brief argues for preserving 
psychiatrists' evaluative role in execution competency cases, but states that competency-
restoring treatment should not be imposed on inmates contrary to their Mmedical interests." 
Id. at 12. Psychiatrists, however, regularly treat non-capital patients and restore their abili-
ty to return to Prison. and may do so over their objection. Washington v. Harper, 494 
U.S. 210 (1990) (upholding the state's right to treat an inmate against his will). While 
the emotional impact of psychiatrists' activity may be greater where the death penalty is 
involved, the ethical issue raised by psychiatrists' dual role as treaters and as state em-
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cate for the patient's "medical" interests. Yet psychiatrists often un-
dertake evaluations and treatment under such controversial circum-
stances, with far less concern that their functions violate ethical 
nonns.21S In fact, a psychiatrist might feel some obligation to ad-
minister treatment; helping a prisoner avoid treatment might be 
viewed as collusion with his desire to avoid punishment 
(2) A physician who is asked to evaluate and/or treat an un-
conscious inmate whose execution is imminent but who has devel-
oped a potentially fatal medical disorder (for example, a myocar-
dial infarction, or respiratory suppression caused by the inmate's 
intentional ingestion of a surreptitiously-obtained barbiturate) faces 
a difficult ethical problem. Suppose that the physician believes that 
without treatment the inmate stands a good chance of dying a 
peaceful death; but with pharmacologic interventions and other con-
ventional supportive measures, there is a high likelihood that his 
condition can be stabilized. The physician knows that if he elects 
to treat the convict, there will come a point where he will be 
asked to determine whether the convict is ready to be returned to 
prison, where the convict's execution will be scheduled and carried 
OUt.216 
Clearly, the decision whether to treat is an awful one. What is 
not clear is whether the physician would either appear or feel 
worse for treating rather than withholding treatment The physician 
who treats an unconscious prisoner wrestles with the same ethical 
problems that accompany psychiatric assessment or treatment of the 
incompetent condemned. Most physicians would choose "instinc-
tively" to evaluate and treat the convict In fact, most physicians 
would feel tempted to reproach a colleague who refrained from 
providing medical care, allowing the convict to die. Such 
evaluation and treatment probably would not raise criticisms that 
the physician was indirectly participating in an execution, violating 
ethical codes, vitiating the requirements of informed consent doc-
trine, or perverting the profession. It is unlikely many physicians 
ployees seems no different in the case of peISOllS convicted of non-capital crimes. 
215. "'To our knowledge, nobody has cited ethical difficulties in treating" to restore 
competency to stand trial, Meven though treatment might again facilitate the administration 
of punishment .•• " Heilbrun et al., supra note 40, at 601. 
216. Note the grim irony involved in the case of the potentially-fatal barbiturate over-
dose: in a state where convicts are executed with lethal injections, saving the convict·s 
life would make it possible for the state to administer another lethal overdose in order to 
bring about the same result sought by the prisoner. 
HeinOnline -- 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 53 1992-1993
1992] THE PSYCHIATRIST AND EXECUTION COMPETENCY S3 
would criticize such treatment even though the ethical consider-
ations raised by the inmate's physical disorder are identical to 
those raised by mental incompetence. 
(3) One final scenario further illustrates the ethical complexity 
of psychiatric treatment of the condemned. Suppose a psychiatrist 
had available a medication that would safely induce a pleasurable 
psychosis but would render a prisoner pennanently incompetent to 
be executed.217 Such a medication would have the potential for 
saving the lives of condemned prisoners, and many prisoners might 
desire it. If psychiatrists felt that their obligation to save lives were 
of paramount ethical importance, they would have an obligation to 
offer this medication to competent death row inmates and could be 
remiss in withholding it. 
Understandably, these hypothetical scenarios produce ambivalent 
reactions. The purpose of examining them is only to emphasize the 
importance of thinking about execution competency dilemmas in a 
much broader framework that reflects different perspectives about 
the role and justification of punishment itself. My contention is that 
psychiatrists can resolve such dilemmas only if they acknowledge 
the moral basis for criminal sanctions described in the next section. 
IV. nIB PSYClllATRIST AND TIffi JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT: 
HypOTHETICAL CONSENT 
If the death penalty itself is immoral,2IB physicians may have 
a powerful ethical justification for spuming involvement in many 
aspects of the capital punishment process.219 Yet most of the lit-
217. Many legal (as well as illegal) phannaceuticals induce psychosis. particularly in 
overdose. MOverdose with psychostimuiants [e.g., amphetamines] results in marked sympa- . 
thetic ovemctivity • • • often accompanied by toxic psychosis or delirium." STEVEN E. 
HYMAN & GEORGE W. ARANA, HANDBOOK OF PSYClUA1lUC DRUG 1lIERAPY 141 (1987). 
Usually, stimulant-induced psychoses are not pleasant; fortunately, they are usually self-
limited. 
218. A full discussion of the morality and constitutionality of capital punishment lies 
beyond the scope of this article. For a concise introduction to the case against capital 
punishment, see, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punish-
ment, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1670 (1986) (arguing that the capital punishment system as-
sumed by death penalty proponents does not exist; capital punishment is mrely inflicted, 
often spares the most vicious killers and exists primarily in former slave-holding states 
against killers of whites). For a succinct defense of the death penalty, see, e.g., Ernest 
van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1662 (1986) 
(arguing that maldistribution of capital punishment cannot be an argument against its 
momlity, since guilt is individual and that the tendency to apply death sentence to killers 
of whites suggests an injustice to black victims who receive lesser vindication). 
219. There is no reason to assume that physicians markedly vary from the rest of the 
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erature discussing the propriety of psychiatric participation in exe-
cution competency proceedings is silent on the morality of the 
death penalty itself, preferring to separate the legal issue of punish-
ment from the medical issue of treatment. 220 The psychiatric liter-
ature on execution competency is also largely silent on the issue of 
the morality of punishment in general. Punishment is often recog-
nized as an evil or a fonn of "harm, "221 but the justification for 
punishment is a subject which this literature ignores.222 Many of 
the ethical issues generated by the psychiatric problems of 
condemnees are also present in the evaluation or treatment of pris-
American public in their views about the death penalty. If, however, physicians were 
unanimous in the view that capital punishment is immoral, or if their professional organi-
zations declared involvement in the evaluation and care of capital defendants and 
condemnees to be unethical, physicians" reluctance to assess or treat these classes of pris-
oners might constitute a powerful and effective method of attaining legislation against the 
execution of those who become insane while awaiting the death penalty. See, e.g., Ewing, 
supra note 134, at 185 (arguing that, if medical professionals refused to treat incompetent 
condemned inmates, the United States legislature may be led to exempt insane 
condemnees from execution). 
A number of writers have commented that a psychiatrist's reluctance to participate in 
execution competency proceedings is an implicit rejection of the death peIll!lty. See, e.g., 
Ward, supra note 23, at 99 (MIf we shudder at the thought of an imnate who would have 
been spared the gas chamber but for an injection of Prolixin [an anti-psychotic medica-
tion], our uneasiness reflects a more basic abhorrence of the death penalty itself.,. 
Weinstock and colleagues note, MIf one opposes capital punishment one might con-
sider it unethical to evaluate the sanity of a death row prisoner if such evaluation were to 
be used to certify that he it fit to be executed." Robert Weinstock, et al., The Role of 
Traditional Medical Ethics in Forensic Psychiatry, in EnnCAL PRAcrrCB IN PSYCHIATRY 
AND TIlE LAw 31, 38 (Richard Rosner & Robert Weinstock eds., 1990) (citing personal 
communication from Bernard Diamond (April 25, 1988». While I am not sure that the 
view that the death penalty is immoral entails an obligation to abstain from evaluation or 
treatment of condemned inmates, such a view seems implicit in the argument that physi-
cians should abstain lest they absolve jurors" guilty consciences or inadvertently give 
capital punishment a Mveneer" of respectability. See, e.g., Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 
17. 
220. This is not surprising. It would be very difficult for the leadership of the American 
Psychiatric Association to take an official position against a punishment the use of which 
a substantial portion of its membership may favor. However, the APA is not totally op-
posed to taking stands on controversial political or moral issues. See, e.g., Commission on 
AIDS, American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement Opposing Mandatory Name 
Reporting of HlV-Seropositive Individuals, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 541 (1990). 
221. Appelbaum, for example, discusses the potential conflict between physicians" cus-
tomary obligation to "do no harm" and the potential results of psychiatrists" participation 
Min criminal proceedings, especially on behalf of the prosecution, when their testimony 
may result in a defendant"[s] ..• punish[ment]." Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 17, at 
254. Arguably, this conflict arises out of a failure to analyze the peculiar moral status of 
punishment. See supra note ISS. 
222. See Mossman, supra note 23, at 404-07, for a brief discussion of this issue. 
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oners accused or convicted of non-capital crimes.223 The prospect 
of assessing or treating a possibly-incompetent condemned inmate 
thus forces the psychiatrist to come to grips with his own views 
about the morality of both capital punishment and the justification 
of criminal sanctions in general.224 
This section sketches out a theory of punishment which ad-
dresses concerns central to general principles of ethical medical 
practice. More precisely, it presents a perspective on punishment 
that accords with the respect for autonomy and dignity that are at 
the core of medical ethics.22S Although this theory could help 
psychiatrists sort out their duties and obligations toward most indi-
viduals who have been accused or convicted of either capital or 
non-capital crimes, this article focuses on the obligations befalling 
psychiatrists who might be asked to evaluate or treat incompetent 
condemnees. This discussion assumes the truth of a number of 
propositions which, although entirely consistent with published 
viewpoints objecting to psychiatric participation,226 are all, to 
some degree, controversial. 227 This article argues that disagree-
223. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text. 
224. For perhaps the best-known discussion by a psychiatrist of the morality of pun-
ishment, see KARL MENNINGER. DiE CRIME OF PuNIsHMENT (1968) (arguing that the 
desire to punish arises from sadistic and vindictive feelings). See also infra notes 263 and 
375 and accompanying text for a discussion of Menninger's views. 
225. See VEATCH, supra note 147, at 22. See also supra note 166. Presenting an argu-
ment for a general theelY of punishment is well beyond this article's intended scope. Yet 
some discussion of this issue seems unavoidable given the connection between the morali-
ty of psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings and in non-capital pro-
ceedings. 
226. Bonnie is in favor of abolishing the death penalty. See Richard J. Bonnie, The 
Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REv. 1363, 1364, 1390-91 (1988) (arguing that the 
law should override an incompetent condemnee's wish to die because doing otherwise 
would subordinate the societal interest in the integrity of the legal process to the individu-
al interests of the prisoner). However, his ideology does not enter into his considerations 
about how psychiatrists should deal with requests to evaluate or treat the incompetent con-
demned; his recommended grounds for abstention have other bases. See, e.g., supra text 
accompanying note 163. I suspect other writers share my opposition to the death penalty, 
but, like Bonnie, they argue for abstention on other grounds. 
227. This is an understatement. But, to review, even briefly, the scholarly argumentation 
justifying punishment in general, capital punishment, or the fairness of the criminal justice 
system would take me far beyond this article's scope. This article's modest goal in dis-
cussing these points is only to flesh out a moral context and framework for considering 
the ethical status of psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings. The 
purpose of listing these propositions is to emphasize that psychiatrists must recognize 
these issues before they can adopt a coherent conclusion about the morality of participa-
tion. This article suggests that opponents to participation really disagree with one or more 
of these propositions. 
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ment on these propositions underlies the moral controversy about 
psychiatrists' interactions with incompetent condemnees. 
Proposition 1: Punishment is an appropriate and moral-
ly-justifiable response by society to criminal wrongdo-
ing.228 
Proposition 2: The criminal justice system metes out 
criminal sanctions in a reasonably fair manner.229 
228. Psychiatrists confronted with the dilemma of treating or evaluating the incompetent 
condemned ~ot resolve the ethical controversy without understanding and accepting the 
moral justification of punishment. Efforts to understand the moral justification must be 
kept distinct from those that attempt to elucidate historical or emotional roots for our 
notions about punishment. For a summary of the literature on the historical, emotional, 
cultural, and theological roots of American society's approach to punishment, see Michael 
L. Perlin, Mental Illness. Crime. and the Culture of Punishment (manuscript in preparation 
at 51-79, on fIle with the author). 
229. Stipulating that the criminal justice system be only Mreasonably fair" allows for 
such human imperfections as occasional wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions, 
failures to detect and detain the perpetators of a substantial number of crimes and the 
inevitable level of inequality that results from the fact that not all criminals can be appre-
hended, tried, and sentenced by the satne court at the same time. Despite a fairness re-
quirement that punishment must be proportional to the offense, it is very difficult to as-
sign punishments with perfect proportionality. Reasonably fair criminal justice systems, 
while humanly imperfect, must not tolerate persistent or systematic injustices. In addition 
reasonably fair systems must, at a minimum, satisfy constraints of Hobbesian political 
theory. See GREGORY S. KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND PolJTICAL THEoRY 245-54 
(1986) (reviewing the effect of power on crime and punishment in the Hobbesian state). 
For a discussion of Hobbesian constraints on social justice, see infra, note 280 and ac-
companying text. 
In his defense of the death penalty, Professor van den Haag comments Mthat irra-
tional discrimination, or capriciousness, would be inconsistent with constitutional require-
ments [for just administration of capital punishment]. But I am satisfied that the Supreme 
Court has in fact provided for adherence to the constitutional requirement of equality as 
much as is possible." van den Haag, supra note 218, at 1663-64. There is ample reason 
to believe that a host of unconscious, cognitive errors influence a vf!rlety of aspects of 
the legal process, from the fonnulation of laws to the adjudication of constitutional issues. 
For example, after lohn Hinckley was acquitted of the attempted assassination of President 
Reagan in 1981, some state legislatures changed their statutes regarding the insanity de-
fense to add a guilty but mentally ill option. Salvador C. Uy, From the Ashes of Penry 
v. Lynaugh, The Diminished Intent Approach to the Trial & Sentencing of the Mentally 
Retarded Offender, 21 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, 580 (1990). The Model Penal Code 
had two requirements for culpability, volition and cognition, but the public was not sup-
portive of the idea that mentally ill defendants were not acting of their own volition. Id. 
When prospective jurors who admit they could not vote to impose the death penalty 
are excluded the result is a death-qua1ified jury more likely to convict. For a sample of 
the research showing that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict and impose 
death sentences, see George L. lurow, New Data on the Effect of a MDeath Qualified-
Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 567 (1971) (presenting fmd-
ings of a survey showing that jurors' beliefs about capital punishment affect verdicts 
through a process involving belief in authoritarian or conservative legal positions); Robert 
Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification 
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Proposition 3: Capital punishment is administered in a 
reasonably fair manner and is a just and moral punishment 
for some crimes.230 
Proposition 4: The death penalty is morally the same 
as other punishm~nts; all punishment, when ethical, in-
volves a justified infliction of harm sanctioned by a moral 
57 
and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 31 (1984) (presenting findings of a demo-
graphic survey showing, among other things, that greater proportions of blacks and women 
are excluded by death qualification process); Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson, & 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Efficts of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to 
Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 53 (1984) (present-
ing findings of a simulated trial showing that diversity of death - qualified and non-
qualified jurors leads to jury deliberations which are more vigorous, thorough and accu-
rate); Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death -
Qualification.Process, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 121 (1984) (arguing that certain psycho-
logical features of the death qualification process may account for the bias that death -
qualified jurors have toward conviction). For a discussion of the role of cognitive errors 
in legal decisionmaking, see Michael J. Sab & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Pro-
cessing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & SOC'y REv. 123 (1980-81) 
(addressing the effect of quantitative evidence on the truth-finding process in adjudication 
and concluding that mathematical evidence may be necessary to prevent jurors from think-
ing intuitively as opposed to rationally). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's inconsis-
tent application of medical and social science data, see Paul S. Appelbaum, The -Empirical 
Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J. L. & MEn. 335, 346 
(1987) (concluding that a majority of the Court may be vulnerable to misreadings of 
statistical analysis). For a discussion of how one segment of the American criminal justice 
system really operates, see DAVID HElLBRONNER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF 
A YOUNG D. A. (1990). 
230. A Mreasonably fair manner" of application would include, among many other 
things, assurances that such decisions do not reflect beliefs based on inflammatory or 
unreliable testimony. It also assumes that capital punishment can be fair and just in 
principle. 
The Supreme Court appears to accept capital punishment decisions that faIl outside 
these bounds. For example, in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Supreme 
Court afr1I1Iled the denial of a habeas corpus petition filed in a death sentence case on 
the basis of the testimony of experts who had not examined the defendant The Court 
deemed such testimony to be acceptable despite unanimous psychiatric opinion that such 
testimony is of little or no probative value. See Barefoot'S Brief at 11-18, (82-6080), 
supra note 10. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun noted that psychiatrists are 
able to predict violence with no greater ability than laymen, and that it was Mcrystal 
clear" that the witnesses Mhad no expertise whatever" in making predictions of violence. 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920-22 (Blackmon, J., dissenting). He concluded, Mwhen the Court 
knows full well that psychiatrists' predictions of dangerousness are specious, there can be 
no excuse for imposing on the defendant, on the pain of his life, the heavy burden of 
convincing a jury of laymen of the fraud." Id. at 935-36. The subsequent commentary on 
Barefoot is summarized in MENTAL DISABILI1Y LAw, supra note 1, § 17.14. Cj. D. Mi-
chael Risinger et aI., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The 
Lessons of Handwriting Identification -Expertise,· 137 U. PA. L. REv. 731, 780 n.215 
(1989) \[W]e have yet to find a single word of praise for, or in defense of, Barefoot in 
the literature of either science or law."). 
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legal system. The kinds of arguments legitimizing punish-
ment in general (i.e., those that would justify Proposition 
1) are the same types of arguments that legitimize capital 
punishment.231 
Proposition 5: As physicians, psychiatrists owe their 
evaluative and treatment obligations to the individuals they 
evaluate and treat, and should not color their evaluations or 
231. Both abolitionists and supporters of the death penalty have endorsed the assertion 
lhat M'the penalty of death is qualitatively different' from other forms of criminal punish-
ment. M Bonnie, supra note 226, at 1363 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality». Proposition 4 merely as-
serts lhat the death penalty is morally justified in the same way lhat other punishments 
are. In general, punishment has been justified as a means to restrain and/or deter the 
wrongdoer from committing further offenses, to deter other individuals from wrongdoing, 
to rehabilitate the offender, and/or to indicate society's general, vindicative condemnation 
of the wrongdoer. Punishment has also been explained as the community's symbolic 
means of judging and regulating behavior through Mproportional deprivationM of personal 
liberty. Perlin, supra note 228, at 52-53. Of course, lhat the death penalty is as moraIly 
justified as other punishments leaves open the possibility lhat its administration might 
require special legal procedures, despite its moral similarity to other punishments. Such 
procedures could be justified without reference to a moral difference from other punish-
ments, but in reliance on notions of Mseverity and irrevocability.M Spaziano v. Florida, 468 
U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
However, the harshness of capital punishment may provide an unsatisfactory justifica-
tion for special legal proceedings. For example, it is far from clear lhat, for a 20-year-old 
man, the prospect of execution is a fate more horrible than the prospect of spending the 
rest of his life in prison. Although Kant wrote lhat retribution requires the execution of 
murderers because M[t]here is no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive 
even under the most miserable conditions •.•. ,M IMMANUEL KANT, nm METAPHYSICAL 
ELEMENTs OF JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans., 1965) [hereinafter KANT's METAPHYSICAL 
ELEMENTs], other writers have viewed life imprisonment as a worse fate than death. See, 
e.g., van den Haag, supra note 218, at 1669 (MDoes not life imprisonment violate human 
dignity more than execution, by keeping alive a prisoner deprived of all autonomy?); 
CEsARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMEs AND PUNISHMENTS, 62-70 (1764); Jacques Barzun, In 
Favor of Capital Punishment, in nm DEATIl PENALTY IN AMERICA 154, 161-63 (Hugo 
A. Bedau ed, 1964) (arguing that, given prison conditions and the pace of change in the 
outside world, life sentences produce more suffering than execution). 
The finality of the death penalty provides the clearest reason why MCOurts in virtually 
every state have abandoned the traditional rules on direct appeal of death sentencest and 
have ruled Mdirect review of death sentences to be obligatory,M even over the defendant's 
objections. Bonnie, supra note 239, at 1368. Capital punishment places a special kind of 
pressure on courts to vindicate society's interest in the integrity of its institutions of crim-
inal punishment. This moral interest is. however, also expressed in requirements of non-
capital cases (e.g., that the actions of a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense must 
satisfy the factual predicates for sentencing). Id. at 1369-71. For a recent analysis of the 
nature and importance of retaliation in punishing murderers. see Jeremy Waldren, Lex 
Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25, 41-42 (1992) (arguing lhat what is unique about murder is 
not necessarily the victim's death, but the crime's radical disruption of an autonomous 
life). 
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use the treatment of their patients to achieve either particu-
lar social outcomes (e.g., abolition of the death penalty) or 
particular legal outcomes (e.g, acquittal232 or clemency). 
59 
If these propositions are true, then it is ethically permissible for 
physicians to participate in the evaluation and treatment ,of an 
incompetent death row prisoner, with the full awareness that such 
participation might make possible the prisoner's execution.233 
Caring citizens should regard even a "reasonably fair" system 
of criminal punishment with ambivalence; such a feeling is conso-
nant with a sober acknowledgement of the inevitability of and 
necessity for such a system. Criminal conviction in a just legal 
system marks a failure by a fellow citizen. Caring citizens should 
share a sense of sadness about (as well as disapproval of) this 
failure, and perhaps some empathy for the criminal who, however 
guilty, must suffer for his wrong-doing.234 Physicians (among 
232. Cj. supra note 183 and accompanying text. For a discussion that favors 
psychiatrists' restricting their forensic services to uses that serve only defendants, see 
Bernard L. Diamond & David w. Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some 
Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MrCH. L. REV. 1335 (1965). Positions like this may 
fonn the basis for what is often perceived as psychiatrists' Mpeculiarly tolerant attitude 
toward criminal behavior." Manfred S. Guttmacher, The Psychiatric Approach to Crime 
and Correction, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 633, 633 (1958). See also Benjamin Karpman, 
Criminality, Insanity and the Law, 39 J. CRIM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 584, 584 (1949) 
(Karpman is a psychiatrist who believes that Mcriminality is without exception symptomatic 
of abnormal mental states and is an expression of them. j. A decision to serve only de-
fense interests has been criticized as an aUempt by mental health professionals to impose 
their views on society in GARY B. MELTON et al., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR 
TIm COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS § 
3.05(b) (1986) (asserting that a function of mental health professionals is to balance the 
needs of the individual and society and that this function would be subverted if mental 
health professionals were only allowed to represent the individual). The notion that psy-
chiatrists consistently are biased toward acquittal of criminal defendants may be mistaken. 
See JONATHAN ROBITSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 24, 389-404 (1980) (arguing 
that most psychiatrists are prosecution-minded and project the values of their traditional 
upwardly-mobile class backgrounds into their practice and into their testimony at criminal 
trials). 
233. This article also contends - both as a logical consequence and as an important 
heuristic device - that the contrapositive contention is true: If participation seems unethi-
cal, then one or more of the above propositions is false. See infra notes 375-76 and 
accompanying text. 
234. Punishment also presents all citizens with a moral dilemma insofar as it imposes 
suffering on our fellow human beings. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF 
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 63 (1968). Hegel recognized this as a powerful indication that 
consequentialist views of punishment are morally flawed: 
If crime and its cancellation • • • punishment are regarded only as evils in 
general, one may consider it unreasonable to will an evil merely because anoth-
er evil is already present. This superficial character of an evil is the primary 
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them, psychiatrists) may have special reason to view punishment 
with some measure of "gut-level" antipathy. Physicians frequently 
begin their careers with oaths in which they profess their dedica-
tion to the alleviation of suffering; ideally physicians' training 
engendered emotional as well as ethical aversions to the notion of 
intentionally-imposed suffering. 
Physicians' training also acquaints them with the grounds and 
justification for intentionally-imposed suffering. Most of the proce-
dures physicians undertake involve varying degrees of intrusion and 
discomfort; even the questions they ask often make their patients 
uncomfortable. Physicians believe that the medical benefits justify 
the intrusions and discomfort. For example, the intense distress 
caused by chemotherapy for cancer is outweighed by the chance 
this treatment offers for prolonged life. Physicians encourage pa-
tients to choose the violent intrusion and risks of coronary bypass 
surgery in the belief that they will survive with a higher quality of 
life. While this type of 'cost-benefit' judgment may influence both 
a physician's decision to recommend a course of treatment and a 
patient's acceptance of treatment, the justification for the treatment 
derives from the patient's consenting to it.23s Without such con-
sent, treatment, however beneficial it may be, is morally impermis-
sible.236 
assumption in the various theories of punishment as prevention. as a deterrent, 
a threat, a corrective, etc • . • • [T]he objective consideration of justice . . . is 
the primary and substantial point of view in relation to crime . . • • The vari-
ous considerations which are relevant to . • . [punishment's] relation to the 
particular consciousness, and which has its effect on representational thought (as 
a deterrent, corrective, etc.) . • . take it for granted that punishment is and for 
itself is just. 
G. W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHiLoSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed. & H.B. 
Wisbet trans.," Cambridge University Press 1991) (1821) (citation and original emphasis 
omitted). For a discussion of the value of our emotional reaction to crime in guiding our 
appropriate moral and punitive response, see Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of 
Retribution, in REsPONSmlUTY, CHARACTER AND TIlE EMOTIONS: NEW EsSAYS IN MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 179, 198-217 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (discussing the epistemic rele-
vance and virtuous nature of some emotions in guiding our moral judgments). 
235. KIf the normative principles of ethics are articulated by reasonable people • • . then 
no reasonable person would be foolish enough . . • to contract with medical professionals 
authorizing them to do simply whatever they think will benefit patients." VEATCH, supra 
note 147, at 11. 
236. For a discussion of the ethical primacy of consent over anticipated benefits of 
treatment, see id. at 192-213. Veatch's views appear to derive from Kantian consider-
ations. particularly Kant's Kaffmnation that 'every rational being exists as an end in him-
self not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will.'" ld. at 193 (quoting 
"IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF TIlE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 95 (H. J. Paton 
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There is an important and extensive homologf37 between the 
justification of medical treatment and the justification of punish-
ment Medical care often requires the imposition of pain and sacri-
fice, which would be unconscionable for physicians to inflict with-
out the prior consent of the patients who suffer them. These pa-
tients must base their decision to accept cru;e on the view, shared 
with their physicians, that the pain and sacrifice are justified by the 
benefits obtained through treatment Punishment involves coercion 
and deprivation, which would be prima facie wrongs for society to 
inflicf38 were it not for the consenf39 of the crin$lals who 
suffer them. Prior to committing crimes, criminals shared with their 
fellow citizens important moral and practical reasons for wanting 
all citizens who committed crimes to be justly punished. 
The homology between the justifications of medical treatment 
and punishment extends further. By requiring that the justification 
of medical treatment include the physician's and patient's consent, 
we place medical care amidst a broad array of human interactions 
that protect and affirm persons' mutual respect, dignity, and au-
tonomy. Accordingly we view the practice of medicine from the 
standpoint of a broader ethical theory that governs inter-individual 
obligation in the largest sense.240 Similarly, a justification of 
criminal sanctions based on the consent of those who are punished 
trans., 1964 2d ed. 1785) [hereinafter KANT'S GRoUNDWORK]. Veatch writes: 
From the standpoint of one committed to the principle of autonomy, consent is 
required independent of the calculations of consequences if a person is to be 
touched (as in assault and battery), if privacy is to be invaded, or if the person 
is to be used in research. Whether the context be research, thempy, or preven-
tive medicine, if a person is to be treated as an end and not as a means only, 
then permission is needed when that person is brought into,the professional 
medical nexus. 
VEATCH, supra note 147, at 201. 
237. 'That is, a close correspondence in structure and origin. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 107, at 1085. 
238. Cj. Waldron, supra note 231, at 27 ("A justification of punishment is required in 
all, cases becal15e punishments usually have features that, in general, make actions 
inpermissible.j. 
239. This article argues for a contractarian justification of punishment. See infra at text 
accompanying notes 241-59. Bonnie, supra note 30, at 85 n.50, argues that a comparison 
between the justifications of treatment and punishment is flawed because the consent given 
by medical patients is pamdigmatically explicit, while the consent given by criminals - if 
one accepts contract theal)' to begin with - is implicit and/or hypothetical. For a discus-
sion of the implications of this 'hypotheticality,' see notes 328-37 and accompanying text. 
240. For a discussion of the relationship between basic, general principles of inter-in-
dividual obligation and the obligations incumbent upon the medical profession and indi-
vidual physicians engaged in treating patients, see VEATCH, supra note 147, at 324-27. 
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sets punishment in the broader context of a general theory of polit-
ical obligation, the centerpiece of which is the implicit consent of 
all citizens who, to secure their basic rights, establish governments 
among themselves.241 
The notion that legitimate government derives its authority 
from a hypothetical contract binding all citizens to obedience to 
law appears repeatedly in the political theories of the last four 
centuries.242 In all these theories, just social arrangements are 
those to which free and equal rational people would agree, were 
they to find themselves in a situation where no laws or sociopoliti-
cal organizations had control over individuals. Hobbes,243 among 
others, termed such a situation a "state of nature," where individu-
als, lacking civil governments, relied solely on themselves for 
protection. He imagined this state to be a dismal anarchy, a war of 
all against all, which he describes in this famous passage from 
241. -We hold lhese truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that lhey 
are endowed by lheir Creator wilh certain unalienable Rights; that among lhese are Life, 
Liberty, and lhe pursuit of Happiness. That to secure lhese rights, Governments are insti-
tuted among Men, deriving lheir just poweIS from lhe consent of lhe governed •••• " 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776). 
242. Because contractarian political lheory fonus lhe basis for my justification for 
psychiatrists' participation in lhe capital sentencing process, I note a few of lhe histori-
cally-important works on lhe philosophy: John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 
OF CIVIL GoVERNMENT AND LETIER ON TOLERATION 3 (J.W. Gough ed., 2d ed. Basil 
Blackwell 1956) (1698); HENRy S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw (1861) (Fredrick Pollock, ed., 
1957) (10th ed. 1884); and J. W. GoUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STIlDY 
OF ITS DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1957). Contractarian lheory justifies punishment by arguing 
that citizens have agreed to accept state coercion in exchange for lhe benefits and 
protections of a society ruled by I~w. Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Socilll Clwice: 
An Economic Inquiry Into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. LJ. 
1787, 1790 (1992) (noting that individuals consent to state-imposed restrictions on liberty). 
A1lhough its roots may be traced to antiquity, contractarian lheory -rllSt came to promi-
nence in lhe seventeenlh century", id. at 1791 n.24, lhrough such influential writings as 
THOMAS HOBBES, LEvlATIIAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge UniveISity Press 1991) 
(1651); and 3 (J.W. Gough ed., 2d ed. Basil Blackwell 1956) (1698) and JEAN JACQUES 
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) (1762). 
Contractarian lheory remains a powerful influence which fonus lhe basis of important 
modern works. E.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JAMES M. BUCHANAN 
& GoRDON TUlLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LoGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTIro-
TIONAL DEM~RACY (1965). 
243. The Hobbesian veISion of contractarianism allows for a partial defense against what 
have been tenned -Marxist" critiques of olher veISions (e.g., Kant's lheories). Marxist cri-
tiques argue that crime is caused primarily by economic conditions; and that since society 
is responsible for lhese conditions, to claim that lhe individual has eilher chosen to com-
mit a crime or to accept lhe conditions and contract imposed by society is inaccurate. 
Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified 
42 STAN. L. REV. 1149 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 276-97. 
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Leviathan: 
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, 
where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is 
consequent to the time, wherein men live without other 
security, than what their own strength, and their own in-
vention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there 
is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncer-
tain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Naviga-
tion, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by 
Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, 
and removing such things as require much force; no 
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; 
no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, 
continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life 
of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.244 
63 
Hobbes believed that rational individuals would want to extricate 
themselves from this dismal state.24S To achieve this end, they 
would surrender their individual power and right of absolute self-
government to a sovereign,246 who would then have the power to 
defend them from the injuries of each other. This sovereign would 
retain the right to punish subjects "as he should think fit, for the 
preservation of them all. ,,247 
244. HOBBES, supra note 242, at 89. 
245. Residents of inner cities provide an obvious example. Nicholas Lemann described 
the conditions that existed in the mid-1970s in the Robert Taylor Homes, a public hous-
ing project in Chicago: 
After ••• [Larry Haynes, son of Ruby Haynes] left, there were no adult men 
pennanently in residence on Ruby's floor in 5135. The unemployment rate in 
their section of the project rose duriiig the seventies from 18.6 per cent to 31.4 
per cent. Several times in the late 19605 and early 1970s police were fired 
upon by snipers in the windows of high-rise public-housing projects; in 1975, a 
policeman was killed by a sniper in [another project] • • • • VISitors to the 
project from the outside world - firemen, emergency medical technicians, poll 
takers. bilI collectors. delivery men, salesmen, social workers. maintenance 
workers, truant officers. sociologists - were often robbed or roughed up, and 
as a result most of these people found excuses not to go there any more. 
When gang members and other vandals incapacitated the elevators, they 
weren't speedily repaired •••• Problems with the heat, water, electricity, and 
fire alarms were also slow to be fllted. The project was becoming a world unto 
iiself, completely cut off from the institutions and mores of the wider society. 
NICHOLAS LEMANN, nIB PROMISED LAND: nIB GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT 
CHANGED AMERICA 266 (1991). 
246. HOBBES, supra note 242, at 117-21. 
247. Id at 214. 
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Hobbes's account is one of many versions of the thesis that 
justifies punishment on the basis of benefits (such as self-preser-
vation or the opportunities available in well-developed civil society) 
that accrue even to those who are punished. Socrates was perhaps 
the earliest proponent of the notion that citizens make a bargain 
with the polity, receiving its benefits in exchange for a commit-
ment to, among other things, accepting punishment as a cost of 
breaking the law.248 
Notwithstanding differences in intellectual temperament (as well 
as differences in historical setting), the 18th century philosopher 
Rousseau arrived at justifications for punishment quite similar-to 
those offered earlier by Socrates and Hobbes.249 Punishment is 
the price we pay for self-preservation: "[1]t is in order that we may 
not fall victims to an assassin that we consent to die ourselves if 
we ourselves turn assassins."25O Each of us willingly consents to 
punish murderers and thieves, since not doing so would establish 
the freedom of others to kill or rob US.251 
Kant, a great admirer of Rousseau,252 adapted Rousseau's 
conception of the proper subordination of individuals to a "general 
will,,253 to his own moral philosophy. Rousseau's notion of the 
248. See, e.g., Plato, erito, in SOCRATES, THE MAN AND IUS TEACHINGS 54 (FJ. 
Church trans., R.I. Mason et aI., eds., 1955) (discussing the death of Soc:rates). Soc:rates' 
followers encouraged him to flee Athens to avoid the death sentence, his punishment for 
corrupting the city's youth. Soc:rates argued that gratitude and a sense of fairness required 
that he accept punishment, for he had benefited for seventy years from the protection of 
the laws of Athens. If he had fled the city to escape execution, he would have broken 
his bargain with the Laws, a bargain that he had made willingly and with knowledge of 
its implications, a bargain that he could have revoked at any time he wished by leaving 
the city. 
249. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
250. ROUSSEAU, supra note 242, at 32. 
251. ROGER D. MAsTERs, THE POLITICAL PHILoSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU 331 (1968). 
252. For example: 
[Kant] maintained throughout his life a severe regimen. It was arranged with 
such regularity that people set their clocks according to his daily walk along 
the street named for him, "The Philosopher's Walk." Until old age prevented 
him, he is said to have missed this regular appearance only on the occasion 
when Rousseau's Emile so engrossed him that for several days he stayed at 
home. 
10 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 390, 393 (1979). 
253. Rousseau stated: 
If . . . we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall 
frod • • . the following terms: MEach of us puts his person and all his power 
in common under the supreme direction of the general will. and, in our c0rpo-
rate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible" part of the whole." 
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universalization of the "maxims"2S4 governing action plays a cen-
tral role in detennining whether conduct is permissible, Kant's 
approach to the exploration of the justification of criminal sanc-
tions255 has received its most prominent modem expression in the 
writings of John Rawls,2S6 Both Kant and Rawls believe that a 
system of just laws and criminal sanctions rationally would be 
chosen by criminals themselves if they were freed from their idio-
syncratic preferences,257 and were asked to develop social regula-
ROUSSEAU, supra note 242, at IS. , 
[W]hat makes the will general is less the number of voters than the common 
interest uniting them; for, under this system, each necessarily submits to the 
conditions he imposes on others • , • , [T]he social compact sets up among the 
citizens an equality of such a Idnd[ ] that they • , , bind themselves to observe 
the same conditions and should therefore • , • enjoy the same rights • • , • 
[E]very authentic act of the general will[], binds or favors all the citizens 
equally, , .. 
Id. at 30. 
254. "[T]he conformity of actions to universal law • • • must serve the will as its prin-
ciple. That is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that 1 can also will that 
my maxim should become a universal law." KANT's GROUNDWORK. supra note 236, at 
70. 
255. For a geneml discussion of Kant's political theories. see Jeffrie G. Murphy, KANT: 
THE PHILoSOPHY OF RIGKr (1970) [hereinafter THE PHILoSOPHY OF RIGKr]. 
256. See, e.g., John Rawls' magnum opus, A THEoRY OF JUSTICE (1971) (Although not 
primarily concemed with punishment, the book outlines Rawls' views on punishment's 
justification as a stabilizer 'of just social relationships.). For a discussion of the relation-
ships between Kant's and Rawls's theories of punishment, see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RET-
RIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: EsSAYS IN TIlE PHILoSOPHY OF LAw 77-92 (1979) 
[hereinafter RETRIBUTION]. 
257. Being freed from "idiesyncmtic preferences" is implicit in Kant's universalization 
test. It is also an explicit feature of Rawls's philosophy, embodied in his notions of the 
"original position" and the "veil of ignorance." Rawls argues that the conditions needed 
for making objective decisions are contained in an imaginary situation where hypothetical 
individuals convene to choose principles to govem themselves. The parties are aware of 
the nature of the world, but are ignorant of their own particular status in it. See RAWLS, 
supra note 242, at 17-22, 136-42. 
An oft-repeated critique of Rawlsian contmct theory is that it ignores one of the 
major benefits of civil society: the moml upbringing from which comes our sense of what 
morally acceptable political agreements would be. 
In a world where people mise children,' live in communities. and value friend-
ships, a moral theory that demands mtionaI cognition to the degree that Rawls's 
does is little help and may well be a burden. It teaches people to distrust what 
will help them most - their personal attachments to those they know - and 
value what will help them least - abstmct principles that, for all their 
philsophical brilliance, are a poor guide to the moral dilemmas of everyday 
life , • " Having sacrificed their affective and known bonds for abstmct 
principles. and having yielded their capacity to empathize and interpret in favor 
of a capacity to reflect, how would such principled individuals govem their 
moral obligations in a thoroughly secularized society? 
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tions to govern their community. Punishment is justified as a logi-
cally-required institution, the necessary outcome of rational, moral 
relations among rational, moral beings. It would be chosen as a 
form of sacrifice by all citizens as part of their "hypothetical ratio-
nal consent" to the requirements of justice.2S8 Criminal sanctions 
are justified by the criminal's implicit, rational promise to submit 
himself "along with everyone else t<? those laws which, if there are 
any criminals among the people, will naturally include penal 
laws.,,2S9 
Hypothetical ~onsent theory prescribes schemes of punishment 
that are, in the literal sense of the word. retributive: the wrong-
doer, through punishment, fulfills his obligation to "pay back" 
society as the cost of his disobedience.260 By committing a crime, 
ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER?: SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBUOATION 125 (1989). 
See also DWORKIN, supra note 187, at 173-77 (arguing that Rawls' position is too ab-
stract and removed from the real world). However, Rawls's theory is neither intended as 
a comprehensive or exclusionary psychological technique, nor as social psychology; it is a 
philosophical account of what considerations people should have when they contemplate 
the requirements of a just polity: 
The conception of the original position is not intended to explain human con-
duct except insofar as it tries to account for our moral judgments and helps to 
explain our having a sense of justice • • • • So while the conception of the 
original position is part of the theory of conduct, it does not follow at all that 
there are actual situations that resemble it. What is necessary is that the princi-
ples that would be accepted play the requisite part in our moral reasoning and 
conduct. 
RAWLS, supra note 242, at 120-21. Note, fmally, that the "veil of ignorance" is not a 
feature in Hobbesian contract theory; on Hobbes' account, those in a "state of nature" 
need not see themselves as perfect equals to appreciate the benefits that accrue from civil 
govermnent. This aspect of Hobbesian theory is discussed further. See infra note 282. 
258. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 509, 516-17 (1987) [hereinafter Does Kant Have a Theory?] (summarizing and ques-
tioning the consistency of Kant's view of punishment as necessary for individuals to 
enjoy a maximum amount of liberty compatible with similar liberty for others). 
259. KANT's METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTs, supra note 231, at 105. 
260. Hypothetical consent theory does not require that society punish each and every 
criminal; rather, it tells us why punishment in general is juStified, why there are good 
reasons ordinarily to punish crimina1s and why, in a just legal system, the commission of 
a criminal offense is a sufficient reason to subject a guilty person to a punishment that is 
(one would hope, at least roughly) proportional to the magnitude of his crimes. Retribu-
tion, in this literal sense, refers to the basis of a criminal debt to society. In judging an 
individual's guilt, however, there is room to draw distinctions among criminals, to consid-
er individual situations, to consider aggravating or mitigating circumstances in assigning 
particular punishments and even to consider "forgiving" some "debts." The criminal law 
allows those who commit crimes to adduce a variety of mitigating circumstances and 
recognizes that each case brings with it a host of unique factors that may be relevant to 
sentencing. It also allows wrongdoers to obtain immunity via agreements to testify against 
others, and to be excused from punishment when procedural or constitutional rights are 
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the criminal has selected an alternative means, undergoing punish-
ment, rather than the usual method, obedience, of repaying his 
fellow citizens for the benefits he receives by virtue of their sacri-
fices in upholding the law.261 To those citizens who choose to 
obey the law, the expectation that those who disobey will be pun-
ished provides assurance that their sacrifice will be acknowledged 
by a society that expects reciprocation even from those who choose 
not to obey. 
Legal texts262 commonly list, among the justifications of pun-
ishment, the three future-oriented263 goals of 1) incapacitating 
those whose acts threaten society (special deterrence), 2) providing 
disincentives for potential offenders (general deterrence), and 3) 
offering offenders the potential for rehabilitation. In addition, these 
texts discuss a fourth goal, the past-oriented goal of retribution. 
Retribution is a troublesome justification because of its historical 
association with the view that punishment offers society emotional 
satisfaction, and provides a socially-acceptable means for citizens 
violated. See generally YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (7th ed. 
1989). 
Consequently, what Morawetz tenus "the weak fann of retributivism which merely 
asserts that only the guilty should be eligible for punishment" seems most in accord with 
our collective sense of what justice requires. Thomas H. Morawetz, Retributivism and 
Justice, 16 CoNN. L REv. 803, 814 (1984). For a general discussion of this point, see id. 
at 812-15. This "weak fonn" is consistent with Kant's notion of a social obligation to 
punish criminals, although Kant is typically associated with a "strong fonn" of 
retributivism that always requires punishment of all guilty persons. Kant himself may have 
been somewhat inconsistent in his writings about 'what conditions except society from this 
obligation. See Does Kant Have a Theory?, supra note 258, at 509, 512-13. See also 
infra notes 285-88 and accompanying text (discussing the obligation to punish). 
261. See THE PHILoSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 255, at 142-143 (discussing Kant's 
theory of punishment as an obligation to be analyzed in terms of reciprocity). 
262. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAw § 1.5(a) 
(2d ed. 1986), and PACKER, supra note 234, at 35-61. 
263. "Future-oriented" parallels Morawetz's tenn "forward-looking" to descn'be what are 
also called "utilitarian" goals of punishment. See Morawetz, supra note 260, at 818. He 
feels that "utilitarianism" is a "tainted" tenn because of its association "with the notion 
that happiness or satisfaction is only contingently or accidentally related to the moral 
features of a social context. A context in which the greatest happiness is gained by the 
greatest number mayor may not be a just society; its justice remains to be demonstrat-
ed." ld. Morawetz cites Hart's recognition that utilitarianism ignores of what we usually 
take to be "uncontroversial" values. ld. (referring to HERBERT L A. HART, THE CoNCEPT 
OF LAw 195 (1968». The utilitarian's response to this critique should be that moral fea-
tures are dejinitionally related to happiness. If there is a conflict between our utilitarian 
calculus and conventional values, either the calculus was wrong (and the "arithmetic" 
should be "checked") or the values need revision. The tenn "ruture-oriented" focuses 
attention on utilitarian defenses of a practice, i.e., the practice's consequences. 
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both to express their disgust and to experience a sense of re-
venge.264 Retribution can be distinguished logically from revenge 
on grounds that, whatever our individual feelings about an offender 
may be, the goals of retribution are the collective goals of justice. 
Justice requires us to direct our attention to a rational and dispas-
sionate determination of what kind of punishment a criminal de-
serves.26S 
Retribution remains problematic, however, even when distin-
guished from revenge. Retribution authorizes punishment for com-
mitting a crime simply because the criminal deserves punishment, 
regardless of whether any other clear benefit will occur as a result 
of the punishment. Retributive thinking is pointless to those who 
fashion and justify punishment practices with a view to how they 
will make the future better.266 But as Michael Moore points out, 
264. This idea has been seen as both a defense of punishment and a reason for 
criticizing it 
We punish and blame people to express our resentment and disapproval of their 
deeds and our detestation of the ugliness of character that their crimes bespeak. 
Both in praising and in blaming we intend the deserved treatment to hit home 
and to sink in deep, to mark our judgments of the person in virtue of the 
deed. 
Stanley C. Brubaker, In Praise of Punishment, 97 nm PUBuc INTEREsT 44, 49 (1989). 
See also JAMES F. STEPHEN, LmERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 161 (1873) (punishment is 
undertaken "for the sake of gratifying the feeling of hatred - call it revenge, resentment, 
or what you will - which the contemplation of such conduct excites in healthily con-
stituted minds"); David Dolinko, Three MistaJces of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 
1623, 1647-57 (1992) (retributive theories of punishment are associated with the legiti-
mation and even glorification of anger and hatred); MENNINGER, supra note 224, at 190: 
[B]ehind what we do to the offender is the desire for revenge on some-
one .... We call it a wish to see justice done, i.e., to have him "punished." 
But in the last analysis this turns out to be a thin cloak for vengeful feelings 
directed against a legitimized object 
Personal revenge we have renounced, but official legalized revenge we 
can still enjoy. 
265. "Criminals should get what they deserve, but their deserts are determined by fair 
enforcement of the principles of right, and not by a counting up of the public outrage." 
Alexander E. Rawls, Of Rawls, Responsibility, and Retribution, 99 nm PUBuc INTEREsT 
130 (1990). In a similar vein, Morawetz notes Strawson's comparison of resentment and 
justified disapproval. 
Unlike resentment, justified disapproval carries with it a claim to be able to 
justify or demonstrate that the disapproved conduct violates shared norms of 
mutual respect and dignity. Resentment is a personal responsive attitude toward 
actions affecting oneself, while disapproval is a responsive attitude backed by 
reasons and concerned with actions affecting oneself or others. 
Morawetz, supra note 260, at 816 (emphasis added); see also P. F. S'rRAWSON, FREEDoM 
AND REsENTMENT AND OTHER EssAYS 1-25 (1974) (arguing that different views of deter-
minism are actually expressions of different moral attitudes). 
266. Morawetz, supra note 260, at 804. As Murphy points out, this is not a valid 
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retributivism underlies the societal sense of right and wrong and 
who should be punished.267 We do not condone punishing a per-
son whom we know is innocent,268 even if doing so would keep 
him from committing future criminal acts, would deter genuine 
criminals or would provide him the opportunity for moral improve-
ment We do condone punishing a justly-convicted person (e.g., a 
Nazi found guilty of crimes committed nearly five decades ago) 
simply because he deserves it, even when it produces no clear 
social benefit 
Hypothetical consent justification of criminal sanctions reinforc-
es our moral intuitions about whether puirlshment of an individual 
is defensible. Consent theory reconceptualizes retributive punish-
ment as serving the common good. As Hobbes and other contract 
theorists point out, our hypothetical consent to subject ourselves to 
rules of law stabilizes and secures for us the opportunities of civil 
society. This stability and security allow us to make plans and act 
with the expectatipn that our lawful treatment of others will be 
reciprocated to everyone's mutual advantage. A system of punish-
ment that reflects shared notions about acceptable conduct provides 
a public mechanism for both expressing those notions and affirm-
ing the law's relationship to shared moral values, even if it does 
not deter or reform criminals. 
The "good" that is served by imposing retributive punishment 
is not a utilitarian good. Retributive punishment does not yield any 
particular, specific, tangible, or expected social benefits. The mutual 
advantage supported by a criminal justice system that stabilizes 
fair, reciprocal arrangements among persons merely allows them to 
criticism of retributivist theory. -If 'pointless' is to be analyzed as 'disutilitarian', then the 
whole question is being begged. You cannot refute a retributive theory merely by noting 
that it is a retributive theory and not a utilitarian theory. The circle here is not large 
enough even to be interesting." THE PHILoSOPHY OF RIGlIT, supra note 2S5, at 141. 
267. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAw AND PSYCHIATRY: RE'IHINKING TIm RELAnoNSHIP 
233-243 (1984) (positing that retribution, utilitarianism and a combination of the two 
theories are the only prima facie justifications of punishment Retn"bution is an integral 
element in both utilitarianism and the combination theory). 
268. Laws governing the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill may constitute a 
partial exception. These authorize detaining persons who are not charged with or convicted 
of violent acts, but who are believed to represent a substantial risk of harm to others. 
Although such individuals are incarcerated in hospitals rather than in prisons, they may 
not necessarily receive any treatment - indeed, they have a right to refuse treatment 
Hospitalization for such persons is little different from being jailed from the standpoint of 
individual liberty interests. See Paul S. Appelbaum, The New Preventive Detention: 
Psychiatry's Problematic Responsibility for the Control of Violence, 145 AM. J. PSYCln-
ATRY 779 (1988). 
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act as rational beings, to organize their lives around rational plans, 
and to have reasonable expectations about the fulfillment of those 
plans.269 Retributive punishment in this way ultimately preserves 
the opportunity for rational action. This opportunity is essential to 
any conception of the good that includes individual dignity, self-
respect, and autonomy. 
Punishment thus affinns and respects an individual's humanity 
in the same way that ethical medicine does. Medical treatment 
generallf70 is permissible not because it will benefit others or 
society, or even because the doctor knows treatment would benefit 
the patient himself, but because the patient has consented to it 
Punishment is permissible neither because it will deter others or the 
criminal himself, nor because it will rehabilitate and thus confer a 
concrete expected benefit to him, but because the criminal has 
implicitly consented to it 271 Medical treatment may further prac-
tical goals (just as may punishment), but it is constrained by re-
spect for individuals' humanity and autonomy, and is justified only 
by virtue of the non-consequentialist reason that the patient and 
doctor have consented to its undertaking. Medical treatment and 
criminal punishment share the central ethical imperative that per-
sons must not be regarded as means to the fulfillment of societal 
goals, but as ends in themselves - "self-originating sources of 
claims who also have moral power to develop and change their 
own conceptions of the good. ,,272 
269. Rawls explains why this Mmutual advantage" should be recognized by everyone in 
his Mthin " (or minimal) theory of the good. This theory stipulates that persons, as rational 
individuals, seek to organize their activities around rational plans, and thus require those 
minimal things necessary to the fulfillment of any rational plan. These minimal require-
ments include self-respect and a modicum of possessions. See RAWLS, supra note 242, at 
62, 92, 396-99, 433-39, 447. 
The law clearly addresses itself to persons who organize their lives rationally and 
thus should be interested in the minimal requirements for doing so. See MOORE, supra 
note 267, at 44-112 (discussing Mthe legal view of persons") and infra notes 306-27 and 
accompanying text. 
270. There are exceptions, but these should be recognized as Mproving the rule." Persons 
with tuberculosis, for example, can be confmed and treated so long as they are conta-
gious. But a legal theory that places the highest value on individual freedom will recog-
nize that individuals must co-exist; thus, such quarantining is allowable in a society that, 
to use Rawls' words, guarantees Man equal right to the most extensive basic liberty com-
patible with a similar liberty for others." RAWLS, supra note 242, at 60. 
271. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
272. Samuel J.M. Donnelly, The Goals of Criminal Punishment: A Rawlsian Theory 
(Ultimately Grounded in Multiple Views Concerned with Human Dignity), 41 SYRACUSE L. 
REv. 741, 747 (1990) (discussing John Rawls, Kannan Constructivism in Moral Theory, 
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The crucial thrust of Kant's claim that society is morally obli-
gated to punish criminals is that criminals are ends in themselves. 
A person's humanity generates the obligation to treat him as an 
end in himself, and prohibits a just system of criminal punishment 
from invoking societal goals when detennining who is to be pun-
ished.273 If respect for the humanity of others 'prescribes that pun-
ishment be rendered if and only if someone is guilty,274 it also 
prohibits ignoring the humanity of those who are guilty; refraining 
from punishing a criminal does not respect his humanity.27s Hu-
manity entitles us to experience the logical consequences of our 
acts. We implicitly, communally promise to obey the law and to 
punish the disobedient. Failure to punish a criminal is failure to 
give him what his humanity entitles him to.276 
Kantian contractarianism277 has some problematic features, 
77 J. PHIL. SIS, 520-522 (1980». 
273. Kant's theory thus would prohibit imposing harsh plUlisbment on a criminal for the 
purpose of 'sending other criminals a message: Of course, if a criminal's (deservedly) 
harsh plUlisbment incidentally were to deter other would-be criminals from wrongdoing, 
this would be acceptable on Kant's theory. -Judicial punishment can never be used merely 
as a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but 
instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has commit-
ted a crime; for a human being can never be manipulated merely as a means to the 
purposes of someone else." KANT's METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTs, supra note 231, at 100. 
274. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text (summarizing necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for punishment). 
275. Note that this argwnent only establishes a prima facie obligation to punish. It does 
not preclude adducing mitigating circumstances, which might allow a person to escape 
plUlisbment but still allow his humanity to be respected. . 
276. Hegel provides a succinct version of this argwnent: punishment vindicates the 
individual's will and freedom, and affmns -the formal rationality of the individual's voli-
tion." HEGEL, supra note 234, at 71. Respect for the criminal entails a right to be pun-
ished, for by being punished -the criminal is honoured as a rational being • . • • He is 
denied this honour • • • if he is regarded simply as a harmful animal which must be 
rendered harmless, or plUlished with a view to deterring or reforming him." Ttl. 
277. Although the above discussion has relied heavily on Kant's moral and judicial -
philosophy, I should point out that I view differences between Kant's theories and those 
of other contract theorists as more or less reconci1abl,e. 
Kant theorizes that the motivation for plUlisbment arises as the logical consequence 
of an appreciation of the individual's autonomy and rationality. Hobbes and Rawls believe 
plUlisbment stabilizes a system of relationships - a -social fabric" - that makes it pos-
sible to pursue otherwise-unavailable opportunities to achieve happiness. Hobbes' and 
Rawls' theories speak to opportunities, rather than specific consequences of plUlisbment 
(e.g., deterring someone). These later theories focus on and elaborate the purpose of pun-
ishment. Kant's theory, on the other hand, focuses on punishment's logical and moral 
justification. 
As Donnelly points out, one can incur an obligation to repair the fabric of society 
only 
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however. Hypothetical consent theory presumes that there can be 
no objection in principle to social arrangements that would be 
established by free, rational, uncoerced parties to an original social 
contract But how does hypothetical consent theory affect our 
thinking about arrangements in the world as we actually find it? 
Among those convicted of crimes, willingness to undergo pUnish-
ment is unusual. Unlike Socrates,278 criminals typically retain 
lawyers to help them avoid conviction, and once convicted, they 
rarely ask to be punished.279 Why should anyone, especially crlm-
because one is a free, equal, and moral peISOn engaged in social cooperation 
with others. In that context one respects others as peISOns by repairing the fab-
ric of society. Those imposing punishment respect both the criminal, by punish-
ing him in a manner consistent' with his obligation as a free, equal, and moral 
member of society, and other persons in society, by repairing the fabric of 
society •. 
Donnelly, supra note 272, at 765. -Donnelly and Rawls see punishment as limited by 
desert, but also require that punishment repair the fabric of society. Donnelly, id., and 
RAWLS, supra note 242, at 313-15. If the -damage" done by an individual criminal to the 
-fabric of society" were an empirically-verifiable entity (a -rip" or a -tear" or some -fray-
ing around the fabric's edges"), I could accept this -damage" as an important consequence 
of crime, and thus see an important difference between, for example, Rawls or Donnelly 
and Kant. 
Of course, it may be the case that widespread criminal activity would have socially 
deleterious consequences. But the -damage" done by an individual criminal to the -social 
fabric" of a generally law-abiding society seems to be appreciable only by those who 
maintain a sense of fairness and a concem that justice be done. The -damage" creates a 
logical duty to repair the -fabric" of social cooperation. This duty is logically grounded 
in implicit promises or a hypothetical contract. The only way to measure such damage is 
to determine the trangressor's level of criminal guilt. I do not see how, as Donnelly 
claims, -[t]he repair of social relations" achieved through punishment has any concrete 
effect on social circumstances -and thereby reaches out to Utilitarian thought and crime 
control goals of criminal punishment." Donnelly, supra note 272, at 792. My analysis, 
therefore, suggests that the practical difference between RawlsfDonnelly and Kant is mini-
mal. 
Another approach to reconciling apparent differences between Kant and Rawls is 
contained in Murphy's writings. For example, he sees both as analyzing political obliga-
tion in terms of reciprocity and the fair distribution of benefits: 
In order to enjoy the benefits that a legal system makes possible, each man 
must be prepared to make an important sacrifice - namely, the sacrifice of 
obeying the law even when he does not desire to do so • • • • Now if the 
system is to remain just, it is important to guarantee that those who disobey 
will not thereby gain an unfair advantage over those who obey voluntarily. 
Criminal punishment thus attempts to maintain the proper balance between 
benefit and obedience by insuring that there is no profit in criminal wrongdo-
ing. 
RETRIBUTION, supra note 256, at 77. 
278. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing Socrates' acceptance of his 
death sentence). 
279. There are exceptions: 
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inal wrongdoers/so be concerned, motivated, or obligated by what 
they would consent to under counterfactual circumstances?281 
From his death-row cell, [Martin] Rojas [convicted of rape and murder 
in 1988) flIed a motion with the [Ohio Supreme C)om Thursday [November 
IS, 1991], asking it to _ •• Mdirect the state of Ohio to carry out the sentence 
of • • • death by electrocution." 
Rojas said after his trial and death sentence in 1988 • • • that he wanted 
to be executed. MIf the death sentence is not imposed, then justice will not be 
completed," he told the judges. 
Dave Beasley, Murderer Requests Own Electrocution, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Novem-
ber 16, 1991, at Cl. See also supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (discussing Gary 
Gilmore). 
While criminals try to evade punishment, they do so through plea bargains, grants of 
immunity in exchange for testimony, protestations of innocence, claims of extenuating or 
mitigating circumstances, or pleas for mercy. Rarely do criminals claim that the law's 
prescribed consequences for disobedience simply oUght not apply to them. Even if this is 
simply because the law assumes its own validity and constrains the claims they may 
make, it reflects criminals' awareness of the general expectation that punishment follow 
crime. 
280. Kant's legal theory, on its face, seems to have little to do with reality. In what he 
has characterized as a MMarxist" objection to Kantian retributivism, Murphy writes: 
The retributive theory really presupposes what might be called a Mgentiemen's 
club" picture of the relation between man and society - i.e., men are viewed 
as being part of a community of shared values and rules. The rules benefit all 
concerned and, as a kind of debt for the benefits derived, each man owes 
obedience to the rules. In the absence of ••• obedience, [each man) deserves 
punishment • • • • For, as a rational man, he can see that the rules benefit ev-
eryone (himself included) and that he would have selected them in the original 
position of choice. 
Now this may not be too far off for certain kinds of criminals - e.g., 
business executives guilty of tax fraud • • • • But to think that it applies to the 
typical criminal, from the poorer classes, is to live in a world of social and 
political fantasy • • • • [These criminals) certainly would be hard-pressed to 
name the benefits for which they are supposed to owe obedience. 
RETRIBUTION, supra note 256, at 107. Decency, Murphy writes, tlemands that we object 
to punishing Mthose who, in a socially uneven community, always get the short end of 
the stick." [d. at 80. See supra text accompanying note 245 (discussing this problem fur-
ther). 
281. Rawls's answer to this question is that the duty of justice is a fundamental natural 
duty. 
Now in contrast with obligations, it is characteristic of natural duties that they 
apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts • • • • 
. • • Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is 
reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do 
his part in the existing scheme. Each is bound to these institutions independent 
of his voluntary acts, performative or otherwise. Thus even though the princi-
ples of natural duty are derived from a contractarian point of view, they do not 
presuppose an act of consent, express or tacit, or indeed any voluntary act, in 
order to apply. The principles that hold for individuals, just as the principles 
for institutions are those that would be acknowledged in the original position. 
RAWLS, supra note 241, at 114-15. While this argument is both intellectually and emo-
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There are a variety of reasons to assume that most individu-
als282 ought to be motivated to accept conditions of a social con-
tract that obligates them to undergo punishment should they be-
come criminals. Some people can really be motivated by hypothet-
ical consent theory's appeal to our sense of justice and fair-
ness,283 which suggests that we abjure illegitimate social advan-
tages such as those achieved through criminal acts. A purely egois-
tic view would lead others to consent to fair social arrangements 
because these are in everyone's long-term self-interest.284 
Hobbes's arguments about the dangers and misery of anarchy, and 
the benefits to all persons of stable governments and social ar-
rangements,28S "appeal to enlightened long-run prudence as a ma-
tiona1ly satisfactory, its opponents would argue: 
[Hypothetical consent] theory says that someone ought morally to do something 
if and only if an ideal \U1biased observer would approve of his doing it; but 
the theory does not say how the reactions of such a hypothetical \U1biased ideal 
observer give a typically biased actual pelSOn a reason to do anything, because 
the theory does not say why anyone should care about the reactions of this 
imaginary pelSOn. 
GILBERT HARMAN, 'nm NATIJRE OF MoRAUn' 91 (1977). Rawls would direct the 
skeptic's attention to a sense of fairness. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 242, at 18, 21, 
587 (stating that principles of justice should not favor any specific individual). 
Zimmerman argues that the force of hypothetical consent theories derives from its appeal 
to ·second-order~ desires for impartiality, rationality, and consistency; these second-order 
desires put constraints on, among other things, what kind of political arrangements we can 
support. See generally David Zimmerman, The Force of Hypothetical Commitment, 93 
Ennes 467 (1983). 
282. In Rawls's theory, the social contractors are unaware (by virtue of the ·veil of 
ignorance) of their own endowments, but in reality, we know who we are. As Kavka 
points out, however, Hobbesian political theory - which assumes contractors are aware of 
who they really are and are motivated essentially by egoistic considerations - exp1ains 
why our real individual differences do not \U1dermine the validity of a hypothetical social 
contract. Individuals of very different endowments all can expect to benefit from the 
mutual constraints characteristic of civil society, for these restrictions are far preferable to 
life in a ·state of Warre;~ in this sense, they would ·operate essentially as equals, and 
the social arrangements they [would] select may properly be regarded as reasonable and 
morally justified. ~ Kavka, supra note 229, at 404. See also HOBBES, supra note 242. at 
86-90 (discussing the essential equality of men in the state of nature). As the following 
discussion elaborates, ·predominant egoism~ elaborates motives for cooperating with just 
social arrangements. See KAVKA, supra note 229, at 405-07, for a fuller exposition of 
·predominant egoism.~ 
283. See Rawls, supra note 242, at 453-512 (discussing our ·sense of justice.) 
284. Egoism is consistent with appeals to justice and fair play. See generally KAVKA, 
supra note 229, at 357-84 (explaining that egoism gives preference to the well-being of 
the actor and, like utilitananism would ensure that all pelSOns would be treated as fairly 
as possible). 
285. Reich suggests that these kinds of considerations historically have appealed to 
Americans. He cites de Tocqueville: 
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tive of obedience" to the dictates of a reasonably fair legal sys-
tem.286 Prudence also suggests, to those unmoved by any of the 
previous reasons for acquiescence to the law, that anyone who 
refuses to make sacrifices along with the vast majority will be 
regarded by their fellow citizens as an enemy of the state. The vast 
majority would be inclined to treat recalcitrants in a very hostile 
manner.287 
Criminals (along with everyone else) accept political obliga-
tions in exchange for the benefits they receive as citizens. "In. 
particular, it may be argued that a citizen in a stable law-governed 
society receives from his fellow citizens numerous important bene-
fits following from their general compliance with the civil law and 
therefore owes them similar compliance on his own part as a mat-
ter of fairness. ,,288 In. other words, those who benefit when their 
fellow citizens accept social burdens and constraints on personal 
liberty must be expected to accept similar burdens and constraints 
thetnselves.289 Particular criminals may not always realize they 
benefit from social cooperation and general obedience to law, but 
'The Americans,' Tocqueville noted, 'are fond of explaining almost all the 
actions of their lives by the principle of self-interest rightly understood; they 
show with complacencY how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly 
prompts them to assist one another and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a 
portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state.' 
It is an important insighL Americans have willingly sacrificed for the 
nation's well-being because - Americans have repeatedly claimed - such 
sacrifices are ultimately in their own best interests. 
ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 23-24 (1991) (quoting ALEXIs DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 122 (Henry Reeve trans., Francis Bowden et 
. aI., eds., Alfred E. Knopf 1945) (1840». 
286. KAVKA, supra note 229, at 406. 
287. Id. at 416. See also HOBBES, supra note 242, at 121-29. Kavka discusses the prob-
lem of how a satisfactory. legal system may treat those rec8Icitrant independents 
who refuse to acknowledge an obligation to obey the laws • • • • 
On grounds of peace and self-defense (d' nothing else), the State and its 
citizens may justifiably enforce • • • the fundamental rules of conduct necessary 
for civil peace. Thus, independents can rightly be prevented and deterred from 
killing, assaulting, stealing, • • • and so forth, so long as they are provided 
with similar protection from others (should they wish it). Further, on grounds 
. of fair play they may be required to pay their full sIuire of the costs of these 
fundamental protections • • • • [B]ecause there are moral grounds of political 
obedience besides hypothetical consent, independents in the satisfactory. State are 
not morally free to do as they please. 
KAVKA, supra note 229, at 416-17 (citation omitted). 
288. Id. at 409. 
289. See THE PHILoSOPHY OF RIGHT, supra note 2SS, at 142 (arguing that Kant's theo-
ry of punishment is based on reciprocity). 
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they do, and their ignorance or ignorement of this fact does not 
excuse them from the requirements of fairness and justice.290 
Most criminals, if asked prior to their own arrests, would want and 
expect protection from being murdered, assaulted, or robbed, and 
would want and expect those who committed crimes against them 
to be prosecuted and punished. Of course, some criminals do not 
have this expectation, and others might legitimately doubt whether 
a particular criminal justice system would do this reliably and 
fairly; but these expectations and doubts are not sufficient to un-
dermine the principle of requiring punishment for those who fail 'to 
adhere to just laws. 
A final argument for the force of hypothetical consent derives 
from the common experience that "the homely challenge 'How 
would you like it if someone did that to you?' is frequently an 
effective way to get someone to see that he is in fact committed to 
an impartial point of view.,,291 It is a central feature of normal 
moral developmenf92 that one becomes capable of recognizing 
that one's own individual interests are set within a social context 
where multiple, competing interests have equal claim to satisfac-
tion. As Zimmerman explains, 
It is a mistake to think that the desire to act impartially is 
easily escapable just because it is a feature of one's empiri-
cal self and thus contingent . . . . I do not decide to take 
seriously the interests of persons qua persons. It is a deep 
feature of my psychological makeup which I encounter in 
myself as motivational rock bottom.293 
290. TIlls source of obligation is discussed more fully in KAVKA, supra note 229, at 
409-13. Kavka concludes that -a carefully developed fair-play account of political obliga-
tion might actually apply to a large number of people, including some citizens of 
nonsatisfactory States." Id. at 413. 
291. Zimmerman, supra note 281, at 481. 
292. Jean Piaget, the pioneering developmental psychologist, writes: 
The ethics of mutual respect, which is that of good (as opposed to duty), and 
of autonomy, leads, in the domain of justice, to the development of equality, 
which is the idea at the bottom of distributive justice and of reciprocity • • . . 
As the child grows up • • • unilateral respect [for adults and the authority they 
represent] tends of itself to grow into mutual respect and to the state of coop-
eration which constitutes the normal equilibrium. 
JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF TIm CHILD 324 (Marjorie Gabain trans., Free 
Press 1966) (1932). 
293. Zimmerman, supra note 281, at 482 (emphasis added). Zimmerman concludes that 
anyone who merely tries -to monitor his beliefs and desires in accordance with principles 
of epistemic rationality" is committed to acknowledging the force of hypothetical com-
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V. WHY Is PARTICIPATION PERMISSIBLE? 
, Contractarian theory SUpports the prima facie assumption that 
individuals are bound by a reasonably fair criminal justice system's 
rules concerning obedience to the law and infliction of punish-
ment.294 If citizens would give their rational consent to these 
rules from an antecedent position of choice, a citizen who breaks 
the law is presumptively obligated to undergo appropriate 
punishment. 295 This obligation provides guidance to psychiatrists 
for fording the murky, ethically-treacheroUs waters swirling around 
execution competency proceedings. 
Prisoners who are so ill that they lack execution competence 
would likely fail to meet competence standards to give informed 
consent for evaluation or treatment. 296 However, present legal and 
ethical doctrine advises physicians dealing with incompetent pa-
tients to defer to what those patients' wishes would be if they were 
competent, provided those wishes can be determined.297 Assuming 
that a just conviction implies that the criminal met minimum stan-
dards of rationality at the time of the offense, hypothetical consent 
theory posits that the criminal, in committing the offense, made a 
valid choice to be punished.298 From a choice to be punished one 
can reasonably infer a choice to accept the lawful means to bring 
about punishment. In the case of the incompetent death row in-
mate, the means would include psychiatric evaluation and treat-
ment. 
In addition to providing general rules to govern decisionmak-
mitment; "there is little • • • point is making moral judgments about the obligations of 
creatures who cannot take up any practical attitudes toward their own desires." Id. at 482-
83. 
294. See supra text accompanying note 257 (deriving the justification for punishment 
from political obligations to which an individual consents). 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59 (discussing contractarian political theory 
and the binding obligations this theory imposes on citizens). 
296. See supra text accompanying note 158 (discussing the incompetent person's in-
ability to comprehend). 
297. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Ufe, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infir-
mities and Hidden Values in the Law, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 376 (1986) (analyzing the 
substituted judgment standard to determine what an incompetent patient would choose if 
competent); Elias Baumgarten, Patient Autonomy and the Refusal of Psyclwtropics Medica-
tions, in DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN MEDICAL Ennes 13, 21-26 (1983) (finding conscious-
ness is not a prerequisite to autonomy and, therefore, wishes expressed by a competent 
person should be respected if that person becomes incompetent). 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 248 and 259 (presenting the theoty that a 
criminal offense is the willing breach of a citizen's bargain with the polity). 
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ing, moral reasoning helps resolve apparently contradictory intu-
itions about the right course of action in specific situations,299 As 
suggested earlier, a ban on participation would preclude a 
psychiatrist's involvement with a condemned inmate who had sin-
cerely and competently requested evaluation and treatment should 
he become incompetent,300 This ban contradicts society's intuitive 
sense that such involvement would be ethical. 301 Banning compe-
tency-restoring evaluation or treatment of a death row inmate runs 
counter to sentiments about the psychiatric evaluation or treatment 
of a nori-capital inmate,302 which most would condone303 even 
though it would enable the inmate to face punishment he would 
otherwise avoid, 
If the criminal justice system and the death penalty are justified 
and administered reasonably fairly, 304 the contractarian argument 
~at punishment is an appropriate and morally justified response by 
society30s resolves these contradictions, The condemned prisoner's 
"living will,,306 can be honored without breaching medical ethics, 
not because the prisoner has given explicit prior consent, 307 but 
because the prisoner has incurred an obligation, The fulfillment of 
this obligation both vindicates his autonomy and confirms his free-
299. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text (describing scenarios that generate 
mixed feelings a1?out the proper course of action). 
300. See supra text accompanying notes 192-95 (asserting that it is not a perversion of 
medical ethics for a psychiatrist to treat a condemned prisoner who made a -living will" 
requesting treatment should he become incompetent). 
301. See id. 
302. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98. 
303. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (fmding that treating an in-
mate with a psychotropic drug to control his manic depression disorder did not violate his 
due process rights). It is important to recognize that society condones treatment even if 
the prisoner enjoyed being mentally ill, and especially if the prisoner's only reason for 
wanting to remain ill was to avoid returning to prison. It would be wrong for a physician 
to withhold treatment in collusion with someone's desire to avoid his obligations. See 
supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text (explaining that failure to punish a guilty per-
son denies the person's humanity). If Propositions 3-5 (see supra notes 230-32 and ac-
companying text) are correct, then there is no ground for making a distinction between 
obligations to undergo capital as opposed to non-capital punishments. 
304. See supra text accoinpanying notes 229-32 (Propositions 2-5). 
305. See supra text accompanying note 228 (Proposition I). 
306. See supra text accompanying note 199; see also Bonnie, supra note 30, at 83. 
307. Psychiatrists working with prisoners may be emotionally reassured when those pris-
oners have given previous explicit consent for treatment, especially if the prisoners' state-
ments of consent included explicit acknowledgement of the prisoners' duty to undergo 
punishment See supra notes 23641 and accompanying text (establishing consent as the 
basis for treatment and punishment). 
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dom.30s Wrongdoers who are justly convicted find themselves 
with a peculiar interest, an interest in undergoing the sacrifice of 
liberty attendant upon receiving just punishment A political theory 
that holds liberty to be the highest value can tolerate such a sac-
rifice only "for the sake of liberty itself. "309 The only acceptable 
justification of punishment, therefore, must be that the criminal, in 
an antecedent position of choice, rationally would have consented 
to it because it presents the greater liberty of receiving the benefits 
of civil society.310 Respect for the criminal's dignity and freedom 
demands that society honor his liberty-enhancing commitments 
above all other competing commitments (such as a physician's 
commitment to preserve life).311 Honoring those commitments, 
psychiatrists ethically can evaluate and treat both capital and non-
capital prisoners, even when psychiatric intervention might lead to 
further punishment, not because of some state interesf12 in mak-
ing sure punishments are carried out, but because such intervention 
furthers prisoners' paramount interest in having the law respect 
their dignity and autonomy.313 
308. See supra text accompanying notes 24243 and 275-76 (describing both the process 
by which an individual implicitly consents to punishment and how the failure to give this 
punishment deprives the individual of the consideration due him under his contract with 
society). 
309. RAWLS, supra note 242, at 241. 
310. See supra text accompanying note 248 (discussing hypothetical consen,t theory as a 
willing exchange of commitments for benefits). 
311. See supra ndtes 235 and 275-76 and accompanying text (admonishing physicians to 
acquaint themselves with justifications for intentionally imposing suffering and to uphold 
their obligation to preserve the convicted person's dignity). 
312. In the exercise of their physicianly skills, doctors ordinarily owe their allegiance to 
individual patients and direct their efforts toward treatment interventions that are consistent 
with their individual needs. The American Bar Association suggests that the same obliga-
tions apply when physicians engage in decisionmaking about the psychiatric treatment of 
prisoners: 
When providing treatment or habilitation for a person charged with or convicted 
of a crime. the mental health or mental retardation professional's obligations to 
the person and to society derive primarily from those arising out of the treat-
ment or habilitative relationship. Consistent with institutional security require-
ments, correctional and mental health or mental retardation facilities should not 
interfere with that traditional professional relationship • • • • 
. . • If therapists or habilitators are to play a helping role, their rela-
tionships with defendants should be structured as far as possible as if it were 
an ordinary therapist-patient or habilitator-client relationship. Thus, professional 
obligations to patients or clients undergoing treatment or habilitation within the 
criminal justice system should be, to the greatest extent possible. identical to 
those governing any treatment or habiliation relationship. 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, Standard 7-l.1(d) an.d cmt. (citation omitled). 
313. Professor Bonnie views these considerations as' central to the prohibition against 
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Another reason to respect the criminal's interest in undergoing 
punishment above all other interests comes from a fundamental 
societal obligation to respect others' humanity.314 In a, discussion 
that elucidates the connections between rationality, autonomy, and 
personal accountability,31s Moore explains how society's determi-
nation of criminal responsibility establishes the legal and moral 
personhood316 as well as the rationality of the lawbreaker.317 
Necessary condition[s] of personhood ... [are] rationality 
and autonomy, defined as the ability to perfonn actions in 
response to valid practical inferences . . . . It is only per-
sons like us - practical reasoners - who are obligated by 
moral noons and thus have the capacity to be responsible 
(culpable) when we breach them.318 
The statement that a criminal "deserves to be punished" is ordinari-
ly a critical one. It is associated with overtones of emotional harsh-
ness and an unwillingness to tolerate human fallibility, to under-
stand difficult circumstances, and to empathize with someone's 
misfortune.319 Saying that someone deserves punishment seems, 
executing the incompetent: 
[A] contemporary justification for [this] prohibition ..• must be found in the 
dignity of the condemned. 
The prisoner has a right, even under imminent sentence of death, to be 
treated as a person, worthy of respect, not as an object of the state's effort to 
carry out its promises . • • • He should have the opportunity to decide • • • 
whether he will repent or go defiantly to his grave. A prisoner who does not 
understand the nature and purpose of the execution is not able to exercise the 
choices that remain to him. To execute him in this condition is an affront to 
his dignity as a person. 
Bonnie, supra note 30, at 88. 
314. See supra text accompanying notes 288-89 (rmding citizens owe each other com-
pliance with the law and the corresponding benefits which result from that compliance). 
315. MooRE, supra note 267, at 44-112. . 
316. Moore argues that the legal and moral guilt of individuals are contingently con-
nected. MWe could have laws that assign rights and liabilities in ways that have little 
resemblance to moral theory, and they would still be laws. As it happens, however, our 
laws do reflect underlying moral theories." Id. at 49. 
317. Only entities that are, in Moore"s terminology, Mpractical reasoners" can be eligible 
for criminal conviction. Id. at 61. A practical reasoner, among other things, is an entity 
for whom actions are interpretable as the outcome of valid practical syllogisms, i.e., for 
whom explanations are the appropriate means for discussing why they did something. Id. 
at 13-14. Moore argues that logically, in order for legal standards to be binding, the 
standards must address Mpractical reasoners capable of forming belief/desire sets around 
such laws, and then acting accordingly. If persons were not like this. . • • laws ••. 
would have no point." Id. at 61. 
318. Id. at 62. 
319. See Dolinko, supra note 264, at 1647-57 (lamenting MharshJy punitive attitudes" of 
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in a word, uncaring; but there is no logical contradiction between 
caring about someone and passing judgment on him,32D Kant,321 
Hegel,322 and Moore323 remind us that moral and legal 
denunciation implicitly affirm our belief in, and paramount concern 
for, someone's worthiness as a rational being and his interest in 
being respected as a moral agent. 
If capital punishment is moral and just, one cannot invoke an 
incompetent condemned prisoner's "medical interest"324 to oppose 
his execution; one cannot adduce any medical concern more impor-
tant than a prisoner's humanity,32S Even if execution is mistaken-
those who would not excuse criminals who have suffered social and economic privations). 
320. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (recognizing caring citizens should 
share a sense of sadness and empathy when they realize that a system that induces suffer-
ing is necessary). 
321. See supra notes 273-76 and accompanying text (discussing Kant's belief that pun-
ishment is not designed to serve society's ends but the individual's ends, namely 
recognition of and respect for the individual's humanity). 
322. See supra note 276 and accompanying text (continuing the discussion of punish-
ment as a reaffirmation of an individual's power of choice). 
323. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text. 
324. The phrase Mmedical interest" is taken from the APAfAMA Brief. See supra notes 
103-08 and accompanying text (requiring Mmedical interest" to justify giving involuntary 
psychiatric treatment to prisoners). 
325. What about life itself? Courts have consistently recognized that M[n]o right is held 
more sacred • • • than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person." Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (holding a court 
cannot order a plaintiff to submit to a surgical examination when the injuries form the 
basis of a negligence claim against defendant). The interest an individual or a state may 
have in the preservation and sanctity of life is outweighed by an individual's Mmuch 
stronger personal interest in directing the course of his life." In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 
1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985) (discussing how the right to self-determination ordinarily out-
weighs any competing State interest in decisions concerning refusal of medical treatment). 
The Supreme Court recently affirmed this interest (often termed the Mright to diej in 
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (recognizing the liberty 
interest of a competent person to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition, but requiring 
clear and convincing evidence of the vegetative patient's desire to withdraw treatment). 
Physicians would commit a legal as well as a moral error if their dedication and their 
traditional commitment to preserving life were to prevent them from recognizing that the 
ultimate justification for the use of their skills is in the service of higher values. Id. at 
267 (stating the corollary of the infonned consent doctrine, infonned refusal, that can 
subject a physician to tort liability for treating a patient against his will). MLiving will" 
legislation is evidence of the public's need for assurance that physicians will respect the 
fundamental and constitutional right to be left alone. See generally, MENTAL DISABILITY 
LAW, supra note 1, § 18.12 & Supp. 1991 (discussing the emergence of legislation that 
allows a competent patient to direct doctors to withold life-saving treatment without judi-
cial intervention). 
Although most Mright to die" cases and ethical discussions deal with the right to 
refuse treatment, the rationale for honoring someone's refusal of treatment (even if death 
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It26 viewed as a consequence of competency-restoring treatment, 
respect for the prisoner's humanity dictates that restoration to ratio-
nality is his paramount need.327 
If contractarian theories of punishment do provide a basis for 
asserting an incompetent condemnee's hypothetical consent to psy-
chiatric evaluation and treatment, 328 how may a psychiatrist re-
spond to an incompetent prisoner whose actual, pre-incompetence 
sentiments, behavior, or pronouncements indicate329 that he does 
might follow) should be the same as the rationale for honoring someone's acceptance of 
treatment (even if death might follow). See, e.g., id., supra note I, §§ 18.07-18.12 (sur-
veying cases, commentary and legislation on right to refuse treatment); Cruzan, 497 U.S. 
at 273 (recognizing the individual's liberty interest as the underlying rationale for deci-
sions regarding medical treatment). 
Bonnie makes a similar argument where a competent condemned prisoner requests 
that appeals cease and that his execution be carried out. Bonnie, supra note 239, at 1376-
80. Bonnie believes that society's interest in preserving the integrity of the law precludes 
a prisoner from refusing mandatory appeals that determine whether the prosecution proved 
"a legally sufficient predicate for a death sentence." Id. at 1377. The prisoner should 
consent, hpwever, before the procedures leading to his death sentence are reviewed. Id. at 
1378. Bonnie notes: 
A convicted prisoner does not become a pawn of the state. Even a prisoner 
sentenced to death retains a constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy - of 
belief, expression, and, to a limited extent, action • • • • 
As long as the prisoner is competent to make an informed and rational 
choice, the argument for respecting this choice would appear to be a powerful 
one. 
Id. at 1376 (citation omitted). 
326. Punishment is a consequence of violating the law. To ignore this invites moral 
confusion. See supra note 276 (quoting Hegel in support of the proposition that punish-
ment results from an individual's own volition), and notes 178-83 and accompanying text 
(finding that punishment is a result of a decision to commit the crime and not a direct or 
indirect result of competency-restoring treatment). 
327. A variation of the argument that psychiatrists' ethical issues are similar in cases 
involving the treatment of capital and non-capital offenders emphasizes this point: psy-
chiatrists have not argued that treatment should be withheld from incompetent, psychiat-
rically-hospitalized, non-capital convicts in order to prevent them from being able to return 
to prison. See supra notes 196-98; Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990) 
(treating with antipsychotic drugs did not violate the due process rights of a non-capital 
offender). Arguably, psychiatrists who withold treatment from non-capital criminals inter-
fere with the workings of the law and tacitly encourage criminals to avoid their legal 
responsibilities. This action would violate Proposition 5: a psychiatrist's obligation to treat 
should not be used to achieve particular social or political outcomes. See supra note 250 
and accompanying text. Propositions 3 and 4 leave no room to argue for different atti-
tudes toward the obligations of capital and non-capital inmates. See supra notes 230-31 
and accompanying text. Objectors to participation in evaluation and treatment of incompe-
tent condemnees are really objecting to either Proposition 3 or 4, unless they also ap-
prove psychiatric assistance in non-capital prisoners' efforts to escape imprisonment by 
refusing psychiatric treatment. 
328. See supra notes 241-60 and accompanying text. 
329. The condemned prisoner, for example, might have expressed an intense desire ei-
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not want treatment? Ordinarily, past explicit acts or utterances 
provide proof of the sorts of treatment an incompetent patient 
would have consented to were he still competent. 330 Hypothetical 
consent's effect on the actual refusal of treatment has two parts. 
First, to be meaningful in general, hypothetical consent to 
undergo punishment must outweigh the actual desire to escape 
it. 331 If a person, justly convicted of a capital crime, says, "1 
know that 1 gave my hypothetical consent to being executed under 
these circumstances, but I've changed my mind,,,332 we would 
likely respond, "We're sorry, but you already promised."333 Sup-
pose the prisoner says, "1 know 1 gave my hypothetical consent, 
but in spite of that, 1 don't - in actuality - wish to be pun-
ished." We would explain how hypothetical consent theory, espe-
cially in this circumstance, establishes a general obligation to un-
dergo punishment. The obligation stems from a rational pre-convic-
tion wish that logically overrides the post-conviction wish to avoid 
punishment. More precisely, hypothetical consent theory delimits 
what wishes can be honored or have weight in determining how 
we treat others and how others treat US.334 
ther for having his life spared if at all possible or for having his execution delayed as 
long as possible (sentiments consistent with a preference 10 remain psychotic); or he 
might have been intensely involved in filing of legal motions 10 prevent execution; or he 
may have stated, "If I go crazy, don't let me get treated - I want 10 live as long as 
possible." 
330. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (upholding the state's requirement of clear and convinc-. 
ing evidence to establish that an accident victim would not wish 10 live in a vegetative 
state before terminating her hydration and nutrition). 
331. Murphy comments, 
The test for an illegitimate interference with freedom cannot • • • be that the 
interference thwarts the particular empirical wishes or desires that a citizen 
might have at the moment. (If this were so, we could never punish at all, for 
what criminal wants 10 be punished? • • • ) The test, rather, must be this: a 
law's interference with freedom is justified (or, if you prefer, is not a genuine 
interference with freedom), even if it thwarts desires, so long as it does not 
thwart the rational will of any citizen • • • • Consent is required for justice, 
but it is hypothetical rational consent - a consent 10 be modeled in social 
contract terms. 
Does !Cant Have a Theory?, supra note 258, at 528. 
332. I am indebted 10 Iames C. Ballenger, M.D., for this succinct formulation of this 
problem. 
333. See supra notes 241-59 and accompanying text. 
334. Does Kant Have a Theory?, supra note 258, at 528. Kant characterizes justice as 
.. the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one person can be united with 
the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom." Kant, supra note 245, 
at 34. The purpose of the law, in other words, is 10 insure that one's choices (expressed 
in actions) can be reconciled with the choices of others. 
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Second, in certain situations medical treatment without explicit 
consent is jUStified.33S In ordinary medical practice, obtaining ex-
plicit consent is more the exception than the rule. When we go to 
a doctor's office with a complaint, the doctor ordinarily neither 
asks for our consent to be evaluated or \ examined, nor is he likely 
to obtain our formal, explicit consent for the treatment he pre-
scribes. We tacitly accept evaluation and treatment by going to the 
doctor and filling the prescription.336 In emergency circumstances, 
physicians also ethically evaluate and treat both unconscious pa-
tients, who cannot consent, and delirious patients who reject evalu-
ation and treatment, yelling "no, no," on the grounds that most 
reasonable people would want such care if they were conscious 
and found themselves in such circumstances.337 Competent pa-
tients also may waive their right to be informed and consulted 
about treatment by informing their physician, "I've sought your 
help believing that you're the doctor and know what's best for me; 
give me whatever treatment will benefit me ... 338 
Again assuming that the criminal justice system and capital 
punishment are morally justified and fair,339 hypothetical rational 
consent provides the grounds for evaluation and treatment of the 
incompetent prisoner. The prisoner's consent is implied because he 
accepts the benefits of civil society and because he rationally 
would have consented in an antecedent position of choice. The 
condemnee has waived the right to avoid suffering in exchange for 
the benefits of civil society.340 
Evaluations of execution competency should be conceptualized 
as attempts to determine whether a prisoner needs treatment.341 
Ordinarily, people consult a physician because they believe they 
335. HARRy J. GRAYSON, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS, §§ 5-1 to 5-
49 (1971) (While explicit consent is desired, most treatment is based on implied consent 
- actions and behaviors that demonstrate consent for Ireatment. Most commonly, bases 
for implied consent are emergency care and the treatment a patient receives when he 
submits to a physician for diagnoses and care.). See also THOMAS GU1HElL & PAUL S. 
APPELBAUM, HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHlA1RY AND TIlE LAw 159-162 (2d ed. 1982). 
336. See MARc FRANKLIN, TORT LAw AND ALTERNATIVES 608-9 (2d ed. 1979) (dis-
cussing implied consent theory). 
337. See GRAYSON, supra note 335, at §§ 5-1 to 5-49. 
338. Id. at 165. 
339. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (Propositions I-S). 
340. See supra notes 241-58 and accompanying text. 
341. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text (Inferring that treatment is needed 
when a prisoner is incompetent for execution). 
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have a problem the physician can somehow remedy. Patients have 
little reason to seek a doctor's diagnosis absent a belief in the 
possibility of gaining relief or some other form of help with their 
problems.342 Justifying evaluation of the incompetent condemned 
on the condition that treatment is needed places evaluation in its 
typical context within medical practice. Regarding evaluation as 
subsidiary to treatment not only reinforces customary roles and atti-
tudes in medical practice,343 it also addresses the moral problems 
associated with the position that evaluation of the condemned is 
ethically permissible while treatment to restore competency is 
not344 
First, those who draw an ethical distinction between evaluation 
and treatment point out that evaluation is potentially life-sav-
ing.34S But attention to this outcome alone dictates that psychia-
trists adjust their testimony to maximize the possibility that a court 
would rule that the prisoner is incompetent 346 However, such a 
342. MRemedies" for medical problems include providing emotional support for patients 
suffering incurable diseases, reassuring patients that nothing serious is wrong, and inform-
ing patients that the illness will get better on its own. Information, even if it does not 
change treatment (e.g., being told that one has an untreatable, incurable disease), allows 
for rational planning of one's life, and thus is a remedy for the very important problem 
of medical uncertainty. See David A. Asch et al., Knowing for the Sake of Knowing: 71ze 
Value of Prognostic Infonnation, 10 MEDICAL DECISION MAKINo 47, 48 (1990) (discuss-
ing the role of prognostic tests and how these tests allow patients to view themselves dif-
ferently, even if the tests do not directly alter the course of medical treatment). 
For a succinct discussion of the essence of the doctor-patient encounter, see George 
L. Engel, The Clinical Application of the Biopsychosocial Model, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
535, 535-36 (1980) (recognizing doctor-patient relationships as human encounters character-
ized by assigned roles and expectations). 
343. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (asserting the distinction between 
treatment and evaluation of condemned prisoners is that an evaluating Mprofessional" does 
not act as a physician and therefore, is not bound by a physician's ethical standards) •. 
344. See, e.g., supra note 183 and accompanying text (noting the conflict that exists 
between a physician's duty to Mpreserve life" and the duty to tell the truth in court.). 
345. See, e.g., Salguero, supra note 58, at 177 (asserting evaluation can only preserve 
an inmate's life because the evaluation affIrms the sentence, changing nothing, or delays 
the sentence, thereby saving the inmate's life). Competency evaluations would have this 
life-saving potential, especially if a subsequent court determination of incompetence were 
to lead to commutation of a death sentence. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying 
text (discussing state statutes that either automatically commute a death sentence to life 
imprisonment, or suspend the sentence, based on a fmding that the inmate is incompetent, 
as well as recommendations contained in the APA/AMA Brief, supra note 38, at 20). 
346. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. The physician is more likely to offer 
false testimony that the prisoner is incompetent if he or she believes a determination of 
competence to be Mtantamount to imposing a ••• death sentence." Radelet & Barnard, 
supra note 23, at 49 (discussing the implications of an initial assessment of incompetence 
and a subsequent assessment of competence). See also supra notes 129-38 and accompa-
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strategy, even if not deemed perjury, removes any pretense of 
scientific accuracy that the psychiatrist might claim. The 
psychiatrist's testimony would be relatively valueless to the fact-
finder.347 
Second, placing evaluation in its usual relationship to treatment 
obviates the need for the counter-intuitive argument that a psychia-
trist who is evaluating a potentially-incompetent prisoner is not 
acting as a physician but as a "forensicist;" in this alternate role 
the duty to do no harm is suspended.348 Evaluation and treatment 
offer potential benefits to prisoners, even if punishment follows 
efficacious treatment. This position is counter-intuitive349 only un-
til one recognizes that all benefits are context-specific. Those ac-
cused or convicted of crimes fmd themselves in a peculiar context 
with what would otherwise be peculiar desires.3so Those desires 
are governed by what we would want if we viewed possible life 
situations from an antecedent position of choice. From an anteced-
ent position of choice, all of us rationally would decide to accept 
punishment should we become criminals ourselves.3S1 We would 
know that if we were mentally impaired and accused or convicted 
of a crime, the availability of psychiatric competency evaluations 
and treatment to restore competency would fulfill our decision to -
be punished. Psychiatric participation thus would be a desirable 
feature of a fair legal system.352 The integrity of the legal sys-
tem, and our hypothetical, rational desires, would be compromised 
unless psychiatrists were constrained to conduct objective evalua-
tions, to testify truthfully, and to help us fulfill our rationally-deter-
mined obligations and. promises. We would see the opportunity for 
having courts know our mental status to be a benefit that furthered 
our wish in attaining just results; and we rationally would request a 
nying text (declaring competency detenninations are tantamount to participation in execu-
tion because these detenninations render an inmate fit for punishment). 
347. See supra note 153 (asserting professionals who evaluate in the adversary system 
act as consultants whose function it is to apply expertise in the legal context). 
348. Physicians can MforegoO primary adherence to the principles of beneficence and 
nonmaleficence when they act as other than physicians." Appelbaum's Parable, supra note 
17, at 252. See also supra note 153 and accompanying text (asserting a lower ethical 
standard for evaluating physicians who act as consultants). 
349. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (proposing that a person's view of 
punishment depends on whether he is facing it). 
351. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
352. See supra notes 347-48. 
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psychiatrist's help in presenting evidence about our mental status. 
We would utilize appropriate psychiatric treatment in furtherance of 
our paramount desire to have our humanity respected. 
These are general justifications of competency evaluation and 
restoration. They also justify psychiatric participation in non-capital 
contexts and in situations where punishment is not imminent Ap-
plying the justifications in all contexts rebuts the argument that 
participation in execution competency proceedings violates the 
physician'S duty to avoid harm.3S3 As Professor Bonnie explains: 
It is sometimes argued that the principle of 
nonmaleficence . . . is fundamentally contradicted by any 
professional interaction with a client that might elicit infor-
mation or opinion that could be used to support a death 
sentence. However, this same premise could be deployed 
against professional participation in any criminal case, 
when information elicited during the evaluation . . . could 
be used to support a criminal conviction and imprison-
ment . . .. [1]t would seem that clinical participation in 
capital cases is, in principle, no more (or less) problematic 
than forensic participation in any criminal case.3S4 
The problem is solved if we recognize that, for an accused or 
convicted individual, exposing the truth is a hypothetically, ratio-
nally desired benefit In the context of being tried, sentenced, or 
punished, this benefit outweighs many others, including the "bene-
fit" of avoiding the "harm" of being punished. Truthful psychiatric 
input into the determination of the various competencies associated 
with trials, sentencing, and administration of punishmenfss helps 
assure that the rationality and humanity of the accused or convicted 
individual is respected.3S6 Insofar as an individual's humanity is 
353. See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text. 
354. Bonnie, supra note 3D, at 75-76 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Mit would 
seem difficult to sustain the argument • • • that forensic testimony that might lead to 
execution offends the tenet of nonmaleficence even though the presentation of testimony 
that might lead to profoundly debilitating imprisonment does not." ld. at 76. Cf. 
Appelbaum's position, supra notes ISS, 174 (asserting that the immediacy and degree of 
hann facing the prisoner heighten the ethical concerns associated with execution compe-
tency evaluations). 
355. Such competencies include competency to stand trial, to waive counsel and to pro-
ceed without assistance of counsel, to plead guilty, to waive appeals, etc. These issues 
implicitly concern the personhood of an accused or convicted individual at a variety of 
points in criminal proceedings. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, Standards 7-5.1 to 
7-5.4 and cmt. 
356. See supra notes 238-59, 273-76 and accompanying text (asserting that contracts 
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of paramount interest to him, a psychiatrist is bound to respect that 
interest above all others.3S7 A psychiatrist thus fulfills his physi-
cianly duty to avoid hann by conducting honest and objective 
forensic evaluations, even when the infonnation obtained supports 
criminal conviction or punishment 
This section concludes with a reconsideration of the four sce-
narios discussed in Section m.358 The four hypothetical situations 
will be examined from the perspective that punishment is justified 
by hypothetical rational consent and by society's paramount interest 
in vindicating its citizens' autonomy and humanity - the thesis of 
this article. 
In the first scenario an incompetent condemned prisoner, prior 
to becoming incompetent, expressed a wish to be evaluated and 
treated to restore his competency so as to allow him to be execut-
ed.359 His expressed consent provides a substantial source of 
emotional support for those involved in his care.360 Given his sta-
tus as a convicted prisoner, the treatment's potential for helping 
him regain his legal personhood and his moral status as a re-
sponsibility-fulfilling human being provide the ethical justification 
for psychiatric care.361 
The second scenario describes an inmate who, while serving a 
life sentence in a nasty prison, had deteriorated mentally. 362 The 
inmate was transferred to a relatively nice psychiatric hospital for 
care; he then recovered, and faced being returned to prison.363 
The evaluation and treatment of this prisoner raise many of the 
result from individuals' rational free choices; therefore, punishment based on these choices 
affinns the rationality of the individual). See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 19, at 
266 (declaring that competency tests must focus on rational choices among alternatives 
when the tests are perfonned on a person who has pled guilty). 
357. Professor Bonnie points out that Mthe paramount ethical obligation in the forensic 
setting is objectivity. This is not to say, however, that the principle of nonmaleficence is 
irrelevant, only that it is subsidiary to the search for" truth." Bonnie, supra note 30, at 76, 
n.25 (citation omitted). This is the case only because not having the truth available would 
be a greater hann to the humanity of an accused or convicted individual than would his 
receiving just punishment. 
358. See supra notes 191-94, 211-17 and accompanying text. 
359. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Bonnie's 
concept of a Mliving will" to permit psychiatric treatment). 
360. See Radelet & Barnard, supra note 23, at 301-05 (noting the conflict faced by 
professionals requested to treat mentally incompetent death row prisoners). 
361. See supra notes 269-76 and accompanying text. 
362. See supra part m.c. 
363. See id. 
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same ethical problems raised by assessment and treatment of pris-
oners for execution competency.364 Yet psychiatrists perform such 
services for non-capital inmates without generating extensive ethical 
debate.36S This article's contractarian argument suggests that the 
issues for capital and non-capital inmates are similar: in both cases, 
assessment or treatment allows the prisoner to receive punishment 
and vindicates the prisoner's humanity.366 
A similar argument justifies evaluation and treatment by physi-
cians confronting the third scenario.367 In this situation, the physi-
cian must decide whether to administer life-saving medical treat-
ment to a condemned inmate whose execution is imminent. 368 
Here, the obligation to "preserve life" seems futile, given that a 
potentially more painful and grisly death looms in the near future. 
Most physicians would "instinctively" treat the prisoner 
anyway.369 Their instinct would serve the ailing prisoner well, for 
it would offer him the opportunity to fulfill an obligation of para-
mount importance - the obligation to accept punishment. 370 
The last scenario involved the ethics of administering a drug 
that would induce a pleasant, permanent, and competency-de-
stroying psychosis.371 This drug would save a condemned 
prisoner's life but would destroy his rationality.372 Even if he de-
sired such treatment, respect for the prisoner's personhood and 
humanity would preclude its administration.373 The psychiatrist 
364. See supra notes 213-14 (mcluding detennination of the inmate's fitness for pun-
ishment, allowing the punishment to proceed, and operation as "an instnnnent of punish-
ment"). 
365. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. 
366. See supra notes 213-14 (listing various reasons why psychiatrists should face the 
same ethical dilemmas regardless of whether the prisoner is facing the death penalty or a 
non-capital sentence). 
367. See supra part m.c. 
368. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
369. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (declaring that the physician who re-
fused to treat in this situation would be reproached). 
370. See supra notes 242-59 (asserting citizens bargain with society to receive benefits 
and accept the corresponding responsibilities of punishment as the cost of those benefits). 
371. See supra part m.c. 
372. This imaginary drug scenario is ethically distinct from the use of real medications 
to induce death in competent individuals who are suffering excruciating, terminal illnesses. 
While this article does not deal with the ethics or merits of euthanasia, it is important to 
consider the argument that euthanasia can, in situations where the natural course of death 
is degrading or gruesome, convey the utmost respect for someone's humanity. See gener-
ally JOHN LAnD, EnnCAL IsSUES RELATING TO LIFE AND DEAlH (1979) (discussing the" 
ethics of euthanasia and individual autonomy). 
373. This argument also shows why treatment with such a drug should not be consid-
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must honor those ethically-prior wishes that are consistent with the 
prisoner's hypothetical, rational consent to just punishment374 
VI. CONCLUSION: THEORY AND REALITY 
If capital punishment is just and is administered fairly,375 
psychiatrists ethically may both evaluate condemned prisoners' 
competency to be executed and treat incompetent condemnees in an 
effort to restore their rationality. This conclusion avoids the incon-
sistencies in published arguments which oppose psychiatric partici-
pation while remaining silent on the morality of capital punishment 
as administered in the United States. Anyone who rejects this 
article's conclusions must either reject its assumptions about capital 
punishment or object to some aspect of its argument concerning 
the morality of punishment As I have noted above, the assump-
tions are entirely consistent with published arguments opposing 
psychiatric participation in execution competency proceedings. For 
example, no one has suggested that organized psychiatry should 
oppose participation because the legal system is unfair or because 
capital punishment is immoral. However, there may be valid 
grounds for disagreeing with at least some of these assump-
tions.376 
In the course of defending a contractarian theory of punish-
ment, this article tried to anticipate some of the answerable objec-
ered as an acceptable substitute for capital punishment (assuming capital punishment is 
just) or life imprisonment. Such treatment is. we have stipulated, not cruel and is even 
pleasant. It might even render individuals forever docile and hanuless. But this "chemical 
lobotomy" would undoubtedly vitiate the prisoner's humanity, which is something that just 
punishment must never do. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (msisting that 
respect for humanity is a condition for imposing punishment). 
374. See supra notes 241-67 and accompanying text. 
375. ,This phrase is intended as a brief encapsulation of Propositions 1-5. See supra 
notes 228-32 and accompanying text. 
376. Although some might disagree with Proposition 1, I would argue that such views 
either lack coherence or misunderstand punishment. Menninger seems to be guilty of the 
latter type of error, which arises in part from a conflation of attitudes and justifications. 
"Punishment is in part an attitude, a philosophy. It is the deliberate infliction of pain in 
addition to or in lieu of penalty." MENNINGER. supra note 224, at 203. Of course, some 
have praised this conflation. See supra note 264. Expressed views or feelings about crimi-
nals that may be morally unsavory and· may taint legal proceedings do not imply that 
punishment is unjustified. In fact, Menninger endorses Platonic and Kantian justifications 
for retaliatory or retributive punishments. MENNINGER. supra note 224, at 205-06. Howev-
er, he prefers to call these punishments "penalties" in order to avoid the vindictive conno-
tations. "Penalties should be greater and surer and quicker in coming. I favor stricter 
penalties for many offenses, and more swift and certain assessment of them." Id. at 202. 
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tions to the theory. I believe that contractarian arguments support 
the view that most Americans should be presumed accountable for 
their crimes because they are obligated by the dictates of the im-
perfect but reasonably fair legal system under which they live. 
Citizens can be punished because they benefit from others' obedi-
ence, from others' expectations that obedience will be reciprocated, 
and from the social arrangements made possible by these expecta-
tions. The hypothetical, rational choice between citizens' current 
situations and those that they would experience in a "state of na-
ture" is an obvious choice. Most citizens, therefore, can be pre-
sumed to be obligated by that choice. 
But there is a substantial fraction of citizens - .e.g., many 
residents of inner cities - whose lives are not much different from 
a Hobbesian "state of Warre," and who benefit little from current 
social arrangements; these groups account for a disproportionate 
number of those convicted of serious crimes.377 A substantial 
number of citizens may legitimately claim that their "bargain with 
the Laws" to undergo punishment for committing a crime is nulli-
fied when their fellow citizens fail to provide the reciprocal bene-
fits of a civil society. They may also point to the racial and class 
biases that characterize criminal sentencing, especially in the appli-
cation of the death penalty,378 as reasons to feel less-than-obliged 
by court decisions. 
An equally important problem in the practical application of 
contractarian theories of punishment is that a considerable fraction 
of incarcerated individuals suffer from genetic and environmental 
influences which limit their ability to plan and act responsibly.379 
In this regard, death row inmates are especially stigmatized. Many 
of them, when examined, are found to suffer from brain damage 
377. '"The [Justice] [D]epartment's Bureau of Justice Statistics said that as of Dec. 31, 
1990, 40% of the prisoners awaiting death penalties were black. The 1990 Census found 
that the U.S. population is 12.1% black." AsSOCIATED PREss, supra note 53, at AS. The 
Supreme Court ruled that statistical evidence demonstrating mcial discrimination in Georgia 
prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty and juries' decisions to impose it does 
not render an individual's execution unconstitutional unless that individual shows Mthat the 
decisionmaker in IUs case acted with discriminatory purpose." McCIesky v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 292, 313 (1987), afftJ, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991) (denying the second habeas cor-
pus petition). 
378. See, e.g., AsSOCIATED PREss, supra note 53. 
379. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. See generally JAMES Q. Wn..sON & 
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE, 69-285 (1985) (providing an in-
depth discussion of both environmental influences such as schools and families and genet-
ic factors such as gender, age, intelligence, personality and psychopathology). 
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and severe neuropsychiatric disorders; most of them had appallingly 
traumatic childhoods.380 
These two objections - unequal class and racial distribution of 
punishment, and punishment of persons unable to act responsibly 
- actually strengthen the case for a contractarian approach to 
justify punishment. Kant's theory particularly reinforces the 
contractarian model. 381 His vision of roughly equal, intelligent, 
reflective, and responsible individuals who create a system of laws 
for their mutual benefiesz establishes a frame of reference from 
which to judge the fairness of our society. The Kantian "Kingdom 
of Ends" appears so different from the actual character of society 
that it seems inapplicable to many real-life criminals, especially 
those who find their way to death row. Kant's theory tells us the 
source of our urge to protest the punishment of those who suffer 
from disabilities or grossly unjust disadvantages in an imperfect 
society. Kant argues that just punishment rests on reciprocal agree-
ments among equals, but often the conditions of reciprocity are not 
met in our society, partiCUlarly when the criminal justice system 
tolerates erratic arrest patterns or sentencing practices that favor 
certain racial or socioeconomic groups. 
To the extent that a condemned inmate has suffered unfair 
social disadvantages or has been treated unfairly in the capital 
sentencing process, it should be hard to regard the inmate as hav-
ing made a rational choice to be executed. Even those psychiatrists 
who find the death penalty morally acceptable should struggle with 
the idea that the inmate's humanity and rationality are honored by 
holding him responsible. Participation in execution competency pro-
ceedings may thus be deemed unethical because the death penalty 
is wrong or because the legal system is unfair to those whom it 
wishes to execute. But this is not an argument that psychiatric 
participation is immoral per se, but an argument that psychiatrists 
should refuse to participate because the criminal justice system's 
use of capital punishment itself is offensive. 
If my thesis is correct organized psychiatry is left with two 
coherent alternatives. First, it could officially oppose participation 
in execution competency proceedings based on an opposition to the 
380. See, e.g., Characteristics, supra note SS, at 840 (discussing the histories of IS 
death row inmates). 
381. See RETRIBUTION, supra note 256, at 79-80. 
382. Id. 
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death penalty.383 Second, organized psychiatry could support ef-
forts by mental health professionals to develop appropriate evalu-
ation procedures and standards of thoroughness for competency 
evaluations. It could also suggest limits and restrictions on forensic 
testimony.384 Clear and authoritative legal opinions38S would 
greatly assist psychiatrists by defining execution competence more 
precisely, specifying proper procedures when the issue of incompe-
tence is raised, insuring that judicial procedures will maintain and 
distinguish the psychiatrist's role vis-a-vis those of judicial and 
executive authorities,386 and clarifying how the treatment of the 
383. An official ban on evaluation and treatment has been proposed by Ewing, supra 
note 134, at 185. He does not suggest that capital punishment is wrong, but rather that 
evaluation and treatment have Mthe practical effect of authorizing • • • [an] execution[,]" 
id. at 182, or MresuIt[mg] in the death of an otherwise healthy human being." ld. at 184. 
Further, Ewing feels that traditional clinical ethics preclude mental health professionals' 
participation in capital sentencing proceedings. As a result, he proposes an official ban on 
these activities. See Charles P. Ewing, Psychologists and Psychiatrists in Capital Sentenc-
ing Proceedings: Experts or Executioners, 8 Soc. ACTION & L. 67, 70 (1982). Donald H. 
Wallace also proposes an official ban Mbased on the hea1ing ethic of the mental health 
professions," Wallace, supra note 131, at 278, but suggests an alternative posture, in 
which Mthe ethical mental health professional could ••• refuse to provide ••• [a compe-
tency] assessment if the prisoner is not provided the adversary assistance of a mental 
health professional." ld. at 279. Foot argues that, if capital punishment is immoral, Mthen 
something will follow for anyone who has anything to do with it • • • • A special duty 
will also belong to those actually asked to participate in the business • • • • Psychiatrists 
are asked to make significant contributions to legal proceedings involving the death penal-
ty, and this is the reason that they, as psychiatrists, have a special obligation to consider 
the ethics of capital punishment." Foot, supra note 146, at 214. 
384. For examples of proposed procedures and standards for evaluation of execution 
competency, see Heilbrun & McClaren, supra note 29; Iowa Comment, supra note 29, at 
1480; Radelet and Bamard, supra note 23, at 46-48. For a discussion of the clinical, 
ethical, and legal pitfalls associated with efforts to assess execution incompetence, see 
Ward, supra note 23, at 79-87. 
385. Data from a national survey showed that, 
prior to the Ford decision, few states had even formally addressed the issue of 
competency for execution; and that there is significant ignorance at the attorney 
general level of what actually happens when inmates raise the issue of incom-
petency •••• 
The major reason for the lack of procedural specificity appears to be 
lack of experience with the problem • • • • [O]nJy four states have had (at the 
time of my survey [1987]) any cases • • • • 
Robert D. Miller, Evaluation of and Treatment to Competency to Be Executed: A National 
Survey and an Analysis, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 67, 71 (1988). The problem perists. 
See Heilbrun et al., supra note 40, at 599 (discussing ambiguity and inconsistency in 
statutory defmitions of execution incompetence). 
386. See Due Process and Insanity, supra note 29, at 108-09 (citations omitted). 
A judicial inquiry is the best alternative for the initial hearing [concerning a 
prisoner's execution competence] •••• [p]sYchiatrists can analyze, if not agree 
upon, factual medical aspects of the prisoner's competency, [but] they should 
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incompetent condemned can be legally authorized.387 
Although it is an issue that will personally and directly concern 
very few individuals, the question of whether psychiatrists should 
evaluate or restore the competency of the condemned touches all of 
us. Answering the question leads us to examine the foundations of 
political obligation, the justification of punishment, the ends of 
medical practice and the implications of respect for our fellow 
human beings' autonomy, rationality, and responsibility. Answering 
the question also forces us to examine both the appearance and the 
moral status of psychiatrists' social role as it is increasingly affect-
ed by judicial decisions.388 
Id. 
If the death penalty is just, psychiatrists will not be ethically 
not be expected to apply the law and arrive at fonnal legal conclusions regard-
ing the prisoner's rights . . . • [R]esponsibility for the fmal decision with re-
spect to the legal question [sh]ould be placed in the hands of a judge. 
387. If capital punishment is just, then psychiatrists may morally assume that the crimi-
nal has implicitly requested the psychiatric care necessary to effect his choice to be pun-
ished for his crime. Criminals hypothetically request such care because the evaluation is 
the means for detennining whether the criminal needs care that would allow him to 
achieve his wishes. However, psychiatrists should not actually evaluate or treat incompe-
tent persons without fIrSt obtaining proper judicial authorization. The point is, in thinking 
about how to deal with the criminal's incompetence. both the legal system and psychia-
trists may, with some justification, assume that the incompetent criminal's paramount 
desire is to have his humanity vindicated. This entails engaging in those activities that 
will enable him to be punished. 
Various authors have disagreed as to what fmdings the American legal system, which 
does not recognize a Mright to be punished," actually would require to permit involuntary 
treatment of someone adjudicated incompetent for execution. Compare G. Linn Evans, 
Perry v. Louisiana: Can a State Treat an Incompetent Prisoner to Ready Him for execu-
tion?, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 249, 258 (1991) (arguing that the Louisi-
ana court order forcing Perry's treatment violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Washing-
ton v. Harper. MFrom Harper, the state must establish both a police power and parens 
patriae interest in forcibly administering psychotropic drugs to an incompetent inmate," 
but there can be Mno parens patriae justification fOI facilitating an incompetent prisoner's 
death.") with Bonnie, supra note 30, at 85 (M[D]oes the incompetent prisoner have a right 
to refuse treatment? I doubt it. If presented with this question, the courts would probably 
hold that the state has a compelling interest in carrying out its lawful sentences that over-
rides the prisoner's interests in bodily privacy and self-determination.). For a summary of 
pre-Ford case law that might bear on these issues, see Ward, supra note 23, at 95-97. 
For additional discussion of Msuggested procedures." see Miller, supra note 385, at 
80-82 (discussing different ways to deal with execution competency such as choosing 
Mdeath qualified" evaluating clinicians. establishing a Mconsclentious objector" status for 
clinicians and automatically changing a death sentence to life imprisonment upon a fmding 
of competency to be executed). 
388. Cj. Heilbrun et al., supra note 40, at 596 ~Even for clinicians who will never be 
involved with inmates under death sentence, the competency issue is useful as a heuristic 
device with which to explore issues such as trust and beneficence.}. 
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compromised when they perform competency evaluations of, or 
give competency-restoring treatment to, death row inmates. Some 
psychiatrists will not be swayed by this argument, especially those 
who profoundly dislike being associated with the execution compe-
tency process. However, their sentiment really expresses moral 
reservations about capital punishment's place in the modem crimi-
nal justice system, not a reasoned assessment of psychiatric partici-
pation itself. 
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